The impact of Allied Military Government (AMGOT) on the population of Sicily July 1943 - February 1944: A case study of the towns of Catania and Caltagirone in the Province of Catania. by Dorothy Ellen Mary, Jones
  Swansea University E-Theses                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
   
The impact of Allied Military Government (AMGOT) on the
population of Sicily July 1943 - February 1944: A case study of the
towns of Catania and Caltagirone in the Province of Catania.
   
Jones, Dorothy Ellen Mary
   
 
 
 
 How to cite:                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
  
Jones, Dorothy Ellen Mary (2008)  The impact of Allied Military Government (AMGOT) on the population of Sicily July
1943 - February 1944: A case study of the towns of Catania and Caltagirone in the Province of Catania..  thesis,
Swansea University.
http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa42245
 
 
 
 Use policy:                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
  
This item is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms
of the repository licence: copies of full text items may be used or reproduced in any format or medium, without prior
permission for personal research or study, educational or non-commercial purposes only. The copyright for any work
remains with the original author unless otherwise specified. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium
without the formal permission of the copyright holder. Permission for multiple reproductions should be obtained from
the original author.
 
Authors are personally responsible for adhering to copyright and publisher restrictions when uploading content to the
repository.
 
Please link to the metadata record in the Swansea University repository, Cronfa (link given in the citation reference
above.)
 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/library/researchsupport/ris-support/
 THE IMPACT OF ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT (AMGOT) ON 
THE POPULATION OF SICILY JULY 1943 - FEBRUARY 1944:
A CASE STUDY OF THE TOWNS OF CATANIA AND CALTAGIRONE 
IN THE PROVINCE OF CATANIA
Dorothy Ellen Mary Jones
Submitted to the University of Wales in fulfilment 
of the requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
Swansea University 
2008
ProQuest Number: 10797953
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10797953
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
LIBRARY
THESIS SUMMARY
Candidate's Surname/Family name .... Jones 
Candidate's Forenames .... Dorothy Ellen Mary 
Candidate for the Degree of .... PhD
Full title of thesis ___ THE IMPACT OF ALLIED MILITARY
GOVERNMENT (AMGOT) ON THE POPULATION OF SICILY JULY 1943- 
FEBRUARY 1944; A CASE STUDY OF THE TOWNS OF CATANIA AND 
CALTAGIRONE IN THE PROVINCE OF CATANIA
The main objective of this thesis is to describe the 
problems and difficulties of an island population, which 
had suffered from extreme shortages of food and other 
basic necessities for a number of years and also endured 
months of intense aerial bombardment before being invaded 
by an Allied army which became engaged in fierce combat 
with the defending forces. The conquest of the island was 
followed by the establishment of the first Allied 
Military Government of an enemy territory in Europe in 
World War II. This government, a joint UK/US enterprise, 
also had its problems, caused not only by the war-torn 
conditions in Catania but by its inefficient and inept 
military headquarters in Algiers.
The Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs) responsible for the 
administration had a duel task: to support the combat
forces by ensuring roads were cleared for the passage of 
troops and to obtain supplies for them, and to keep law 
and order and relieve distress among the civilian 
population, the needs of the military always taking 
priority. The thesis aims to show the tenacious way in 
which the CAOs, in very restricted numbers, coped with 
acute shortages of food and other necessities, which 
Allied propaganda had promised the islanders, while the 
military forces, with only a few exceptions, were most 
unhelpful.
Suggested Layout of Declaration/Statements page
DECLARATION
This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is 
not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.
Signed............   ^ ...................................... (candidate)
Date Tip.  2L&7P&
STATEMENT 1
_ “.3 thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise 
r_=:ed. Where correction services have been used, the extent and nature of 
"  s correction is clearly marked in a footnote(s).
2zr.sr sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A 
i  ocgraphy is appended.
u (candidate)
(If a Lc r O S?
STATEMENT 2
.-erecy give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for 
prcicccpying and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be 
~=35 available to outside organisations.
—  . . . . . . . .............................. (candidate)
{ i f  'H . ^
Zarzzaies on whose behalf a bar on access has been approved by the 
,  - . a's.r/ (see Note 7), should use the following version of Statement 2:
‘ 5'ebv give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for 
3 - " 5  copying and for inter-library loans after expiry of a bar on access 
approved by the Swansea University.
Signed 
Date ...
(candidate)
Procedure for Submission (Research Degrees) -  Version 1.3 -  September 2008
Contents
Chapter 1. 
Section 1.
Section 2.
Section 3.
Section 4.
Chapter 2. 
Section 1. 
Section 2. 
Section 3.
Chapter 3. 
Section 1.
Section 2. 
Section 3. 
Section 4. 
Section 5.
Chapter 4. 
Section 1. 
Section 2. 
Section 3. 
Section 4. 
Section 5. 
Section 6.
Allied Experiences of Military Government 
before the occupation of Sicily, pp.1-12. 
Establishing the Machinery for Military 
Government, pp.13-18.
Britain and the United States in active 
partnership, pp.19-26.
Allied Force Headquarters Algiers, pp.27-34.
Planning the invasion of Sicily, pp.35-40. 
Planning AMGOT in Sicily, pp.41-48.
The Selection and Training of CAOs, pp.49-69.
Invasion of Pantelleria and Establishment of 
The First Allied Military Government, pp.70-73 
The Island's Defences, pp.74-82.
The Landings in Sicily, pp.83-92.
The Establishment of AMGOT in Sicily, pp.93-99 
Conditions in the Island, pp.100-107.
Introduction to Chapters 4 and 5, pp.108-114.
The Arrival of AMGOT in Catania, pp.115-121. 
The Public Safety Division, pp.121-127.
The Legal Division, pp.127-130.
The Public Health Division, pp. 130-139.
The Finance Division, pp. 139-145.
The Enemy and Allied Property Division, 
pp.145-152.
i
Section 7.
Section 8.
Section 9.
Section 10.
Section 11.
Section 12. 
Section 13.
Chapter 5. 
Section 1. 
Section 2. 
Section 3.
Section 4. 
Section 5.
Section 6.
Section 7.
Chapter 6. 
Conclusion.
AMGOT Measures to protect the Cultural Heritage 
of Sicily, pp.153-155.
The Media in Catania during AMGOT 
Administration, pp.156-159.
AMGOT's Efforts to re-establish Education 
Provision, pp.159-166.
The Removal of Fascists under AMGOT 
Administration, pp.167-170.
The Re-emergence of Separatism and other 
Political Parties, pp.170-174.
The Slow Return to Normality, pp.175-177.
The Civilian Supply and Resources Division, 
pp.177-190.
War comes to Caltagirone, pp.191-195.
The Arrival of AMGOT in Caltagirone, pp.195-202. 
The Food Situation and the Ammassi in 
Caltagirone, pp.202-213.
The Reorganisation of the Communes, pp.213-220. 
Political Activity and Defascistisation in 
Caltagirone District, pp.220-224.
A heavy workload for CAOs in Caltagirone 
District, pp.224-227.
Allied Efforts to improve Food Supplies, 
pp.228-236.
AMGOT in Sicily, Success or Failure? 
pp.237-256.
Reference notes for all chapters, pp.257-281. 
Bibliography, pp.282-294.
Appendix I, pp.295-297.
There are a number of people I would like to thank for 
their help in the production of this thesis. First of all 
I wish to express my sincere thanks to Dr Jonathan 
Dunnage of the Italian Department at Swansea University 
for his guidance, counsel, encouragement and patience 
during the time it has taken to complete the thesis. I am 
also most grateful to historian and publisher, Dr Ezio 
Costanzo, and to Dr Alfio Caruso, lecturer at Catania 
University who both gave generously of their time and 
knowledge on each occasion I visited Catania for research 
purposes. I am indebted to both of them for providing a 
great deal of information relevant to the Allied 
occupation. To them my very grateful thanks.
I wish to thank the staff of the University library, who 
have always been very helpful and reliable. A special 
thank you to Andrew Orgill and the staff of the library 
at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, who have 
supplied me with military books and journals and kindly 
turned a blind eye to the return date!
Abbreviations
A Adjutant-General's Branch
ACC Allied Control Commission
AFA Allied Financial Agency
AFHQ Allied Force Headquarters
AG Adjutant General
AGIP The semigovernmental organisation in charge of the
distribution of petroleum in Italy 
AGP Army Group
AGWAR Adjutant General, War Department
AMFA Allied Military Financial Agency
AMGOT Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories
AT(E) Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee
Bull Bulletin
Bur Bureau
CA Civil Affairs
CAD US Civil Affairs Division of War Department
CAO Civil Affairs Officer/Chief Administrative Officer
CAPO Civil Affairs Police Officer
CATS Civil Affairs Training School
CCAC Combined Civil Affairs Committee
CCAO Chief Civil Affairs Officer
CCRR Carabinieri Reali, Italian National Police Force
CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff (also CCOS)
CFO Chief Financial Officer
CG Commanding General
CIC Counter-intelligence Corps
CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff
C-in-C Commander-in-Chief
Civ Sup Civil Supplies
CLN Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale
CLO Chief Legal Officer
iii
CMF Central Mediterranean Forces
CM-In Classified Message, incoming
CM-Out Classified Message, outgoing
CMP Corps of Military Police
CofS Chief of Staff
DCA Directorate of Civil Affairs
DCCAO Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer
Dir Director
DMI Directorate of Military Intelligence
DMO Directorate of Military Operations
DMT Directorate of Military Training
EM Enlisted Men
ETOUSA European Theatre of Operations, US Army
FO Finance Officer
FO UK Foreign Office
Force 141 - AFHQ planners for HUSKY
Force 343 - AFHQ codeword for US Fifth Army
Force 545 - AFHQ codeword for UK Eighth Army
FSS Field Security Service
G-l Personnel Division, War Department General Staff
G-2 (Military) Intelligence Division
G-3 Operations Division
G-4 Supply Division
G-5 Civil Affairs Division of AFHQ
GAI General Administrative Instructions
GHQ General Headquarters
GIL Gioventu Italiana del Littorio, Fascist Youth Group
HUSKY Codename for Allied Invasion of Sicily
I&C/INC Information and Censorship
JCAC Joint Civil Affairs Committee
JICA Joint Intelligence Collection Agency
JPS Joint Planning Staff
LO Legal Officer
MGS Military Government Section
iv
MP Military Police
Msg Message
MT Military Transport
NAAFI Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes
NATO North African Theatre of Operations
OETA Occupied Enemy Territories Administration
OPD Operations Division
OR Other Ranks
OVRA Opera Volontaria per la Repressione Antifascista -
A secret organisation to repress anti-Fascism 
PHD Public Health Division
PMG Provost Marshal General
POW Prisoner of War
PRO Public Record Office Kew
PWB Psychological Warfare Branch
Q Quarter-Master-General's Branch
RCAO Regional Civil Affairs Officer
Rpt Report
SAC Supreme Allied Commander
SCAO Senior Civil Affairs Officer
SGS Secretary, General Staff
SO Supply Officer
SOS Services of Supply
SW Secretary of War
TNA The National Archives Kew
UNPA Unione Nazionale di Protezione Antiaerea - Anti-
Aircraft Defence Organisation 
UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration 
WD US War Department
WO War Office
WOSB War Office Selection Board
v
Introduction
The main aim of this thesis is to examine the role of 
Allied Military Government (AMGOT) in Sicily in World War 
II and the impact it had on the civilian population. Much 
has been written about the campaign by military historians 
and war correspondents but it has not attracted the 
attention given to the mainland conflict, possibly because 
the island was captured in only thirty-eight days. Neither 
has AMGOT's contribution to the post-war recovery of 
Sicily been adequately recognised. Even Carlo D'Este, 
author of probably the most comprehensive account of the 
campaign in Sicily, makes only a cursory reference to its 
existence. This was to emphasise its infiltration by the 
Mafia, without making clear that the Mafia did not then 
exist in the east of the island, and there is no evidence 
whatsoever of Mafia involvement in AMGOT there. Although 
D'Este comments that AMGOT in Sicily was a sincere attempt 
to restore order in the island, he nevertheless points out 
that the history of military government in World War II 
was riddled with instances of graft and corruption.(1) 
Many other historians have made similar derogatory remarks 
about AMGOT but I hope to prove that these did not apply 
to the province of Catania, which has been chosen to 
illustrate military administration in the island.
The official history of Allied Military Administration of 
Italy 1943-1945 did not appear until 1957. In his preface 
the editor remarked that the subject had attracted little 
attention from military historians in spite of the fact 
that controlling a civilian population had never before 
presented a problem on the scale of World War II. (2) The 
author, C.R.S. Harris, was AMGOT's Controller of Property 
in Sicily and wrote from first-hand knowledge. He supplies 
a comprehensive account of the operational planning 
details and the organisation to be established in Sicily.
Almost a decade later F.S.V. Donnison produced a volume 
in the same series of official military histories: Civil
Affairs and Military Government: Central Organization and 
Planning. (3) This provides a comprehensive account of the 
machinery set up in 1941 in the War Office for the 
administration of territories occupied by British forces, 
and the establishment in July 1943 of a Combined Civil 
Affairs Committee to oversee the implementation of a joint 
Anglo-American administration in Italy. The volume also 
includes a chapter devoted to the selection and training 
of candidates to become Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs).
An essential part of AMGOT's programme was to establish 
an education system free from Fascist influence. The 
officer responsible was Lt Col George Gayre, whose diary- 
based account of his efforts to install a new system form 
the contents of Italy in Transition.{4) Though disclaiming 
that his book was a comprehensive account of military 
government or the educational work of that government, his 
stated aim was to show the difficulties besetting officers 
in the formative stages of Allied control. (5)
Written from a different perspective is the diary of 
Sergeant Charles Dobson. A Quiet War: Italy 1943-1946 is 
the story of war experienced by a clerk in an AMGOT office 
in Palermo HQ, who then followed the Allied advance north 
via Naples, Caserta, Rome, Brescia and Milan. Dobson 
worked daily with Italians and was frequently invited to 
their homes, which gave him more opportunity than most 
soldiers to get to know them as individuals. His diary is 
a detailed record both of the life of an AMGOT clerk and 
of Italians during the war and post-war years. (6)
To understand fully the complexities of the tasks faced 
by a CAO on arriving at his designated commune in Sicily, 
it is essential to read the initial reports of individual 
CAOs and those of the Senior CAO (SCAO) of the province to
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AMGOT HQ. Many of these appear in an American volume, US 
Army in World War II, Special Studiesr Civil Affairs: 
Soldiers Become Governors. (7) The authors point out that
excerpts from documents rather than text were given the 
primary role in their presentation, text being used for 
linking chapters. Documents cited are from a variety of 
sources, emphasising the Allied aspect of AMGOT.
American military journals published a number of articles 
in the immediate post-war years, mostly concerned with US 
input into Military Government.(8) Research has revealed 
only a few articles in British journals which relate 
specifically to the work of CAOs. (9) The best source of 
information is in the National Archives at Kew. Here the 
Cabinet Office, Foreign Office and War Office files 
contain a comprehensive collection of documents, including 
reports from the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, CAOs, SCAOs, 
Specialist Divisions, AMGOT HQ, Provincial HQ and AFHQ 
Algiers. (10) These files read in conjunction with AMGOT 
records in Sicily (some of which refer to local events not 
included in TNA files) provide a very detailed account of 
life under Allied administration.
Since Military Government was planned on a provincial 
basis, following the Sicilian pattern, the province of 
Catania was selected for the case study. Situated on the 
east coast, it had no Mafia connections. Two towns were 
chosen to highlight the different conditions in urban and 
rural areas, the capital town, Catania, and a smaller 
country town, Caltagirone, in the south-west of the 
province. The latter was chosen because it was one of the 
few towns in this province with AMGOT records in its local 
archives. Historian Dr Alfio Caruso, who lived in the 
town, warned me that the AMGOT files were ' in attesa di 
sistemazione'. (11) An ample supply of documents was
available, however, unnumbered and unclassified, but most
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were dated. Early documents were signed by the senior of 
the two CAOs responsible for the town but within a week 
all communications to the public were signed by the mayor, 
with an acknowledgement that they were AMGOT directives, 
'Presi gli ordini delle Autorita Militari Alleate'. The 
mayor had taken on responsibility for his town under AMGOT 
guidance in keeping with Allied policy of indirect rule. 
The documents included many communications from the SCAO, 
applicable to all communes in the province, e.g. notices 
relating to curfew hours and price lists for basic goods 
and services. Others were specific to Caltagirone, e.g. 
notices of local events. The most important were the CAO's 
reports to HQ on the situation in the town when AMGOT 
arrived, and the follow-up at the end of August, but each 
document was a valuable supplement to those viewed at Kew.
Catania town archives had no files directly relating to 
AMGOT administration but information was obtainable from 
past copies of the local newspaper, which published news 
items and public notices on a daily basis in a column 
reserved for AMGOT. (12) Many documents in Caltagirone 
also related to all communes in the province, including 
Catania town. In addition a series of histories written by 
Catania historian, Salvatore Nicolosi, about his home town 
contain much information about AMGOT, its staff, and the 
relations between CAOs and the local population. (13) 
Although no specific AMGOT files exist, there are 
Prefect's files for 1943-1944 which reveal the conditions 
existing in the capital town at the time - high 
unemployment and shortages of essential commodities.(14) 
Historian Dr Ezio Costanzo, whom I already knew, had been 
involved in establishing a museum in Catania dedicated to 
the invasion. We met with the museum's Director and had a 
most informative discussion on the museum's contents, 
including an 'AMGOT' room, and their significance.(15)
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Apart from the research sources cited above and the oral 
interviews listed in the bibliography, I have had many 
opportunities to discuss the events of World War II with 
British historians and ex-servicemen on an informal level, 
because of my close associations with the Services. These 
included employment in the libraries of the Army Staff 
College and Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, attendance 
at presentations given by the Military History and War 
Studies Departments at Sandhurst and military lectures at 
Aldershot. Many of the Sandhurst staff had taken part in 
the campaigns of the European Theatre, including Sicily 
and mainland Italy. (Lt Col G.A. Shepperd, author of The 
Italian Campaign 1943-1945, was for many years the Senior 
librarian at Sandhurst)
Personal contact with a former CAO proved impossible and 
enquiries made at various military sources when my 
research began drew a blank, unsurprisingly, since the 
average age of a CAO in 1943 (35+) would have made him 90+ 
in this century. Neither did the Army Lists for 1943-1944 
yield any recognisable names, although CAOs recruited from 
civilian sources would not appear in the lists. The CAOs 
provided much information in their individual reports to 
the War Office about their work in the communes but few 
gave details about themselves. Local historians in Catania 
have recorded interviews with many Catanesi and Calatini 
about their memories of the war. In Caltagirone CAO Corbin
was remembered: ".... Con Corbin, tutto andb bene perche
sapevamo di avere finalmente un nuovo capo che avrebbe 
messo ordine." (16) Nicolosi also provides details of 
AMGOT staff, but these are from secondary sources.
I have made the fullest use of my research sources, in 
particular in Caltagirone, where I was apparently the 
first English visitor to the AMGOT archives. I have 
travelled extensively in Sicily over ten years, especially
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in Catania province, and gathered as much information as 
possible in every town and village visited. In writing a 
case study of this particular area, I have concentrated on 
the effects of full-scale combat on a population which had 
not only endured acute food shortages but suffered from 
Allied air bombardment for three years prior to an 
invasion, which brought even more death and destruction. 
Yet the invaders were welcomed as liberators. It was only 
when the Allied promises of food and other essential 
supplies were not forthcoming that disillusionment set in.
The AMGOT staff, in no way responsible for the absence of 
supplies, did all they could to help the civilians, even 
though their priority was to support the military. This 
entailed strict enforcement of the Proclamations and 
compulsory requisitions of local properties which caused 
much ill-feeling. But in spite of these upsets, most 
civilians realised that AMGOT staff were doing all they 
could to ameliorate conditions, as I hope to have shown in 
the relevant chapters. The conclusion I have drawn from my 
research is that a genuine and honest attempt was made by 
AMGOT personnel to restore a measure of normality to a 
war-torn province and I have failed to find any traces of 
alleged corruption among the staff.
As far as the originality of the thesis is concerned, I 
am not aware of the existence of any similar case study 
based on Allied Military Government in Italy.
A Contents page precedes the thesis, which begins with a 
definition of military government, the planning of the 
measures necessary to form the Anglo-American partnership, 
followed by the planning of the invasion, the military 
administration to be established, and the training of the 
personnel. This leads on to the landings in Sicily and an 
in-depth study of AMGOT's work and achievements in Catania 
town and Caltagirone.
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Chapter 1
The first section of this chapter seeks to define the 
exact nature and purpose of Military Government as 
interpreted by the military leaders responsible for its 
implementation in Italy, and to examine previous Allied 
experiences of establishing this type of post-hostilities 
administration in the past. Britain had been at war for 
over a year when the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East 
Forces requested an experienced administrator to be 
responsible for Italian territory in Africa, which he was 
soon to occupy. No preparation for administration of this 
kind had been made and there were no detailed records of 
past experiences in this type of administration. The War 
Office was chosen as the Office responsible for Military 
Government and the machinery required to implement it was 
set up in that Department.
At this stage of World War II, December 1940, the United 
States had not entered the war but when the time came for 
the invasion of Sicily, Britain and the USA were in active 
partnership, having fought side by side in North Africa. 
America, too, had been responsible for a number of 
previous military administrations but this would be the 
first occasion for the two countries to be involved in- a 
joint implementation of military government.
The Casablanca Conference in January 1943 revealed the 
fundamental differences between the British and American 
conceptions of the strategy to be followed in the conduct 
of the war. Relations between both Armies in North Africa 
had become strained and continued to degenerate until the 
Allied victory.in Tunisia in May. Problems often arise in 
coalition warfare between both political leaders and 
military forces in the field. The problems in this 
coalition extended to Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), 
where planning for the invasion of Sicily and its military 
government was taking place. These partnership problems and 
those at AFHQ are described in the final sections.
1
Section 1. Allied Experiences of Military Government
before the Occupation of Sicily
Many definitions of the exact meaning of Military 
Government and what it entails for the population of an 
enemy country, conquered by force and then occupied by the 
victors, are to be found in the writings of military 
historians and in the accounts by the individuals actually 
responsible for organising the military administration for 
an occupied territory. Major-General A.V. Anderson, head of 
the Directorate of Civil Affairs (DCA), established in the 
War Office to oversee the administration of occupied 
territories, defined the expression "military government" 
as the special relationship which exists between a military 
force in occupation of enemy territory in time of war and 
the civil population of that territory. He pointed out that 
certain rights and duties are involved on each side and the 
actions of both sides are governed by the Laws and Usages 
of War on Land. These consist partly of customary rules 
which have grown up in practice and are described in 
Chapter XIV of the Manual of Military Law, and partly of 
written rules drawn up in the Hague Convention of 1907.(1)
Customary rules involve principles of humanity, mutual 
respect and a belligerent’s right to apply the amount of 
force strictly necessary for the purpose of war. The body 
of written rules forming the Hague Convention concern the 
rights and duties of the combatants and the restrictions on 
their behaviour. Forty-four delegations at the Hague 
produced thirteen Conventions of which No.IV, 'Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land’ was particularly 
important. It sought ’to diminish the evils of war as far 
as military requirements permit’ and banned certain weapons 
(such as poisonous substances) and certain practices (for 
example, harming an enemy who had surrendered). (2)
Military historian, F.S.V. Donnison, drew attention to the 
laws of war governing the occupation of enemy territory in 
1939. These laws, set out in the Hague Convention, Articles
2
42-56, accepted the right and duty of an occupant of enemy 
territory under the customary laws of war to set up 
military government, on the grounds that, when enemy 
territory had been occupied, the authority of the hostile 
state passed de facto to the occupant. Article 43 stated 
that 'the occupant shall do all in his power to restore and 
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety.' The 
remaining Articles were designed to restrict the military 
authority from exercising absolute power. (3)
Since Britain was a signatory to the Convention, General 
Anderson ensured that British implementation of a military 
administration conformed to the Hague Rules, while pointing 
out that in order to enforce Article 43, the occupying 
power had the right to demand and enforce such measure of 
obedience as was necessary to secure public order. If 
strong measures were needed to safeguard a commander's 
troops while he carried out appropriate administration, 
they were justified. (4)
A commander's powers in regard to military necessity were 
also emphasised by Lord Rennell of Rodd, Chief Civil 
Affairs Officer (CCAO) of the Allied Military Government of 
Occupied Territory (AMGOT) in 1943, when he wrote that 'in 
an occupied country which is a theatre of war there can be 
no other authority than that of the commander of the troops 
who exercises that authority by the oldest sanction known 
in law, the sanction of force arising out of conquest.' (5) 
Rennell also referred to problems arising when the central 
government is cut off from the territory occupied and local 
government consequently collapses, as occurred in Sicily. 
This was underlined by General Holmes, Head of the Liaison 
Section at AFHQ, when he wrote:'After 20 years of control 
the Fascist Party was so woven into the warp and woof of 
all phases of life that when the Party officials fled, 
provincial and municipal administration came to a 
standstill... Officials and populace alike seemed unable to 
do anything to help themselves.' (6) To set up a new 
administration could have required the use of the sanction
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of force but this did not prove necessary in Sicily.
Military Government of Italy was planned as a joint 
venture by an integrated force of British and American 
Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs). Rennell constantly stressed 
the element of integration, declaring himself 'head of a 
corporate whole of British and American officers’, who 
belonged to him in the same way that troops of a military 
unit belonged to the commander of that formation. (7) The 
result was a uniform policy being put into practice so that 
all areas of occupation were administered in the same way.
Neither partner in this Allied venture was a stranger to 
military administration of a country following occupation. 
In his report on the American Military Government of
Occupied Germany, 1S13-1920, Col Irwin Hunt referred to the 
history of the United States as offering an uninterrupted 
series of wars which demanded the exercise by its officers 
of civil governmental functions. He cited the experience of 
former American military governments in California, Mexico, 
the Southern States, the Philippines, Cuba, Porto Rica and 
elsewhere to underline his assertion that nothing had been 
learned from these previous occupations which would have 
been of assistance to officers involved in the civil
administration of the Rhineland. (8)
In the years leading up to World War II Britain had also 
been involved in a number of occupations, each followed by 
some form of military government. In 1900 Britain set up an 
administration in South Africa and in World War I further 
British military governments were established in Palestine, 
East Africa and Mesopotamia. Britain was also involved with 
America in the occupation of the Rhineland. Between 1941 
and the invasion of Sicily in 1943, Britain had already set
up no fewer than nine military governments in African
territory. In fact World War II saw more countries invaded 
and occupied than in any previous conflicts, with Britain 
involved in the occupation and subsequent administration of 
territories in three continents, Europe, Asia and Africa.
Donnison cites the South African War as the first occasion
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on which British forces had undertaken extensive occupation 
of enemy territory as opposed to mere invasion.(9) Lord 
Roberts, Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), appointed a Military 
Governor to administer the Orange Free State. Problems 
quickly arose because no British regulations defining the 
powers and duties of a Military Governor existed. The C-in- 
C's lack of control over his subordinates prompted Sir 
Alfred Milner, the South African High Commissioner, to 
inform the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain:’Wherever 
soldiers are doing civilian work, things are going badly.1 
Chamberlain’s reply clearly revealed his views:’I am dying 
to hear that you have commenced some sort of civil 
administration...! utterly distrust military administration 
and believe it is calculated to increase the number of our 
enemies and to exacerbate their hostile feelings.’ (10)
Some civil officers had in fact been provided to help with 
the administration but they were entirely subject to the 
instructions of the Military Governor. The situation became 
chaotic due to lack of previous planning and of clear-cut 
guidelines as to the Governor's role. Leo Amery, a World 
War II Cabinet member involved with military government, 
wrote that the first lesson to be learned from the South 
African War was 'the necessity of defining the duties of a 
military governor and his subordinates, and their position 
with regard to other officers exercising military command 
within the area of their jurisdiction.' (11)
Whether the failure of military government was due to 
sheer incompetence on the part of this particular military 
command or the lack of clearly defined parameters in which 
the civil administrators were working is difficult to 
assess but probably both factors were involved. Milner 
recorded that prejudice was growing against the military's 
'hard and fast, follow-your-instructions and never-take- 
local-advice, spirit in management of civil affairs.’ (12) 
Civilians did not always comprehend the military ethos, 
based on immediate compliance with orders given by 
superiors and it would have been difficult for servicemen
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to depart from patterns of behaviour inculcated by years of 
disciplined training. Tensions would inevitably arise.
No lessons were learned from the South African experience 
and virtually no planning took place for the four military 
administrations set up in World War I. In Mesopotamia a 
Chief Political Officer, Sir Percy Cox, accompanied the 
military force. Cox was very experienced and ideally suited 
to deal with political and civil administrative matters. He 
was not an army officer but understood the workings of the 
military and enjoyed very good relations with the military 
commander, General Barratt. According to Donnison he was 
very successful in his dual role of dealing with the needs 
of the local population and helping the military obtain 
essential supplies and services such as a labour force, 
food and billets, (primary tasks also for CAOs in Sicily in 
1943). The arrangement worked well until General Sir
Stanley Maude was appointed commander. Maude saw no need 
for a political presence, and made his own decisions on 
administrative matters without reference to Cox. Donnison 
writes that 'to the new commander a political officer was a
figure of fun and difficult to accept in an army
environment.1 (13)
To remedy the situation the title of Political Officer was 
changed to Civil Commissioner and Cox placed under the
jurisdiction of the India Office of the UK Government 
instead of the Foreign Department of the Government of 
India. The dispute ended in 'the civil authority depending 
on London and the military authority conforming, save where 
urgent local necessity required otherwise.' (14)
According to Rennell the attachment of a Political Officer 
to a military force had long been a feature of campaigns in 
India and the arrangement had always worked well. Any 
difficulties arising were usually due to personality 
clashes with one party not realising the requirements of 
the other. (15)
Conquered territory in German East Africa in 1916 was 
administered by political officers drawn from the staffs of
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British Colonies. They were not given military rank but 
their authority came from the C-in-C, General Jan Smuts. 
Once military operations came to an end a Civil Government 
was established under an Administrator from the Colonial 
Office, directly responsible to the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies on matters of civil administration. Military 
matters remained the responsibility of the C-in-C. (16)
The channels of authority cited above were similar to 
those formally established in Mesopotamia after the arrival 
of General Maude, but this did not establish a pattern for 
British administration of an occupied territory. At the end 
of 1917, Palestine was occupied and General Clayton, a 
Regular Army officer with experience in political posts, 
became Chief Political Officer to C-in-C, General Allenby. 
Kis administrative responsibility was to the War Office, 
and his administration was more military in character than 
those in German East Africa and Mesopotamia. (17)
The dominant military aspect of Palestine’s administration 
continued when General Money took over. He led an energetic 
and constructive administration, setting up departments of 
Finance, Justice, Education, Agriculture, Health and Public 
Works, similar in character to the Specialist Divisions 
that were established in Sicily. Rennell draws attention to 
the fact that in the administrations described above, 
obedience to the .Hague Rules bound a military government to 
administer the laws of the country as they were found, save 
where the Army Commander might otherwise direct. In 
Palestine, for example, the administration was not entitled 
to change the system of taxation but means were found to 
lessen the corruption involved in tax collection. (18)
Only military forces were involved in the post-Armistice 
occupation of the Rhineland in 1918. Its limited scope did 
not allow for a civil affairs staff to undertake any 
administration. It was basically a military measure to 
ensure German compliance with the terms of the surrender. 
At Army HQ a small Civil Affairs Branch of the General 
Staff was formed but Donnison comments on the unlikelihood
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that any of the staff had received special training or had 
been recruited on account of qualifications that would fit 
them for posts in Civil Affairs. He cites the words of the 
official historian of the Rhineland occupation:'No special 
preparations had been made by the Allies to deal with the 
problems of occupation and control of enemy territory.'(19) 
Rennell, who served in the administration of Syria in 1918 
and the military administration of Africa from 1941 until 
his appointment as CCAO for Operation HUSKY, points out 
that no records of World War I military administration were 
kept for the guidance of Army planners of future wars. 
References could be found in campaign histories, individual 
memoirs and biographies but the only official work devoted 
exclusively to Allied Military Government was Command Paper 
1061, "Mesopotamia - Review of the Civil Administration" 
produced by Gertrude Bell, whose extensive knowledge of 
Arab politics had led to her secondment to the Mesopotamia 
Expeditionary Force in Basra and Baghdad. (20)
Having emphasised the paucity of literature dealing with 
the subject of military government and its omission from 
the curricula of Army Training Establishments in the post­
war years, Rennell comments that 'this singular absence of 
study, direction and material led the more cynical to 
conclude that the British Army was not designed, and never 
expected, to occupy enemy territory!' (21) Donnison cites 
another reason for the neglect of all preparation for 
military government, namely the need for peace-time economy 
in defence expenditure, which tends 'to compel neglect of 
preparation against all but the most important risks.' (22) 
This comment accurately reflects what happened in Britain 
after 1918. Her conscript army was rapidly demobilised and 
defence industries dismantled. Huge reductions were made in 
service budgets, following recommendations by the Geddes 
Committee, set up by Lloyd George, to reflect the need for 
economy in post-war Britain. These financial cuts affected 
the Army in particular, and planning for possible future 
Military Governments was not a priority. (23)
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According to Donnison the first reference in World War II 
to military government occurred on 7 December 1940 when a 
telegram was sent by General Wavell, C-in-C British forces 
in the Middle East, to Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), stating the urgent 
need for an experienced administrator to be sent to the 
Middle East to formulate plans for the administration of 
Italian territories in Africa. The telegram went to the 
Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), was then passed 
to the Directorate of Military Operations (DM0) and finally 
to MO 5, a branch of DM0 in the War Office (WO). Donnison 
points out that no official in these branches was
specifically responsible for dealing with the subject. (24) 
At the time Wavell was preparing to attack enemy positions 
near Sidi Barrani. A successful outcome would lead to the 
fall of the Italian colony of Cyrenaica and the need to set 
up a Military Government there. British forces were also 
advancing in Italian territory in East Africa and it was 
only a matter of time before an administration would be 
needed there. (25) Wavell had little to guide him by way of 
written documentation, apart from Chapter XIV, Laws and
Usages of War, in the Manual of British Military Law. The
latter explains the rights and duties of military
commanders but does not prescribe the formal practice of 
administration which should be imposed.(26) Presumably this 
is because of the widely varying circumstances under which 
administration may be carried out. Wavell’s experience in 
the Middle East in World War I had made him aware of 
problems which arise when occupying an enemy country and 
the urgent need for an expert to deal with them. (27) 
Although the military commander has overall responsibility 
for governing an occupied territory, his military duties 
leave him little time, hence the need for an experienced 
administrator who accepts that the final decision on 
matters of policy must be given by the commander in order 
to ensure that administration policies do not conflict with 
military requirements.
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The War Office, having assumed responsibility for the 
provision of military government, proposed Sir Philip 
Mitchell, the pre-war Governor of Uganda, as Chief 
Political Officer. As a Colonial administrator he had an 
extensive knowledge and experience of African affairs.(28) 
Wavell had also requested an officer qualified to assume 
responsibility for the financial and economic affairs of 
the administration, which were to be kept separate from the 
Army’s finances. Major Francis Rodd (later Lord Rennell of 
Rodd) was appointed Controller of Finance and Accounts, 
with the rank of Colonel. He had served in the Syrian 
administration in 1918 and also had substantial banking 
experience. (29) Rodd and Mitchell were joined by two 
Colonial Service officers, Majors Arundell and Thorne- 
Thorne, (the latter eventually becoming the Senior Staff 
Officer at AMGOT HQ in Palermo). Mitchell was given the 
military rank of Major General in keeping with the War 
Cabinet's decision to place the administration of occupied 
territories under the War Office. This decision involved 
appointing military officers only or commissioning all 
civilians invited to join the administration because of 
their relevant experience or specific ability. (30)
Since the need to administer occupied territory arose 
rather unexpectedly, the planning machinery in London was 
non-existent. Mitchell took sole charge of organising the 
administration in GHQ, Middle East, based in Cairo. At that 
time communications with London were difficult and since 
decisions had to be made quickly, the staff in Cairo, 
designated the Occupied Enemy Territories Administration 
(OETA), were under pressure to recruit and train suitable 
officers and to draw up a programme specifically tailored 
to the needs of African countries. The first officers were 
recruited from the Colonial Services and from serving Army 
officers who could be spared from their regiments. Some 
Cairo residents with relevant knowledge of the countries to 
be administered were invited to join the administration, as 
were a number of local bank officials who acted as finance
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officers. (31)
As the conditions surrounding both the organisation and 
implementation of the civil affairs administration for 
Sicily were so different from the situations in Africa, a 
detailed account of the administrations there would not be 
relevant. One specific problem, however, arose in the first 
Italian colony to be occupied, Cyrenaica, which resurfaced 
later in Sicily. Both territories were rich in Greek and 
Roman classical sites and monuments. The manual of Military 
Law states that 'any seizure or destruction of, or wilful 
damage to, historic monuments and works of art is forbidden 
and should be made the subject of legal proceedings', and 
also that 'during bombardment, all steps must be taken to 
spare, as far as possible, historic monuments.' (32)
Cyrenaica was a battleground on three occasions as armies 
advanced and retreated across the desert. Of the three 
administrations set up in Cyrenaica the first, in December 
1940, was a short-lived, rather improvised form of military 
government with a restricted staff and without specialist 
officers. After the Italians reoccupied the country in 
April 1941 they alleged that the British had vandalised the 
monuments on the site of the ancient Greek city of Cyrene 
and produced an illustrated pamphlet, 'Che cosa hanno fatto 
gli Inglesi in Cirenaica', to support the accusations. The 
photographs in the pamphlet, however, were later proved to 
be fakes. (33) The British military authorities, although 
anxious to safeguard the Army's reputation, did nothing to 
prevent acts of vandalism during the second British 
occupation of Cyrenaica which lasted only a month.
It was not until 1943 during the third occupation of 
Cyrenaica that officers were instructed to preserve any 
monuments which might come into British possession. The 
Tribal Affairs Officer of the military administration 
placed guards on the museum and antiquities of Cyrene. 
Meanwhile two Eighth Army officers, Lt Col Mortimer Wheeler 
and Major Ward-Perkins, professional architects in civilian 
life, and concerned that ancient sites such as Leptis Magna
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could be irreparably damaged in the coming battles in 
Tripolitania, requested that measures be taken to protect 
these Roman sites. Ward-Perkins was granted temporary leave 
to oversee their care, and then seconded to the military 
government organisation, becoming the first appointed 
Monuments Officer. (34) The recognition by the military of 
the need for such an officer was reinforced by a letter 
sent to the Adjutant-General at the War Office from the 
directors of a number of prestigious museums, enquiring if 
steps could be taken to avoid unnecessary damage to 
buildings and works of art in the course of an invasion of 
the continent. (35) Consequently an Adviser on- Fine Arts 
and Monuments was later appointed to the CCAO's staff for 
the administration of Sicily.
Rennell points out that in the early days of the first 
administrations in Africa the officers responsible received 
no specific instructions from London on procedure, method 
or policy but relied on their own judgement.(36) London in 
fact was still in the process of organising a central 
authority to meet the need for both a properly planned 
administration of the territories to be occupied or 
liberated in Europe and the Far East, and also for the 
provision of carefully selected and fully trained staff to 
carry out this administration.
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Section 2. Establishing the Machinery for Military
Government
The previous section revealed that no specific government 
department was in a position to deal with General Wavell's 
request for an administrator to be sent to the Middle East. 
It was essential to address the issue without delay, and at 
a hastily convened meeting at Whitehall, representatives 
from the War Office, Foreign Office, Colonial Office, India 
Office and the Treasury agreed that in the field the 
military commander must have responsibility for military 
and civil administration, with military governors serving 
under him to take charge of the civil administration. The 
War Cabinet was asked to select the appropriate department 
in Whitehall and chose the War Office, since the Foreign 
Office was not organised to carry out administration and 
the Colonial Office might signify British intentions to 
incorporate the territories in the Empire. (37) Since other 
departments would be involved in some issues, an Inter- 
Departmental Committee was set up to consider questions of 
major importance affecting more than one department. 
Donnison notes that, after this meeting of the War Cabinet, 
the subject of military government disappeared from its 
agenda for the next two years. (38)
On 31 March 1941 a new branch, MO 11, was established 
within the War Office to deal only with Military Government 
Affairs. It was placed in the DMO, and consisted of two 
officers only, with clerical assistants, a number which was 
considered sufficient for the relatively limited work at 
the time. Any matter arising which needed to be considered 
at a higher level was referred to the Vice Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff (VCIGS). When planning later began 
for the invasion of North-West Europe, another committee 
was formed in June 1942, the Administration of Territories 
(Europe) Committee (AT(E)). Part of their brief was to 
consider the steps necessary to ensure efficient civil 
administration of territory liberated in Europe. The AT(E)
13
Committee proposed that a Chief Civil Affairs Officer, not 
a Chief Political Officer, should lead the civil 
administration.(39) This would be a more acceptable title 
to friendly countries in Europe, which would still need 
interim administration after the expulsion of the enemy 
occupier but not the same form of military government 
necessary for an enemy country.
Consequently when MO 11 expanded it became the Directorate 
of Civil Affairs, not of Military Government. Before this 
took place there were discussions between the VCIGS, 
General Archibald Nye, responsible for MO 11, and the 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State (PUS) at the War Office, 
Sir Frederick Bovenschen. Following the discussions the 
latter wrote to the VCIGS on 8 February 1943, stating that 
he was anxious for a full director to be placed in charge 
of all aspects of Civil Affairs in order to safeguard 
military interests. He emphasised the need for "a strong 
organisation capable of dealing with any aspect which may 
arise and of watching that military interests are not 
encroached upon by the various bodies which may arise in 
connection with the question of civil administration, 
relief and resettlement.” (40) Since, as Bovenschen pointed 
out, constant liaison among the Whitehall departments would 
be needed, the new Director would be best placed with the 
PUS.
In his reply the VCIGS insisted that the term "Civil 
Affairs" should not obscure the fact that it referred to 
the military administration by a Force Commander of 
populations under military occupation. "Civil Affairs" was 
'an operational concern and should be adequate, efficient 
and economical in manpower and services., its policies have 
an immediate bearing on military security, on the tying up 
of troops on employments which are not operational.. In 
view of this the Director should be a soldier.' (41)
In June 1943 Major General S.W.Kirby was appointed 
Director and a number of Deputy Directors were brought in 
to head technical departments, including one for procuring
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the supplies needed for 'the prevention of disease and 
unrest in occupied territories', a problem which would 
later occur in Sicily and on the Italian mainland. As 
planning for the administration of territories in North- 
West Europe proceeded, the Directorate expanded and by the 
end of 1944, by which time Kirby had been replaced by 
General Anderson, ninety officers were employed. (42)
Meanwhile in the United States the decision of where to 
place the organisation of post-hostilities administration 
of occupied territory did not have the same urgency as in 
Britain, although the US Government was clearly aware of 
the need for such future administrations. Many Federal 
agencies, including the State, War and Navy Departments and 
the Board of Economic Warfare were engaged in preliminary 
studies. Already an Army School of Military Government had 
been set up in Charlottesville. At the same time civilian 
agencies were staking claims to be involved in post-war 
administrations. The President was inclined to favour these 
and made his views quite clear in October 1942, when he 
wrote to the Secretary of War:'The governing of occupied 
territories may be of many kinds but in most instances it 
is a civilian task and requires absolutely first-class men 
and not second-string men.'(43) At a Cabinet meeting he 
commented that the instructors at Charlottesville Army 
School of Military Government 'did not seem to be the best 
that could have been collected but were rather second- 
rate .' (44)
The civilian agencies maintained their campaign to take 
responsibility for post-war administration during the 
summer of 1942 but the War Department was determined to 
assert its leadership in the Military Government field and 
directed the Provost Marshal General, Major General Allen 
Gullion, to set up a Division of Military Government (MGD) 
in his Office (PMGO).It was a small Division and the only 
agency in the WD at that time involved in preparing for a 
role in civil affairs and, although authorised to engage in 
broad planning, it was scarcely in a position to extend its
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activities beyond the training of prospective civil affairs 
officers. Coles and Weinberg make the point that the MGD 
'was on too low a level to speak for the War Department as 
a whole and did not command much active s u p p o r t (45)
After the invasion of French North Africa in November 1942 
by a joint Anglo-American force (Operation TORCH) agreement 
was reached between the American and French authorities, 
whereby the administration was carried out by the French 
and did not involve any form of Allied military government. 
General Dwight Eisenhower, C-in-C of Operation TORCH, was 
informed by the WD that purely civil matters, apart from 
those which affected military operations, would be the 
responsibility of civil agencies, since the President had 
charged the Of fice of Lend-Lease Administration (OLLA) 
'with providing food and other essentials for all occupied 
territories. Civil activities in occupied areas have been
made the responsibility of the State Department.’ (46)
A Civil Administrative Section was already in place within 
General Eisenhower's American staff at Allied Force 
Headquarters (AFHQ) in London before the launch of 
Operation TORCH. The section was headed by a civilian, 
Robert Murphy, whose role was defined by the President as 
'Operating Executive Head of the Civil Affairs Section and 
Advisor for Civil Affairs under General Eisenhower'. (47) 
Murphy began his duties in November after the occupation of 
French North African territories but he soon discovered 
that the President's decision to entrust civilian agencies 
with the responsibility for civilian relief was not
vindicated. Disunity, competition and a complete lack of 
coordination between the various agencies resulted in 
shortages of civilian supplies.
The situation deteriorated to such an extent that the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget warned of impending 
breakdown and referred to the Army's grave concern over 
dealing with civilian agencies whose competition 'play into 
the hands of the enemy . . . The Axis propaganda machine is 
making the most of the conflict of American agencies.' (48)
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Eisenhower's concerns over the effects of civilian supply 
shortages on military operations prompted him to inform the 
WD that since civil needs were so closely tied up with the 
success of the military campaign, serious disaffection 
among the French would ensue and threaten military security 
unless tonnages were increased.(49)
It had become clear that a stronger military agency than 
the MGD was necessary in Washington for future planning of 
military government, especially in former enemy territory, 
and a Civil Affairs Division (CAD) of the WD was set up on 
1 March 1943. (50) Its primary function was 'to inform and 
advise the Secretary of War in regard to all matters within 
the purview of the War Department, other than those of a 
strictly military nature, in areas occupied as a result of 
military operations.' (51)
Both Allied countries now possessed departments within the 
military domain dedicated to civil affairs. The decision 
made at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 that the 
next Allied operation would be the invasion of Sicily, and 
the establishment there of a joint military government, 
necessitated the creation of a combined machinery in order 
to achieve full coordination of British and American 
policies. A Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC) was 
formed in Washington in July, under the chairmanship of the 
Assistant Secretary of War, John McCloy. (52) The invasion 
of Sicily had already been launched before the first CCAC 
meeting took place. This was due to months of negotiations 
between the two sides before agreement was reached on the 
CCAC's charter. Coles and Weinberg attribute the delay in 
establishing both national and combined agencies partly to 
the unprecedented scope of civil affairs in World War II 
and partly to the fact that civilian agencies had taken on 
responsibility in North Africa and having proved to be 
inadequate, the Army then had to begin belatedly to 
establish its own organisation. (53)
Establishing the CCAC brought into sharp relief the 
differences in approach of the two Allies. The British were
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at first reluctant to house this Committee in Washington, 
believing that London was preferable. Its proximity to 
Europe, its wealth of experts on European affairs, and the 
fact that it was host to friendly governments in exile, 
made it a more suitable venue. An even more valid reason 
was the fact that the AT(E) Committee had been functioning 
there since June 1942 and had already gathered a great deal 
of information about civil affairs, relevant not only to 
Europe but to other areas. (54) Since, however, the CCAC 
would serve as an agency of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
(CCS) who were based in Washington, the British agreed, 
although rather reluctantly, to locate it there.
Coles and Weinberg refer to the tortuous negotiations 
which took place in the setting up of this international 
partnership, and ’the inexhaustible patience and semantic 
ingenuity required of the negotiators.' (55) The documents 
associated with the lengthy discussions reveal the tenacity 
with which both sides defended their policies, in 
particular the British insistence on the retention of the 
AT(E) Committee in London. It was finally agreed under the 
terms of the CCAC charter that an American officer from the 
staff of the European Theatre of Operations, United States 
of America, would be delegated to serve on this Committee. 
He would transmit the views of the WD to the AT(E) and 
refer any problems relating to other theatres of operations 
from the AT(E) back to the WD. (56) Thus a compromise was 
finally reached but only after much waste of valuable time 
which delayed the planning taking place at AFHQ in Algiers 
and which also reflected the often difficult relations 
between the two Allies.
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Section 3. Britain and the United States
in active Partnership
The previous section referred to the lengthy talks and 
negotiations between the two Allies which preceded the 
establishment of the CCAC. Discussions of this nature 
became the norm after the Washington Conference in December 
1941, when Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President 
Franklin Roosevelt decided to set up a joint command in the 
form of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee (CCS), to 
direct the military effort of both Allies.(57) Another 
decision taken at this conference was to confirm a 
previous decision made secretly in March 1941 by 
representatives of both nations that if and when America 
entered the war, her main military effort would be the 
defeat of Germany. (58)
Setting up the CCS was the first step in the preparation 
for coalition warfare in the European theatre of 
operations. The degree of success of a coalition must 
obviously depend on the extent to which the interests of 
the members coincide. The interests of all members are 
rarely identical and military objectives need to be 
established which reflect the interests and aims common to 
each partner. Constant dialogue is necessary to preserve 
the coalition. With only two partners, both sharing a 
common language and the same basic concept of democracy, a 
successful partnership seemed at first assured.
A.lthough the defeat of Germany was the primary aim of 
Britain, she was in no position at that stage of the war to 
launch a cross-Channel attack against the massive defences 
which Germany had put in place. Military commitments in 
India, the Middle East and the Western Desert, naval 
commitments to anti-submarine warfare, convoy and support 
operations, and an Air Force short of planes and trained 
personnel made a cross-Channel attack out of the question. 
Churchill put forward his proposal that the main objective 
for 1942 should be action in French North-West Africa.
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The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
George Marshall, however, wanted troops and materiel to be 
built up in the United Kingdom from where Germany could be 
attacked as soon as possible by the most direct route 
through Northwest Europe. He dismissed Churchill’s plan for 
an operation in French North Africa, favouring instead ’a 
massive assault aimed directly at the heart of Germany' and 
not the British plan of 'successive stabs around the 
periphery to bleed the enemy to death.' (59) General Sir 
Alan Brooke, (later Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke), Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) had a rather low 
opinion of Marshall's knowledge of strategy, commenting in 
his diary that the American had not studied any of the 
strategic implications of a cross-Channel operation.(60) It 
was soon evident that significant differences existed 
between the Allies' views on the course to be taken.
.A second conference took place in Washington in June 1942, 
when Churchill again pressed for action in North Africa, 
but the discussions again resulted in stalemate. The 
President, however, had become aware that a major invasion 
of Europe was not feasible until a vast amount of men, 
equipment and supplies, to be provided mostly by the USA, 
could be assembled in Britain. Anxious to bring US ground 
troops into action and to create a 'second front' to 
relieve the Russians under pressure in Eastern Europe, he 
told his Chiefs of Staff in July that he had made the 
decision in favour of the North African operation. This, 
according to military historian Rick Atkinson, was the most 
profound American strategic decision of the European war, 
and was made by the President in direct contravention of 
his generals and admirals.(61)
The British, although liberally contributing both men and 
supplies, took a secondary role in the North African 
invasion, codenamed Operation TORCH. This was because of 
the strong anti-British feelings still harboured among the 
French following the Royal Navy's attack on the French 
Fleet at Mers el-Kebir, on 3 July 1940, which had resulted
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in more than a thousand French fatalities. (62) Roosevelt 
considered that the French would offer less resistance to 
an American invasion of French North Africa which did not 
include British ground forces. Churchill accepted a junior 
role for Britain, informing the President that 'in the 
whole of TORCH, military and political, I consider myself 
your lieutenant, asking only to put my viewpoint plainly 
before you.'(63) Having won the main issue he was prepared 
to concede that the operation was an American enterprise.
General Eisenhower, Commander of the European Theatre of 
Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA), based in London, 
was appointed C-in-C of Operation TORCH on 13 August. 
Aware of the difficult relations between the two Allies, 
his primary aim was to instil a feeling of common purpose 
among his British and American staff which would overcome 
nationalistic interests:1 In the organisation, operation, 
and composition of my staff we proceeded as though all its 
members belonged to a single nation.'(64)
This was not always easy since agreement needed to be 
reached on two main issues, sites of the landing zones and 
timing of the arrival of British forces. The President had 
suggested that the British contingent should not land in 
North Africa until a month after the American troops had 
arrived but the British would not agree. They wished for 
early occupation of Tunisia and all landing sites to be 
within the Mediterranean. The President was insistent that 
at least one landing site should be on the Atlantic coast 
of Morocco to guarantee an open supply line from the USA. 
Churchill agreed to this and on 5 September planning went 
ahead. Eisenhower later acknowledged that difficulties did 
at first occur:'Officers of the two nationalities were apt 
to conduct their business in the attitude of a bulldog 
meeting a tomcat.'(65) He would later claim that with the 
passage of time a unity of purpose and absence of friction 
developed which could not have been excelled if all members 
were of the same nationality.
In his autobiography he referred to the many difficulties
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associated with coalition warfareHistory testifies to the 
ineptitude of coalitions in waging war... Even Napoleon's 
reputation as a brilliant military leader suffered when 
students in staff colleges came to realise that he always 
fought against coalitions - and therefore against divided 
counsels and diverse political, economic and military 
interests.'(66) There was certainly no shortage of the 
latter in French North Africa. In spite of the unity of 
purpose achieved by Eisenhower among the planners in 
London, Operation TORCH revealed tensions at Allied Force 
Headquarters in Algiers and between the two armies on the 
North African battlefields. These tensions would continue 
in the next phase of military operations in Sicily.
Eisenhower himself was the subject of doubts as to his 
suitability for the role of C-in-C. He was very well liked 
by both Allies but patently lacked the battle experience of 
many senior British officers. He was still a Lt Colonel in 
1941 but achieved rapid promotion to Lt General. He was, 
however, subordinate in rank to the senior British 
generals and this apparently irked his compatriots, 
including General Marshall. At the Casablanca Conference in 
January 1943, Marshall requested the President to promote 
Eisenhower to a four-star general. The request was refused 
'until there was some damn good reason for doing so.'(67) 
General Brooke was not bothered by the C-in-C’s rank but by 
his ability, and in his War Diaries revealed his concerns 
about the slow rate of progress of Operation TORCH, for 
which he firmly attached the blame to Eisenhower, who ’had 
never even commanded a battalion in action when he found 
himself commanding a group of armies in North Africa.’ (68) 
A further entry records:'I am afraid that Eisenhower as a 
general is hopeless! He submerges himself in politics and 
neglects his military duties, partly, I am afraid, because 
he knows little if anything about military matters.' (69)
Even allowing for Brooke's customary acerbity Eisenhower 
does not emerge as the most suitable C-in-C for a large- 
scale campaign to expel Axis forces from the North African
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continent. His gifts lay in his capacity to achieve unity 
between the British and Americans. He consistently refused 
to tolerate any criticism couched along nationalistic lines 
and was adamant that any American officer spreading anti- 
British talk would be sent straight home.(70)
It was at the Casablanca Conference that the respective 
Chiefs of Staff Committees revealed the differences in 
their conceptions of the future conduct of the war after 
the fall of Tunisia. Admiral King, in General Brooke's 
opinion, was biased entirely in favour of the Pacific, and 
still considered that priority should be given to 
operations there. The US Joint Planners had also changed 
their minds about Germany being the primary enemy and 
thought Japan should be defeated first. According to 
Brooke, Marshall initiated nothing in the policy for the 
future conduct of the war, his part being restricted to 
’somewhat clumsy criticism' of the British plans.(71) 
However, agreement was finally reached and the outcome of 
the Conference was the confirmation of Sicily as the next 
Mediterranean target and the appointment of Eisenhower as 
the C-in-C, General Alexander as his deputy and ground 
force commander, Admiral Cunningham and Air Marshal Tedder 
in command of the navy and air forces.
Alexander took over command of British and American 
troops in Tunisia on 19 February 1943, following the German 
breakthrough at Kasserine Pass, which resulted from Allied 
inexperience and poor coordination. He was appalled by what 
he saw of both armies. In his view the commander of the 
British First Army, General Anderson, 'had lost the 
initiative and was unable to control his headquarters', and 
the American troops appeared 'soft, green and quite 
untrained. .. They lack the will to fight,' and 'They do not 
know their job as soldiers and this is the case from the 
highest to the lowest.' (72) After communicating with 
Alexander, Brooke recorded in his diary on 21 February that 
the American Army would need a great deal more training 
before they would be of any use.(73)
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There was certainly some truth in his comment but this was 
the first campaign of the war for these inexperienced 
troops, many of whose officers had not undergone the 
intensive training programmes which were introduced in the 
USA only after war had actually broken out.(74) Their 
morale inevitably suffered as Eisenhower’s Naval Aide, 
Captain Butcher, made clear when he described in his diary 
the humiliation of 'the proud and cocky Americans after one 
of the greatest defeats in our history at Kasserine 
Pass.'(75) Atkinson rightly points out that Alexander's 
impression of American incapacity, formed on his first 
visit to the front, lingered on to damage Allied comity in 
Italy. (76)
Eisenhower soon made command changes after the defeat, 
which had resulted in 6,000 American casualties. General 
Patton was appointed temporary leader of the American II 
Corps, which the C-in-C now placed under Alexander's 18th 
Army Group, in order to create what he termed 'a feeling of 
partnership between British and Americans.'(77) Butcher 
recorded Eisenhower’s belief that to create the proper 
atmosphere for the development of friendly relations, the 
top commanders must at all times preach it and police it. 
At the same time the C-in-C also emphasised to Alexander 
the need for the British "to respect Americans and to 
prevent loose critical talk." (73)
In spite of Eisenhower's efforts relations between the 
military, particularly Patton and the British commanders, 
gradually worsened. American commanders objected to being 
addressed in a patronising manner by their British 
counterparts. Patton particularly objected to being given 
precise instructions by Alexander on how to deploy his 
troops. Complaints to Air Vice Marshal Coningham that his 
units were not given proper air cover, provoked a reply 
from the latter that the American units concerned were not 
battleworthy. (79) Such comments did nothing to improve 
Allied relations, and when British General Crocker, well 
known for his low opinion of American military capability,
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suggested that the American 34th Division 'should be 
withdrawn from combat and retrained under British guidance' 
senior American officers were furious. (80) Atkinson points 
out that 'Proximity to the British had only deepened the 
latent Anglophobia of many American generals, Patton, Clark 
and Bradley among them.' (81) The latter were also furious 
with Eisenhower for allowing the British to 'run the show 
to their advantage', as angry entries in Patton's diary 
reveal. (82)
Bradley, more restrained than Patton, recognised the 
difficulties of the Allied Commander, who 'walked a chalk 
line to avoid being branded pro-American.' He acknowledged 
that ' it would be foolhardy to deny that tense national 
differences sometimes split the British and American 
commands. Those differences persisted throughout World War 
II... the suspicions and jealousies that split us centred 
largely in the Headquarters commands.' (83)
The official view of Anglo-American relations was 
expressed by Churchill when he met British and American 
commanders in Algiers on 3 June 1943 after the fall of
Tunisia. He spoke of 'the comradeship which characterised 
action in this theatre'. Eisenhower's reply acknowledged
that there were differences of opinion at HQ but they were 
not based upon national lines. (84) As C-in-C he had in 
fact worked very hard to eliminate nationalistic sentiments 
at AFHQ. It was rather more difficult to achieve this in 
the field of combat operations and hostility would soon 
resurface in Sicily.
Historian Michael Howard, however, provides a thoughtful 
insight into the reasons for the difficulties experienced 
in achieving total Allied cooperation. Referring to his 
research for the volume on British Grand Strategy, written 
as part of the United Kingdom Military Series of the 
History of the Second World War, Howard describes how it 
confirmed for him 'the existence of two fundamentally
different military cultures, shaped by National attitudes
and experience, that made Allied cooperation surprisingly
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difficult.1 He describes the American approach as 
logistical and managerial, their strategy depending on the 
concentrated application of their overwhelming industrial 
strength, whereas the British were conscious of the paucity 
of their resources in manpower and materiel. Their approach 
was shaped by memories of the First World War and a deep 
respect for the fighting qualities of the Germans. After 
three years of war experience, 'they tended to patronise 
their allies, who seeing in that experience only a series 
of defeats, responded with something like contempt.1 (85) 
Howard, who himself served 'two bitter winters in the 
mountains' as an infantry officer in Italy, remarks that he 
had noticed this tension in Italy and was 'interested to 
learn how deep it went.' His observations confirm that 
there was little, if any, improvement in Anglo-American 
relations as the war moved from North Africa to southern 
Europe. The following section in this chapter about Allied 
Force Headquarters in Algiers will also refer to a similar 
atmosphere of tension and lack of trust among senior staff 
at Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers.
26
Section 4. Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers
Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) was initially set up in 
November 1942 to serve as HQ for planning Operation TORCH, 
the campaign in French North Africa. After the Casablanca 
Conference in January 1943, when a decision was taken to 
invade Sicily, it expanded to become the planning centre 
for the invasion of the island (and subsequently the 
Italian mainland), and remained the official HQ until July 
1944 when it moved to the Palace of Caserta.
On 13 August 1942 General Eisenhower, already serving in 
London as commanding general of the European Theatre of 
Operations, was named Commander-in-Chief of Operation 
TORCH. Under his supervision planning took place in London 
until 5 November, when the general moved his HQ to 
Gibraltar to await the capture of Algiers. Although the 
town was taken on 8 November and his intention was to move 
immediately, he decided to wait until 23 November because 
the undersea cable from Gibraltar gave a better 
communication service to Britain and the US than he would 
obtain from Algiers where, at that time, the system of 
communications was relatively primitive. However, the C-in- 
C's HQ needed to be closer to the military action, and by 
the last week of November, he was installed in one of the 
largest hotels in Algiers, the St Georges, which had been 
requisitioned to serve as the administrative HQ for 
Operation TORCH. (86)
General Eisenhower had decided that his new HQ, designated 
AFHQ, would be streamlined and able to function with a 
staff of one hundred and fifty officers. Within a fortnight 
staff numbers had doubled and eleven extra buildings were 
needed. The increase in personnel was due to the transfer 
of a considerable number of staff from the UK to support 
the operations of the British 1st Army. When planning began 
for Operation HUSKY the functions of AFHQ naturally 
broadened and increased, requiring more officers and 
secretarial staff. (87)
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At the same time a separate, parallel American Theatre 
Command, the North African Theatre of Operations, US Army 
(NATOUSA) was established at AFHQ. The reorganisation 
necessary to incorporate the new personnel led to a number 
of changes within the internal structure of staff sections 
to accommodate the proliferating joint committees, joint 
planning staffs and joint conferences, which were all part 
of coalition warfare. (88)
AFHQ celebrated its first anniversary in August 1943 
having grown beyond recognition from its inception in 
London in 1942. Concern was expressed that the increase in 
personnel would create a top-heavy organisation and it does 
appear that bureaucracy had gone mad when Eisenhower’s 
original estimate of one hundred and fifty officers reached 
a total of more than one thousand. In addition fifteen 
thousand enlisted troops were employed in various 
capacities and the original hotel accommodation had 
expanded to two thousand buildings. This 'huge chairborne 
force’ inspired among the troops a parody of Churchill's 
famous words: "Never were so few commanded by so many from 
so far." (89)
D'Este refers to the early months of AFHQ as ’a dismal 
period of intense growing pains.'(90) With a staff of 
sixteen thousand it was inevitable that problems would 
arise between the British and Americans, who had very 
different ways of dealing with military matters, different 
office routines, and on a more serious level, different 
conceptions of how the war should be conducted. Mutual 
mistrust and antagonism had characterised the combat forces 
in the field and was found in almost equal measure at AFHQ, 
in spite of Eisenhower's policy of refusing to permit any 
criticism couched along national lines. As D'Este 
comments: 'The commonality of language could not obscure
the fundamental differences between the traditions 
practised in the British Army for centuries and the rawness 
of the peacetime American Army suddenly thrust into a 
global war.'(91)
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Citing his own experience, Harold Macmillan suggested that 
the strained atmosphere at AFHQ was often due to the lack 
of communication at the highest level. He had been 
appointed Minister Resident at AFHQ by the Prime Minister 
with the knowledge and approval of President Roosevelt. The 
latter neglected to inform Eisenhower of his appointment 
and this omission resulted in a very awkward initial 
meeting between the new Minister and the C-in-C, retrieved 
only by Macmillan’s diplomatic skills.(92) Ably supported 
by his American opposite number, Robert Murphy, the British 
Minister worked hard to create an atmosphere of harmony at 
AFHQ, for which Donnison gives him credit:'In the creation 
of this Anglo-American instrument of government, much was 
owed to the efforts of General Eisenhower and Mr. 
Macmillan.' (93)
On one occasion Macmillan described the British staff at 
AFHQ to Richard Crossman, a newly arrived British officer, 
(later an MP and Government Minister), as 'the Greeks in 
this American empire' and advised him that he would find 
the Americans much as the Greeks found the Romans, 'great 
big vulgar, bustling people, more vigorous than we are and 
also more idle, with more unspoilt virtues, but also more 
corrupt. We must run AFHQ as the Greeks ran the operations 
of the Emperor Claudius'- (94) Atkinson comments that 
relations between the two armies were characterised by 'a 
divided-by-a-common-language mutual incomprehension' but 
after defeat at the battle of Longstop Hill in Tunisia on 
Christmas Eve 1942, 'a harsher, toxic tone now seeped into 
the alliance.' This was caused by the British after-action 
report on the battle, fought by US and British troops side 
by side, in which the 1st Guards Brigade commented that the 
Americans 'were unfitted and unprepared for the task they 
were asked to perform.1(95)
The efforts of Eisenhower and Macmillan to achieve better 
relations between the Allies were not supported by American 
General Mark Clark. Before being assigned to command the US 
Fifth Army, he served as Eisenhower's deputy at AFHQ and,
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according to Brigadier Ian Jacob, assistant to Churchill's 
Chief of Staff, General Ismay, was considered 'a hugely 
disruptive influence who intrigued against the British, 
caused immense irritation by his habit of issuing direct 
and sometimes contradictory orders to the staff, terrified 
American officers and was considered the 'evil genius' of 
the force.'(96) Jacob, responsible for drafting the final 
agreement document at the end of the Casablanca Conference, 
also referred in his diary to the 'great deal of confusion' 
at AFHQ during preparations for the Conference. (97)
David Hunt, a Military Intelligence officer on General 
Alexander's staff, was already acquainted with the Hotel St 
Georges from a pre-war visit. He refers to the building as 
'an obviously unsuitable place and not well adapted for a 
HQ.1 Following a visit to AFHQ's Intelligence Branch in 
November 1942, he stated his concern about the efficiency 
of the staff, all British except for one American, 
commenting that 'not only did they not know what they ought 
to be doing, they had learned a whole lot of wrong things 
which they ought not to be doing.'(98) He also confirmed 
the inadequacy of the signal system, which had been one of 
the reasons for Eisenhower's delay in moving his temporary 
HQ from Gibraltar to Algiers. The accommodation in the 
Hotel St Georges was so crowded that the cryptographic 
machines were kept in a bathroom, balanced on a wooden 
frame over the bathtub. (99)
A small Civil Affairs Section had been set up at AFHQ to 
take responsibility for civil affairs in North Africa, but 
because the Americans were initially taking the leading 
role in the campaign/ the Section was virtually 100% 
American, part military, part civil, and headed by a 
civilian official of the State Department. No British 
planning or preparation for civil affairs had been 
organised. Donnison describes the department created for 
dealing with civil affairs as being 'more in the nature of 
an American-French liaison section designed to establish 
contact with the French colonial administration.' (100)
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The French, to the Allies' dismay, were not initially 
eager to cooperate with the Allied invaders and it was only 
a deal struck between the Allies and Admiral Darlan, who 
happened to be in Algiers, which brought about a cease­
fire. The French civil authorities, supported by the 
Allies, continued to administer the French territories 
which the Allies occupied. This agreement with Admiral 
Darlan, although very unpopular in both Britain and the 
United States, prevented the difficult situation which 
could have arisen from the Allies' lack of planning for the 
administration of these occupied territories.(101)
It was inevitable that economic problems would arise in a 
war situation and, in agreement with the French, General 
Eisenhower had set up the North African Economic Board 
(NAEB) after his arrival in Algiers to help restore the 
economic life of French North Africa. This Anglo-American 
agency ensured adequate supplies of food and clothing and 
supervised imports and exports. The Board was presided over 
by Harold Macmillan and Robert Murphy, and the members 
consisted of British and American military and civilian 
personnel, including British officials seconded from the 
Ministries of Food and Supply. The Board experienced some 
of the same problems that would occur later in Sicily, such 
as the hoarding of wheat and the emergence of a black 
market. Macmillan, aware of the difficult relations between 
the Allies at AFHQ, emphasised the close and effective 
cooperation between the Allied members of the Board.(102) 
The French civil authorities, however, still remained in 
charge of administration.
Not until 18 June 1943, a month after the end of the 
Tunisian campaign and less than a month before the 
scheduled date for the invasion of Sicily, was a Military 
Government Section (MGS) set up at AFHQ. Its functions and 
responsibilities were "to act as the executive section for 
the Allied C-in-C in questions pertaining to the military 
government of occupied territory, including political 
questions arising out of military occupation." (103)
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Col Julius Holmes moved from his post as Head of the 
Liaison Section to head MGS, as assistant Chief of Staff 
and Adviser on Civil Affairs to the C-in-C. Harris points 
out that the creation of this new section raised some 
misgivings in the mind of Lord Rennell 'who was anxious to 
avoid the tendency of staff branches of the higher echelons 
to intervene in the operations of the lower.'(104) His 
concerns were assuaged by the Chief of Staff, General 
Bedell Smith, who instructed Col Holmes, in the CCAO’s 
presence, that this new staff section would not interfere 
in political and administrative matters in Sicily and would 
act only as a channel of communication for the C-in-C with 
the CCS in such matters as the C-in-C could not himself 
settle.
The MGS was one of the smaller departments in AFHQ’s vast 
organisation, with an authorised allotment of twenty-three 
officers and eighteen enlisted men. It was a completely 
integrated staff section, British and Americans working 
together at all times. (105) It was designated as the 
channel of communication in matters of military government 
for Force 141, the Planning Group for the invasion of 
Sicily, and for the Task Forces carrying troops and 
supplies. Among its more difficult tasks was the estimation 
of the minimum essential civilian supplies needed in 
occupied areas, since accurate information regarding the 
harvest and the state of inflation on the island was not 
available.
The Section was also responsible for reviewing the 
requisitions submitted for civil supplies by civil affairs 
organisations in the field. Apart from food, there was 
likely to be an acute shortage of winter clothes and 
leather for shoes. In addition the concentrated air attacks 
on the island would have caused a large number of 
casualties and presumably a shortage of hospital supplies. 
The MGS was not always up to the task, and inadequacies and 
mistakes would later cause serious problems in the supply 
of essential items to the island, beginning with a failure
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to send instalments from the stockpiles of food ordered by 
AMGOT. The food had been stockpiled but then accumulated at 
ports in North Africa, at which convoys did not load. (106) 
These supply problems and their effect on the population 
of Caltagirone and Catania will be examined in a later 
chapter but are mentioned now to show the deficiencies 
already apparent in the pre-invasion planning. As an 
example, the NAEB had encountered a number of difficulties 
in the hoarding of supplies and in black market activity 
but there is no evidence that the MGS Section had learned 
anything from the Board's experiences which would possibly 
be of practical use to those undertaking the Civil Affairs 
administration in Sicily.
A much more serious aspect to be considered is the fact 
that this first joint military operation, fought by two 
coalition partners dedicated to the same aim, had revealed 
not only strained relations between them but open 
hostility. This was not just confined to troops on the 
front line but was evident among senior generals in North 
Africa and senior politicians who had conflicting views on 
where and when campaigns should be fought.
As will be shown in the next chapter, the senior 
commanders chosen for the invasion were all British, 
although General Eisenhower was formally appointed 
Commander-in-Chief. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had wisely 
directed that two separate Task Forces, one wholly British, 
the other wholly American, would be employed in separate 
areas, thus avoiding any possibility of friction during the 
actual landings. But inevitably other service arms, air and 
sea, would need to be involved in certain areas of combat 
and this would provoke further ill feeling as the invasion 
progressed.
The number of British and American officers involved in 
the Military Government administration of Sicily was minute 
in comparison to the hundreds of thousands of troops taking 
part in the invasion. Unlike the majority of wartime troops 
few were conscripts. Some were already 'Regulars', others
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were specially recruited from professional institutes as 
will be explained in the next chapter. Most candidates 
received their training either in an American or British 
establishment, and then the two nationalities followed a 
short course together in North Africa, where the Chief 
Civil Affairs Officer impressed on them the need to respect 
one another's nationality. There is no evidence to be found 
in AMGOT records of any antagonism between the British and 
American CAOs among the staff in either Catania town or the 
Caltagirone district.
34
Chapter 2
This chapter is concerned with the planning of Operation 
HUSKY, both the military invasion and the establishment of 
subsequent military government. Planning for both was made 
more complicated because it involved two countries working 
in coalition. The military commanders of both countries had 
radically different views on the way the campaign should be 
conducted. As the commanders of all three service branches 
were engaged in the North African campaign, of which the 
outcome would not be certain for many months, they were 
frequently unavailable for discussion with the planners.
Planning for the establishment of military government was 
initially delayed by the non-availability of planning 
staff. Then difficulties arose with regard to issues of 
policy towards the occupied country, since the coalition 
partners had opposing views regarding the degree of control 
to be imposed on conquered regions. This and other issues 
took months to be resolved. The final section of the 
chapter examines the process of selecting and training the 
personnel responsible for implementing military government.
Section 1. Planning the Invasion of Sicily
In January 1943, after the decision was taken at the 
Casablanca Conference to invade Sicily, the Supreme 
Commander, General Eisenhower, had been directed by the CCS 
to create a separate headquarters to plan the operation. He 
formed a planning group, known as Force 141, since its 
first meeting took place in Room 141 in the Hotel St 
Georges, AFHQ in Algiers. The group later moved into a 
separate building, the Ecole Normale at Bouzar^a but only 
became a separate HQ under General Alexander when the 
Tunisian campaign ended in May. (1)
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It was a very difficult operation to plan since the 
assault forces were to be launched from the Middle East, 
North Africa, the UK and the USA. As mentioned above, the 
three British commanders involved in the invasion were not 
available to monitor closely the stages in the evolution of 
the operational plan. (2) Since Alexander was ground force 
commander with overall responsibility, his presence was 
particularly needed. He later complained that his front­
line duties prevented him from returning to Algiers to give 
the required thought to such a complicated affair. (3)
The CCS instructed that two separate task forces were to 
be formed for the invasion, each inter-service but not 
inter-Allied. Given the stormy relations between the 
American and British armies in the TORCH campaign, this was 
probably a wise decision. The British Eastern Task Force 
HQ, Force 545, was placed under the command of General 
Montgomery, and based in Cairo; the American Western Task 
Force HQ, Force 343, commanded by General Patton was 
initially based at Rabat but later moved to Mostaganem. 
Since the invasion plan also included the shipping of the 
Canadian 1st Division from their base in Britain and the US 
45th Infantry Division from America, both London and 
Washington had to set up planning centres. (4)
Five separate planning operations were now taking place in 
five widely separated locations, inevitably leading to 
great confusion because of the absence of the ground force 
commander. In fact Force 141 had no commander until May 
when the campaign in Tunisia concluded and Alexander was 
free to take over. The two task force commanders were also 
involved in Tunisia and far from the planning taking place 
in their own HQs. (5) Meanwhile Anglo-American relations 
were again becoming strained through the reports published 
in the American press that Eisenhower had now become merely 
a figurehead in North Africa and that the actual command 
was in the hands of his three British subordinates. 
Eisenhower in fact had very little control over the actions 
of his ground, naval and air commanders, as his Naval Aide,
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Captain Harry Butcher, recorded:'Ike has put an excellent 
front on the command set-up but actually has been burning 
inside.' (6) General Brooke admits in his diary that the 
American COS did not appreciate the intentions of the 
British, who brought in Alexander to deal with the military 
situation while elevating Eisenhower to Supreme Commander 
where he could devote his time to political and inter- 
Allied problems.(7)
Force 141 began their planning by considering the options 
of the original plan drafted in London by the Joint 
Planning Staff (JPS). Composed of experienced officers from 
all three services the JPS provided the COS with outline 
plans for future military operations. The original plan had 
been approved in principle by the CCS at Casablanca and the 
Force 141 plan was in essence the same: a series of
dispersed landings in the south-east, east, west and north­
west of the island. General Gairdner, Chief of Staff at 
Force 141, presented the plan to Eisenhower and his three 
service commanders, who approved it. When Montgomery, who 
was personally not in favour of further action in the 
Mediterranean after the fall of Tunisia, heard the details 
of the plan he was horrified and reported to Brooke:' HUSKY 
is in a fearful state....the proposed plan would involve us 
in a first-class disaster.... To operate dispersed means 
disaster...1 (8)
A number of variations of the original plan were then 
debated and rejected because of conflicting army, air and 
naval demands. Montgomery demanded a concentrated assault 
in a restricted area to give his troops more strength in 
the attack. Citing the desperate resistance put up by 
German and Italian forces in Tunisia, he stated that the 
invaders would meet stiffer opposition in Sicily than 
anticipated and the fight would be hard and bitter.'(9) His 
proposed plan was not well received at the next planning 
conference and deadlock ensued. A further meeting was 
called on 2 May at which Montgomery, this time backed up 
by General Bedell Smith, appeared in person to present his
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plan, which was accepted by Eisenhower the next day. (10) 
The American generals objected strongly to any change in 
the original plan and felt they were once again playing 
second fiddle to the British. Not only were the American 
commanders furious, so also were both Admiral Cunningham 
and Air Chief Marshal Tedder. Cunningham had no wish to 
concentrate his shipping in one area, and Tedder insisted 
on speedy acquisition of airfields. Patton later referred 
to the discussions as ’an internecine war.’(11) This new 
plan excluded both a major port facility for supplying the 
American Seventh Army, and the complex of airfields in the 
south-west and Catania-Gerbini area, both of which were 
considered essential for a successful invasion. US forces 
would therefore be obliged to rely on beach maintenance for 
supplies. Patton then demanded a 'definite written promise' 
that his troops would be supplied via Siracusa, and also 
that a definite boundary between the Eighth Army and the 
Western Task Force should be drawn up. (12)
The new plan placed the US force in the south-eastern 
corner of the island with landing sites along the Gulf of 
Gela from Licata to the Pachino peninsula, and the UK force 
concentrated along the same peninsula almost to Siracusa. 
Hence Patton's demand for a definite boundary between the 
two. Clearly Anglo-American relations were further soured.
The military problems resurfaced as political ones in mid- 
May at the TRIDENT Conference in Washington when the Allied 
leaders could not reach agreement on future strategy after 
Sicily. General Marshall's desire to limit operations in 
the Mediterranean was as firm as ever, as was Churchill's 
determination to continue the Sicily campaign into the 
Italian mainland. He and Marshall flew to Algiers together 
to discuss post-HUSKY operations which would keep Allied 
forces further engaged in the Mediterranean.(13) Talks with 
Eisenhower and his commanders were held, but Marshall, in 
Churchill's words, 'remained up till almost the last moment 
silent or cryptic'.(14) It was then agreed that Eisenhower 
would send not only information to the CCS but also strong
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recommendations for future action, based on the success of 
Operation HUSKY and conditions prevailing at the time, to 
enable the CCS to decide on future operations. (15)
After the successful conclusion of the campaign in Tunisia 
on 13 May the respective commanders could now concentrate 
full attention on Operation HUSKY. With the acceptance of 
Montgomery's plan to situate the landing points in the 
south-east of the island with only a twenty mile gap 
between the right wing of the American and the left wing of 
the British forces, detailed planning for deployment of 
both armies could proceed. The introduction of a new 
amphibious vehicle, the DUKW, used in conjunction with LSTs 
(Landing Ships, Tank) solved the problem of maintaining 
supplies to the Americans over the beaches. (16)
The final plan, approved by the CCS, detailed five phases 
for the capture of the island:
1. Air and naval forces to gain air supremacy and 
neutralise enemy shipping in the Mediterranean in order to 
allow safe passage for the vast armada of ships and landing 
craft bringing troops and supplies.
2. Airborne and glider landings on the night of 9/10 July 
to disrupt enemy communications, followed by assault troops 
to capture airfields at Gela and ports of Siracusa and 
Licata.
3. Establishment of a secure base for further operations.
4. Capture of Augusta, Catania and the Gerbini airfields.
5. The reduction of Sicily. (17)
No indication was given of the means by which Phase 5 
should be carried out. Both Patton and Montgomery aimed for 
the capture of Messina which would seal the island from 
mainland Italy. D'Este comments that the ground commander, 
Alexander, wished to allow the land battle to develop 
before any decision was made to specify action from the two 
armies.(18) Although Alexander was held in high regard by 
Churchill and Macmillan, his fellow commanders deplored his 
indecision, his inability to plan for all eventualities and 
to give specific guidance to his subordinates. Brooke made
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many unflattering comments about his leadership skills and 
lack of strategic vision. (19) As the war in Italy 
continued in 1944, Brooke's opinion did not change. In 
April, after a discussion with Alexander on the campaign, 
he commented that the latter was palpably devoid of any 
ideas of his own, and that he had previously 'been carried 
on Monty's back and McCreery's efficiency/(20) McCreery was 
Alexander's former Chief of Staff and Brooke had 'the very 
greatest confidence in his ability.'(21) Even Eisenhower, 
who admired many aspects of Alexander's character, 
remarked;'It seems that he alters his own plans merely to 
meet an objection of a subordinate, so as to avoid direct 
command methods.' (22) D ’Este comments that the invasion 
needed aggressive leadership but the commander distanced 
himself from his subordinates as 'the campaign developed 
into two private wars fought by Patton and Montgomery while 
Alexander stood mutely on the sidelines.' (23)
Planning for the military government was taking place at 
the same time at AFHQ. The discord which had characterised 
relations between the military planners and the ground, 
naval and air commanders was fortunately absent from the 
Civil Affairs planning group. The next section of this 
chapter will deal with their particular problems, which 
were the result of the failures of their respective 
governments to reach consensus on a number of important 
issues which led to long delays in the detailed planning 
process. When these issues had finally been resolved fresh 
problems surfaced between the Civil Affairs and the 
military planners, which concerned landing schedules and 
transport provision for the CAOs charged with setting up 
the Military Government administration.
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Section 2. Planning AMGOT in Sicily
One of General Eisenhower's first actions after receiving 
his directive from the CCS to plan the invasion of Sicily 
was to raise the question of the policy to be adopted 
towards Italy by the military government to be set up 
there. In a message to the War Department on 8 February he 
requested a directive on US policy, and included his own 
recommendation of 'a firm policy of joint Anglo-American 
responsibility and joint conduct of military government 
under an agreed system, to function under the Allied 
Commander. ' He underlined the importance of clarifying 
matters of policy before the operational planning 
progressed too far and of reconciling British and American 
attitudes, pointing out that the British might well feel 
that they should have primary responsibility for the 
administration of Sicily because of their vital interests 
in the Mediterranean. (24)
While awaiting instructions from the WD, Eisenhower sent 
an American officer, Col Charles Spofford, to Tripoli to 
observe at first hand the operation of British military 
administration in the former Italian colony. Spofford's 
report on his visit formed the basis of an 'Appreciation 
and Outline Plan' for military government in Sicily. Col 
Julius Holmes, head of the Liaison Section at AFHQ and 
responsible for Civil Affairs, submitted the plan to 
General Bedell Smith, COS at AFHQ, pointing out that the 
Allies' first occupation of enemy territory would set the 
pattern for future operations and should be carried out 
with care and efficiency.(25) The plan assumed that London 
and Washington would be jointly responsible for the 
military government and would share political, legal and 
financial responsibility for both its planning and conduct. 
British and American staff would be employed on an 
approximately equal basis. (26) The plan was submitted to 
Washington and London in the last week of March. The 
scheduled date of the invasion was 10 July.
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Assembling a staff of specialists to carry out detailed 
planning proved to be a serious problem. Spofford's own 
post-war report on Allied Military Government in Sicily 
refers to the long delay in obtaining staff due to the
difficulties of procurement and transportation, since 
yirtually the entire staff had to be recruited from outside 
the theatre.1 (27) Surveys made to identify suitable 
personnel within the theatre yielded only thirty Americans 
and the WD undertook to make up the balance. British staff 
vere more readily available from Cairo which had provided 
staff for the military government of the former Italian 
colonies, but it was impossible to meet the proposed 
establishment of four hundred officers suggested in the
Appreciation and Outline Plan. Enlisted men (EM) in the
theatre who spoke Italian were interviewed by an Italian­
speaking officer and a number were offered posts in the
future administration. (28)
Spofford points out that as the key personnel were not 
immediately available, detailed planning was considerably 
delayed. On 15 April the British staff consisted of Major 
General Lord Rennell, Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Lt Col 
Naxwell and some administrative officers already serving in 
the Middle East. The American staff was made up of Col
Spofford and two officers who had not yet arrived at 
Algiers. When an Administrative Memorandum from AFHQ 
announced the Establishment of Allied Military Government 
of Occupied Territory (AMGOT) on 1 May, Spofford was still 
the only American planner involved. The US staff was 
increased by the arrival in the first week of May of two 
specialist officers, Col Grafftey Smith, Chief Finance 
Officer (CFO), and Lt Col Bernstein, Advisor on Currency 
and Exchange. Major Henry Rowell came from the School of 
Military Government at Charlottesville to set up the 
Training Centre for officers, designated in the plan. The 
Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer (DCCAO), Brigadier 
General Frank McSherry, did not arrive until June. (29)
The lack of planning staff was not the only reason for the
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delay in formulating detailed plans. Serious disagreements 
of policy had arisen between the two Allied governments. 
Washington was in favour of direct Allied rule of the 
island, a policy which would involve the removal of all 
provincial Prefects and also the Mayors of important 
communities. These would be replaced by Allied officers. A 
draft message from the President to the Prime Minister, 
prepared by John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War and 
chairman of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC) in 
Washington, stated "we should avoid all risk of 
implications arising from attempted selection of suitable 
Italians for these important positions. Believe much 
preferable remove any Italians from these positions as they 
are all prominent Fascists and replace them with Army 
officers for time being thus avoiding stirring up factions 
on the ground and repercussions at home." (30)
A message on the same day from Churchill to Roosevelt 
referred to the degree of control which should be imposed 
on newly conquered regions:'It seems wise to make them run 
themselves as much as possible.... I am sure it would be a 
mistake to flood all these places with hundreds of British 
and American gauleiters...It should be left to the Supreme 
Commander to propose to our Governments what British and 
American officers he wants and the degree of infusion into 
local life.' (31) Both these messages reflecting opposing 
views were sent on 10 June. Four days later the President 
agreed that the issue should be left to the discretion of 
the Supreme Commander but the final directive from the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff for Operation HUSKY was not sent 
until 28 June. C.R.S.Harris, official historian of Allied 
Military Government of Italy, comments that this directive 
left General Alexander free to decide the issue at his own 
discretion, removing from his shoulders 'the incubus of a 
mandatory dismissal of Prefects and Mayors of the important 
communities, irrespective of the actual conditions
discovered upon occupation.' (32)
The dispute between the Allies on the question of direct
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or indirect rule had taken a considerable time to resolve 
in spite of a memorandum sent by Lord Rennell to Spofford 
on 18 April in which he set out the principal reasons why, 
in his opinion, a system of indirect rule would be more 
appropriate. The reasons, briefly summarised, were as 
follows;
i) Economy in Civil Affairs personnel. Fewer officers 
required to control, supervise and give directions than are 
necessary for their actual execution.
ii) Local subordinates more likely to obey the orders of 
their own superiors.
iii) Fewer language difficulties.
iv) More incentive for local personnel to remain at work.
v) Less likelihood of strikes if employees know they are 
responsible for well-being of local population.
vi) Any administrative breakdown will be attributed by 
public to their own civil servants.
vii) Local administrative machine will be educated and 
improved by Allied direction.
viii) Allies will avoid impression of instituting a 
colonial-style government.
ix) No void would be created when the time came for the 
Allies to leave. (33)
The memorandum concluded with Rennell stating that a 
decision on which system to implement was of immediate 
importance, since the two alternatives had a direct bearing 
on the mechanics of administration.
All the reasons put forward by Rennell for indirect rule 
appear to be valid, since their aim was not only to help 
both Allied and Italian administrators, but also the civil 
population. In fact even with indirect military government 
the number of Allied staff proved to be insufficient and, 
as reports from Civil Affairs Officers later revealed, 
language problems occurred which would have been even 
greater under a direct administration.
Since the President did not give his decision until 14 
June, Rennell was justifiably frustrated by the delay. He
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had taken up his post in Algiers on 6 April and less than a 
month now remained to complete the planning of the first 
administration of an enemy territory other than colonial.
Direct versus Indirect rule was, however, by no means the 
only issue which held up progress. One of the problems of 
coalition is the tendency of one partner to claim seniority 
in an area in which he has had a special interest in the 
past and which he wishes to retain in the future. In this 
case both partners had special interests; Britain in the 
Mediterranean as a whole and America in Sicily because of 
the several million Americans of Italian origin living in 
the USA. As mentioned above, Eisenhower’s initial message 
to the WD on 8 February had referred to a possibility that 
the British might wish to claim responsibility for the 
administration of Sicily. In early March, a memo was 
prepared for the President to inform him that Anthony Eden, 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had informed Harold 
Macmillan that the British were inclined to the view that 
they should have prime responsibility for the control of 
civil affairs in Sicily. (34) When the WD was informed of 
the British view and Eisenhower's opposition to it, the 
American Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed the American 
Government's decision that there should be no "senior 
partner" in the joint military administration. (35) It was 
Eisenhower's opinion that if either government assumed 
primary responsibility, this could invite 'undesirable 
speculation with regard to imperialistic intentions which 
could be exploited by enemy propaganda.' (36)
This was not the end of the matter. A month later the 
President stated that 'the administration should be so 
organised that in its relations with the local population 
the greatest emphasis possible is given to the American 
character of the operation.' He referred to the strong pro- 
American feeling in Sicily and emphasised 'America's 
historical detachment from questions involving the 
relations of European states with each other.' (37) On 13 
April, however, he accepted the AFHQ proposal for a joint
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administration after receiving a letter from Secretary of 
War, Henry Stimson, and Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, 
which made clear that planning was being made on the basis 
of joint Allied responsibility. (38)
The Prime Minister wrote to the President on the same day 
suggesting that since the Force Commander for Operation 
HUSKY was British, Britain should be senior partner in the 
military administration.(39) In his reply Roosevelt stated 
that there should be no "senior partner" but pointed out 
that the military problem would be made less difficult by 
giving to the Allied Military Government as much of an 
American character as was practicable.(40) Churchill 
hastened to withdraw any implication that Britain should be 
the "senior partner" and agreed that at least half of the 
officers of the administration should be American.(41)
In an entry in his War Diaries, Harold Macmillan refers to 
the "senior partner" dispute, which he could not make 
public at the time but explained in a later postscript. He 
referred to it as an affair which caused him ’more trouble 
and anxiety than all the other work, even including French 
politicians... The stupidity of London and Washington from 
the highest quarters downwards has been almost
incredible.. .All that has been achieved is a great waste
of time and straining of tempers... My position with 
Eisenhower and Co. is strengthened, because I have stuck 
resolutely to my agreement with them, even under rather 
heavy fire from London.' (42)
The role that Macmillan should play in the organisation of 
military government was also a source of contention between 
the Allies. The British considered it reasonable that as 
Resident Minister at AFHQ, he should be kept informed of 
all political matters pertaining to the military
administration of Sicily. The American view was expressed
in a memo from John McCloy to Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's 
special assistant, which emphasised that the administration 
plan for Sicily did not include a political figure. McCloy 
was of the opinion that the presence of a British Cabinet
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member in addition to a British Military Governor and a 
British CCAO would give such a strongly British flavour 
that it would destroy a joint partner arrangement. (43) 
Roosevelt took up the issue with Churchill, who pointed out 
the need for heads of governments to have immediate and 
intimate information about events in the civil and 
political sphere. It was then agreed that both Macmillan 
and his American counterpart Robert Murphy would continue 
to communicate with their governments, purely to pass on 
information, but in each case would inform the Supreme 
Commander.
According to his diary entry for 17 June Macmillan had 
also been concerned about his future status at AFHQ for 
some time, and was delighted to learn from the President 
that he was to stay with Eisenhower. Macmillan was aware 
that Washington did not like his presence at AFHQ and hoped 
it would end with North Africa but, as he recorded: 'The 
President has given in to the PM on this, largely at
Eisenhower's own request.... The Chief of Staff was very 
nice and said they could not do without me.'(44) After 
their first inauspicious meeting at AFHQ in January the 
Supreme Commander and the British Minister Resident were 
now working closely together. Communications between 
Algiers and Washington were very slow and Macmillan 
received confirmation of his role only three weeks before 
the planned invasion date.
So much time had been taken by the Allies to reach
agreement on various aspects of the invasion that the final 
directive had not yet been made available. To avoid
unnecessary delay, the directive was sent to AFHQ in three
instalments: the first on 31 May, the second on 10 June and 
the final on 28 June. The complete directive consisted of 
three sections: political, monetary and fiscal, and
economic guides, to which, consistent with military 
necessity, the planners were obliged to conform. (45) The 
content of these guides will be examined in a later 
section.
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An essential part of the plan was the establishment of a 
training centre for civil affairs officers destined for 
Sicily. Chrea, thirty miles from Algiers, was chosen and 
British and American officers began to arrive there in 
June. (46) For most prospective CAOs it would not be their 
first period of training since both Britain and the United 
States had previously established their own separate 
military government schools but this would be the first 
combined training. Before describing the instruction given 
at Chrea, the courses provided by the British and American 
schools will be examined.
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Section 3. The Selection and Training of
CAOs
As early as December, 1939, the War Office had instituted 
a series of 'politico-military' courses in Cambridge with 
the object of training British officers for liaison duties 
with other European governments in the period of post-war 
reconstruction. The courses were organised by Cambridge 
University under the auspices of the War Office.(47) Four 
courses were held during 1940 and 1941, each lasting eight 
weeks. The curriculum included the political and economic 
history of Europe, systems of government, races and racial 
theories, the 1919 peace settlement and the modern problems 
of European countries. These subjects were all studied at 
University level. The last course included officers from 
the United States and a number of European countries. The 
courses were then discontinued and for more than a year no 
further training of British officers took place. (48)
The A.T.(E) Committee, set up in June 1942 to consider the 
training needed for military government officers, decided 
to appoint a sub-committee 'to make detailed proposals as 
to the best means of training personnel for civil 
administration in European territories that might be 
occupied by a British expeditionary force'.(49) The sub­
committee held its first meeting on 20 October and decided 
that the previous 'politico-military' courses held in 
Cambridge were unsuitable, since Civil Affairs staff, in 
addition to professional and technical qualifications, 
needed a sound knowledge of military administration and a 
less academic, more practical experience of the problems 
likely to be encountered in the field. This would be better 
achieved by forming study groups to work out typical 
administrative problems and by holding exercises to try out 
the organisation. (50)
London was recommended as the most suitable location for 
the proposed school, which was to be called the Civil 
Affairs Staff Centre (CASC). London would be conveniently
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situated for lecturers visiting from Oxford, Cambridge, 
other universities and various Government Departments, and 
would be easily supervised by the War Office. Each course 
should last eight weeks and an intake of three hundred 
students would be a minimum requirement. The sub-committee 
provided a list of various sources from which suitable 
candidates might be selected. They included military 
sources, ministries, civil departments and professional 
bodies. A recommendation that the minimum age of trainees 
should be not less than forty was also made. (51)
The Centre was established in a large house in Wimbledon, 
'Southlands', and the first course started on 25 February 
1943 with an intake of 150 students. Colonel T. Robbins, 
former Assistant Commandant of the Array Intelligence 
Training Centre, Cambridge Wing, who had been in 
administrative charge of the politico-military courses 
there, became Commandant.(52) He was an obvious choice as 
he was also well acquainted with the School of Military 
Government at Charlottesville, which had been established 
in May 1942, and had reported on the courses held there. 
Donnison describes the course as 'a pioneering venture for 
the staff as much as for the students; both were learning 
together as nothing was yet known as to the probable 
organisation, policy or plans for civil affairs.' (53)
The A.T.(E) Sub-committee also suggested that, apart from 
language qualifications, candidates should have experience 
in specific areas such as Trade and Industry, Finance and 
Banking, Public Health, Legal and Police. (54) These would 
be areas organised by specialist personnel in the military 
administration of Sicily but the implication that language 
qualifications were also required was not borne out by the 
number of Civil Affairs Officers in Sicily who had 
virtually no knowledge of the Italian language and 
depended on interpreters. The CCAO, Lord Rennell, later 
wrote that his officers included a fair proportion of 
Italian speakers and men with administrative experience, 
but 'the combination of these two qualifications in any one
50
individual was indeed rare.'(55)
The Chief Instructor of the Non-Military syllabus was Lt 
Col J.R.M. Butler, (later to edit the United Kingdom 
Military Series of the History of the Second World War). 
Understandably the syllabus was broadly based since it was 
clearly difficult at this early planning stage to forecast 
future events. A general instruction course of 88 lectures 
was given to all officers by visiting experts. These were 
mainly on the political and economic development of 
contemporary Europe, administration and local government 
systems, international law appertaining to belligerent 
occupation and in-depth studies of enemy and occupied 
countries in Europe. Since both Allies would be involved 
in the administration of occupied enemy territories and 
liberated friendly ones, it was essential that British 
officers were made aware of American points of view on 
European affairs and therefore a significant part of the 
course was allocated to study of the United States, with 
lectures delivered by both American and British speakers. A 
number of international administrative bodies such as the 
League of Nations and the High Commission for Refugees also 
contributed to the course. (56)
Apart from receiving general instruction small groups of 
officers were provided with the detailed knowledge required 
for specific kinds of administrative work in the countries 
where they were likely to be involved. Six regional study 
groups and seven functional study groups were formed, each 
officer being assigned to one of each group according to 
the region in Europe in which he was intended to work and 
the nature of his post. (57)
In addition to the non-military syllabus a specific 
military course provided student officers recruited from 
civilian sources with the necessary military background to 
carry out their duties on the Civil Affairs staff of a 
military commander in the field. Teaching methods combined 
group study, syndicate discussions, lectures and practical 
and planning exercises designed to clarify the duties of a
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Civil Affairs staff in the various phases of military 
operations. Newly commissioned civilians were assisted by 
students who were already serving officers. The syllabus 
covered all branches of Army organisation, with special 
reference to the differences between British and American 
staff functions. Also studied in depth was the Army’s role 
in Security, Communications, Transport and Maintenance, 
and the work of the Royal Engineers (RE) and the Pioneer 
Corps in the field. Even the functions of NAAFI (Navy, 
Army and Air Force Institutes) and the YMCA (Young Men's 
Christian Association) were on the agenda. (58)
The final planning exercise of the course was based on an 
operational situation likely to be encountered in an 
assault on enemy territory, such as the capture of a 
bridgehead area including a port, with a subsequent advance 
involving the capture of heavily populated areas. This was 
the situation after the Eighth Army landings south of 
Siracusa. The exercise was designed to illustrate the 
duties of CAOs in the various phases of an invasion from 
their preliminary work with the combat forces when active 
operations were still in progress, followed by the 
organisation of civil administration in base areas, and 
then the phase of regional organisation when the area was 
still under military control but local administration had 
been sufficiently re-established to enable it to function 
with the aid merely of general supervision. (59)
The recruitment and training of suitable officers was the 
responsibility of the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer 
(DCCAO), Brigadier S.S.Lee. A number of civilians, mostly 
civil servants and police officers, were selected from the 
list of sources suggested by the A.T.(E), then interviewed 
by a War Office Selection Board (WOSB). If successful they 
were then commissioned before following a training course. 
This procedure was not welcomed by all departments in the 
War Office. The Adjutant General's Office objected to the 
granting of a Captain's rank to a civilian training for a 
CAO appointment, pointing out that it would be disliked by
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the Army and could give rise to 'grouses from equally 
well-qualified serving officers who are not selected1. 
Objections were also raised concerning the cost of 
providing the uniform allowance, estimated at £5,000. (60) 
Service recruits were drawn from among both serving and 
retired officers. As Donnison points out, the demands of 
civil affairs could not be allowed to interfere with the 
needs of the more combatant branches of the services and so 
no officer below the age of thirty-five, with a medical 
category higher than B was eligible to serve in civil 
affairs. An officer above that age but below fifty-five 
with a medical category of A or B was eligible, as was 
anyone over that age who held special qualifications.(61) 
Other ranks were not normally accepted for training as 
CAOs, unless they possessed special qualifications. They 
were required to attend a preliminary interview and, if 
successful, they progressed to a WOSB. Once selected, they 
were granted a direct emergency commission. (62)
In a letter to the DCCAO on 25 October, the Director of 
Military Intelligence (DMI) expressed his doubts that the 
fighting services would be a good source of supply for 
students as it would be unlikely that any efficient 
officer, having done one of the courses, could be kept in 
reserve until required. (63) A more positive approach came 
from the Operations Directorate suggesting that reliable 
personnel could be found among the considerable number of 
Lt Cols who had finished command of units but were unlikely 
to achieve further promotion. There were also majors with 
experience and energy who, though valuable as such, were 
not recommended for command. (64)
Not every recommendation of the subcommittee was adopted. 
The suggested minimum age was lowered to thirty-five from 
forty and the first course lasted thirteen weeks instead of 
the suggested eight. Subsequent courses became five weeks 
as the need for an increasing number of CAOs in the field 
in Autumn 1943 and throughout 1944 forced the course length 
to be shortened and its content reduced. A greater emphasis
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was given to training in general administration which 
became one of the functional subjects, and the number of 
background lectures was cut. (65)
Police officers would play an extremely important role in 
the military administration of Sicily. Eight senior police 
officers joined the first course at the CASC, followed by 
thirteen in each of the next two courses. On 12 May, 
shortly after the Allied Military Government of Occupied 
Territory (AMGOT) had been formally set up to administer 
Sicily, an urgent request was received from Rennell for a 
minimum of fifty police officers to come to Algiers by the 
end of May. Sixty-six members of the London Metropolitan 
Force were quickly commissioned into the army. With no time 
to train at Wimbledon they arrived at the MGS, Chrea, in 
June for a course of instruction in the principles of 
military government and the Italian language. Twenty-five 
officers were, however, needed immediately to join the 
Eighth Army contingent scheduled to land in Sicily on 10 
July, and were unable to attend the course. (66) The 
qualities of these untrained British Police officers are 
described by Harris from his own first-hand observations: 
'Their tact, common-sense and resourcefulness amply 
compensated for any lack of knowledge of the country or the 
language... they formed a tower of strength.' (67)
Two further police contingents left for Sicily and Italy 
during August and September, having received training at 
Wimbledon or, in the case of junior police officers, at 
Peel House, which normally housed the Metropolitan Police 
Training School. This had been temporarily closed during 
the war, but reopened to provide accommodation for staff 
and students attending one of the seven three-week courses 
which were organised there under the auspices of the CASC. 
At the conclusion of each course students returned to duty 
with their own police forces until required for military 
duty. (68)
Other branches of the army, including the Corps of 
Military Police, senior commanders, staff and regimental
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officers, were given short courses of instruction to 
familiarise them with the work of civil affairs. Visiting 
lecturers toured army bases to explain the purpose of civil 
affairs and to recruit potential CAOs at the same time.(69) 
In spite of the existence of MGS at AFHQ and the presence 
of the AMGOT planning staff, it appears that army staffs at 
AFHQ and the HQs of Seventh and Eighth Armies had
apparently not been given any information concerning the
organisation or functions of military government. Harris 
states that most of the military commanders of tactical 
units were totally ignorant of the functions, or even the 
existence of Military Government. (70)
Much criticism was later expressed of the quality of 
training provided by the CASC. Foreign Secretary Anthony 
Eden referred to Wimbledon as 'rather a farce'. (71)
Harris wrote that 'most of the officers had to be recruited 
with only the barest minimum of training for the jobs they 
had to do.1 (72) Donnison, however, describes the
instruction given at the school as excellent and refers to 
the many students within his knowledge, who passed out from 
the CASC as first-class CAOs. He concedes, however, that 
many of the students were not of the 'calibre or
disposition to profit from the excellent instruction given' 
and were in fact 'of grievously inferior quality, the 
rejects from elsewhere.'(73) He also draws attention to the 
high proportion of candidates rejected by the selection 
boards because they did not meet the standards or possess 
the varied qualifications demanded by the boards.(74)
Lord Rennell pointed out that few people outside the realm 
of the professional administrator knew much about public 
administration apart from the fairly large number of 
Colonial civil servants produced by Britain. Regimental 
training in both the British and American Armies did not 
normally produce good administrative personnel, since a 
regular officer was trained to be 'a fighting man for whom 
administration is simplified as much as possible in order 
to let him devote his time to the art of war'.(75) Rennell
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was referring to the armies of an era when regular officers 
had little experience outside their own regiment, lived in 
a relatively secluded environment and did not acquire the 
type of skills needed for military government. He 
emphasised that his comments did not apply to senior staff 
officers who would have acquired wide administrative 
experience.
Rennell's observations explain why, of the men accepted
1
for training, few could offer the range of qualities needed 
by a general administrative officer. Civilian applicants 
may have had more relevant experience but would, in 
addition, need to prove an ability to work with and command 
respect from the military.(76) Since in the early stages of 
occupation of an enemy territory it was quite likely that a 
CAO would find himself in sole control of a remote area, 
without transport or reliable means of communication with 
senior officers, he needed the ability to make quick 
decisions and decide on priorities. Local administration 
might have collapsed but 'first things first1 meant that 
corpses had to be buried, and food found for a hungry 
population as soon as law and order were established. It 
was not easy to attract men of the right calibre for these 
tasks, for either they could not be spared from their posts 
or they were reluctant to leave appointments to which their 
abilities had promoted them. Donnison describes the civil 
affairs organisation as being 'last in the market'(77) and 
Ellwood refers to it as a 'Cinderella' service suitable for 
Ancient Military Gentlemen on Tour. (78)
In the United States the question of military government 
had arisen as early as September 1941 when the Judge 
Advocate General (JAG) proposed that commissioned personnel 
should be trained 'for the possibility of future service 
involving the administration of military government by the 
United States Army.' (79) Shortly afterwards Jesse Miller,
a civilian consultant at the WD, produced a preliminary 
memorandum, which outlined the nature, scope and personnel 
of a School of Military Government (SMG), to be established
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by the Provost Marshal General (PMG).
The scope of instruction embraced international 
conventions and American regulations, procedure and 
experience relevant to the administration of military 
government, and the historical, political, social and 
economic backgrounds of the occupied regions in which the 
officers would function. It was recommended that the 
Commandant should be a regular Army officer and the 
Director either a civilian or an officer commissioned from 
civil life for that purpose. Miller stressed that only 
student officers whose background and ability indicated
aptitude for the assignment should be selected. (80)
On 13 March a directive from the Adjutant General (AG) 
announced the establishment of the School of Military 
Government at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, 
with General Wickersham as commander, under the supervision 
of the PMG, Major General Allen Gullion. (81) The School 
opened on 11 May 1942 with forty-nine student officers
following a course of instruction which comprised mainly 
civil subjects in a greatly expanded curriculum from the 
original suggested by Miller. The course had no prescribed 
length but was not to exceed sixteen weeks in duration.
In June Wickersham suggested that the School1s next intake 
should number one hundred and fifty students. Gullion was 
strongly in favour but doubted that the Army could supply 
that number given the reluctance of commanders to release 
good men with ability and qualifications. Wickersham had 
suggested a number of outside agencies as sources of 
personnel but Gullion was not inclined to commission
civilians. His view was that the Army was responsible for
the administration of any military government, and the Army 
should therefore prepare the plans and policies for it, 
including the procurement and training of personnel. (82)
At the same time Arthur Ringland, a member of the War 
Relief Control Board, proposed to the President that 
private institutions should be involved in the provision 
of personnel for military government.(83) Miller was now at
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the SMG as Wickersham's assistant and he wrote to the 
Office of the Under Secretary of War pointing out the 
'unwisdom of permitting premature interference by civilian 
agencies'. Citing examples from American history as 
evidence of the unfortunate results of civilian influence 
in the Civil War, and in the occupation of the Philippines, 
he emphasised that the direction and administration of 
military government belonged wholly to the military 
command. (84)
The first course at Charlottesville ended in August and an 
inspection gave the SMG a generally favourable report, 
stating that the course was practical and that the student 
intake possessed 'a very reasonable spread of skills and 
success in civilian pursuits'.(85) As would later occur in 
Wimbledon, the second course was amended to remove the 
over-emphasis on areas not considered essential for 
subordinate officials. There were, however, many criticisms 
from government departments and independent agencies both 
of the Army's plans for military government and of the 
Charlottesville SMG faculty, although the doubts originally 
expressed by the President regarding the quality of the 
staff seem to have been allayed.
Gullion vigorously defended both the School's faculty and 
instruction but admitted that the SMG was vulnerable ' in 
one particular, i.e. we are not getting enough high class 
students. ’ (86) He also admitted that the intake for the 
course in January 1943 was distinctly below the average of 
previous students. It was decided that for future courses 
commanders would be held responsible for ensuring that only 
the best type of officer, those who possessed outstanding 
leadership qualities and unimpeachable character, should be 
selected for training. But as Donnison has shown, neither 
Britain, nor the USA had a sufficient number of outstanding 
serving officers to provide the hundreds of CAOs needed, 
not only for Italy but later for North-West Europe.
After their separate training at Charlottesville and 
Wimbledon, it was essential for prospective CAOs to follow
58
a joint course not only to prepare them to administer a 
specific territory but in order to establish good working 
relationships between officers whose background and 
traditions were very different.(87) Officers came to Chrea 
not only from the USA and UK but from North Africa and the 
Middle East. On 2 June more than 100 Americans arrived, 
followed on 27 June by nearly 100 British. An intensive 
instruction course, comprising the Italian language, and 
Military Government with reference to conditions in Sicily 
and Italy, also provided seminar groups for officers in 
their own special fields such as finance and civil 
supplies. A compulsory part of the course was Physical 
Training since a high level of fitness would be as 
necessary for CAOs in the insanitary living conditions of 
bombed towns as for combat troops and would be essential 
for those landing in the early assault waves from Landing 
Crafts over the beaches.
Visiting lecturers included General Eisenhower and other 
high-ranking commanders. A number of British officers who 
were involved in the administration of Tripolitania and 
thus had practical experience were on hand to assist in the 
instruction of the three hundred and fifty-seven Allied 
officers who attended the two courses held at Chrea from 2 
June to 14 July and the third shortened course held later 
at Tizi Ouzou, a Military Government Holding Centre near 
Algiers. AMGOT had been allocated a War Establishment (WE) 
of four hundred and forty officers plus four hundred and 
sixty other ranks in support roles. (88) This number 
included provision for future landings on the mainland. The 
numbers of CAOs actually on the island at any one time are 
difficult to ascertain as the number naturally increased as 
more areas were captured and as specialist officers joined 
the CAOs already in place. A common complaint in CAOs' 
reports was the shortage of ORs to assist with clerical 
work and to man offices when the CAO was in the field. 
Staff obtained locally were not always suitable, either 
because of language difficulties or the confidential nature
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of the work involved.
Harris comments that the most important function of Chrea 
was not the instruction but the inculcation of a spirit of
cooperation between individuals of two nations, speaking
the same language but with very different traditions and 
prejudices. (89) In view of the acrimony which had 
characterised relations between Allied military commanders 
during the Tunisian campaign and which had influenced the 
attitudes of their troops, Rennell was determined to avoid 
a similar situation developing among officers of the 
Military Government. In the first General Administrative 
Instruction (GAI No.l) issued to all field personnel as
part of the AMGOT Plan, Rennell referred to differences in
procedure, custom and outlook between the Armies, warning 
CAOs that the differences must not affect their efficiency 
or form the subject of complaints or gossiping. (90)
Harris describes the parade at Chrea on 4 July when the 
British saluted the 'Star-spangled banner' and entertained 
the Americans, after which 'no more was heard of Americans 
versus British...AMGOT had indeed become one.'(91) 
Rennell's efforts to inculcate a spirit of cooperation had 
indeed paid off. He later wrote that the Italian experiment 
in military government was an unqualified success and that 
those associated with it were, justifiably, very proud of 
the success achieved. (92)
Although the short courses at Chrea and Tizi Ouzou were 
more focused than those at Wimbledon and Charlottesville, 
which necessarily dealt with the more general problems of 
an occupied territory, they were not immune to criticism. 
Gayre, the Educational Adviser for Italy, refers from his 
own experience to Tizi Ouzou as the place where 'waifs and 
strays who some day might be used for military government 
studied problems of Italian government from instructors, 
the confidence of some of whom was the greater in 
proportion to their ignorance.' (93) These were the 
comments of a senior academic, formerly Staff Officer for 
Education at Oxford, and not a typical prospective CAO.
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A very different view was put forward by an American CAO. 
It was the prospective CAOs, not the Chrea staff who were 
criticised by Henry Adams. Referring to the 'serious 
efforts of the informed instructional staff who presented 
their material carefully', he writes that 'only a minority 
took to heart the importance of this knowledge as a basis 
for efficient action in military government. The majority 
failed to take the instruction seriously and failed even to 
bother to read the material at their disposal.'(94) Adams 
describes the atmosphere at the centre as one of boredom, 
scorn and despair.
The second course at Chrea finished on 14 July and was 
followed by a third at Tizi Ouzou. A Civil Affairs Staff 
School had also begun to function in June at Mena in Egypt. 
Not all the CAOs taking part in the administration of 
Sicily would come from the above-mentioned centres. 
Individuals from more than a dozen countries, most of them 
"unknown quantities" were scheduled to arrive in Algiers to 
join the Chrea graduates and were then sent to an 
embarkation port for the invasion.
Meanwhile detailed planning of the proposed administration 
of Sicily was taking place at Chr6a. To ensure continued 
close contact with the main planning staff, liaison 
officers had been left behind with Force 141 at Bouzarea. 
Since the two separate Task Forces, American Force 343, and 
British Force 545, had HQs at Mostaganem and Cairo 
respectively, their planning staffs were kept informed of 
draft military government plans by visits from MGS AFHQ 
staff. Lt Col Charles Poletti, designated head of Seventh 
Army AMG and SCAO of Palermo province, went to Force 343 
for final planning consultations, while the designated head 
of Eighth Army AMG, Group Captain C.E. Benson, went to 
Force 545. (95)
Plans for the two Military Government organisations were 
finalised and, as Harris points out, the principle of 
division on a fifty-fifty basis was not always applied with 
mathematical exactitude, since it was laid down that the
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Senior Civil Affairs Officers and two-thirds of the staff 
of the two Army AMGs should be of the same nationality as 
their commanders. (96) As part of the AMG of British Task 
Force 545, the SCAO of Catania was therefore British and 
British CAOs outnumbered their American colleagues in the 
province. Of the nine SCAOs heading the nine provinces in 
the island, five were American and four British. (97)
As there were six specialist divisions, these could be 
fairly divided. Legal, Civil Supply and Public Safety were 
headed by Americans, and Finance, Public Health, and Allied 
and Enemy Property by British officers. Officers for these 
specialist divisions were selected on the basis of their 
qualifications and experience in a particular field. (98) 
Apart from a number of trained Police officers (mostly 
British) in the Public Safety Division, who initially acted 
as CAOs as well as CAPOs in the early stages of the 
occupation, the specialist officers, who arrived later than 
CAOs, were responsible for advising the SCAOs and CAOs on 
matters pertaining to their division, and also for 
assisting hard-pressed CAOs in specific areas of their 
administration. The following is a very brief resume of 
their respective roles, described in more detail later in 
the context of the administration of Catania.
The Legal Division's role in the planning stage was 
pivotal since it was responsible for drawing up the 
Proclamations and setting up the Allied Military Courts. It 
also advised the CCAO on his powers under international law 
and the Hague Rules. As the Allied Military Government 
would be based on a system of indirect rule, the role of 
the Public Safety Division was of vital importance since it 
was responsible for the maintenance of law and order. 
Allied officers with police training were entrusted with 
the supervision of the local Carabinieri. Another division 
concerned with the welfare of the population was the Public 
Health Division. Staffed by medical officers who were aware 
of the possibility of epidemics following the destruction 
of water mains and sewers during bombardments in the height
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of summer, they were also responsible for welfare matters, 
including the care of children and refugees.
The Finance Division had a number of specific tasks, which 
included the establishment of the Allied Military Finance 
Agency (AMFA) to issue military lire to the forces and to 
provide currency for AMGOT to cover its administrative 
expenditure. It was also responsible for the regulation of 
banks and financial institutions. The first task of the 
Enemy Property Division (later renamed the Allied and Enemy 
Property Division) was 'to take into their control any 
Enemy State property not required for the time being by any 
other branch of the Allied Forces', and its second, 
according to Proclamation No.6, was 'to assist all other 
branches of the Allied forces to ascertain, secure and take 
possession of all Enemy State property which is susceptible 
of military use that they might require. ' The function of 
the Civilian Supply Division was to plan and supply 
essential requirements of foodstuffs, such as flour, milk, 
meat and sugar, medical supplies, including vaccines, to 
last three months after the invasion. As a precaution 
against a failure of the harvest, it was also decided to 
create a stockpile of flour in North Africa. (99)
With the involvement of AFHQ, Force 141, Chrea, Force 
343, Force 545, and London and Washington in the planning 
process, and also with the need for constant communication 
between scattered locations, it is clear that organising 
the deployment of AMG staff was fraught with difficulties. 
These were compounded by the fact that most of the military 
commanders of tactical units seemed to be unaware of the 
existence of Civil Affairs Officers. (100) As a consequence 
neither Force gave CAOs priority in their landing schedules 
nor in transport for them in spite of instructions from 
Force 141, issued on 22 May. These clearly delineated the 
role of CAOs, both with the assault forces and with Task 
Force HQs during the initial phases of the invasion, during 
which CAOs would act as Staff Officers to the Commanders 
and be subject to their authority. (101) CAOs would be only
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provided with a nominal scale of transport, the remainder 
arriving in the follow-up convoys. They would therefore 
have to depend on locally requisitioned military transport 
(MT) and combat units' MT. Assault commanders were aware of 
this and instructed to assist CAOs in the execution of
their duties but this was an instruction more honoured in 
the breach than the observance.
Seventh Army HQ were most reluctant to accommodate AMG 
personnel and transport. In fact Lt Col Poletti's presence 
at Mostaganem was so resented that the 1st US Division
declared that they were capable of looking after Civil
Affairs themselves. A similar lack of cooperation at AFHQ 
provoked Rennell to remark that they seemed to regard his 
requirements as 'nothing but an unmitigated nuisance to be 
met only when nothing else could be done in the face of
direct orders from the Chief of Staff'. (102) There was a
friendlier atmosphere at Force 545 but even there Rennell's 
wish to attach CAOs to the beach assault forces was 
refused. Benson was told that only four officers could
embark in the second wave, the rest to be called forward
when needed from the various embarkation ports. This was 
not acceptable as CAOs would not be available to take over 
territory as it was occupied. Force 545 finally agreed to 
take 30 officers in the first 3 days but not transport. The 
administrative and logistical problems caused Rennell to 
describe the month before D-Day as 'a nightmare.' (103) It 
was 28 June before the complete directive for the 
organisation of Military Government for Sicily was finally 
dispatched to General Eisenhower. The Directive consisted 
of political, monetary and fiscal, and economic guides. The 
three sections are summarised below and represent the
measures to be taken by CAOs and Specialist Officers 
immediately after occupation of the island.
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Political Guides
1. Both Allied flags to be displayed at HQ to emphasise 
Allied aspect of administration.
2. No political agencies to participate.
3. No civilian agencies to be involved.
4. A benevolent attitude towards the civilian population 
to be adopted.
5. Military Commander to decide replacements of prefects 
and mayors.
6. Immediate dissolution of Fascist Party organisation 
except those organisations whose removal would 
adversely affect the efficiency of the administration.
7. War criminals to be imprisoned.
8. All discriminatory laws to be annulled.
9. Prompt release of political prisoners.
10. No local political groups to be involved in the 
policies of the administration.
11. Powers of the crown to be suspended.
12. Position of Church to be respected and all efforts 
made to preserve local archives and monuments.
13. Transfer of title of property to be prevented if 
intended to avoid fines or punishments on owners.
Monetary and Fiscal Guides
1. US yellow seal currency and British Military Authority 
notes to be used initially until Allied military [AM] 
lire available.
2. US Treasury will provide AM currency when needed.
3. The above will supplement local lire currency.
4. Rate of exchange: 4 US dollars = £1, 100 lire = 1 
dollar,
400 lire = £1.
5. US yellow seal and BMA currency to be withdrawn as 
soon as possible.
6. All persons must accept the rate of exchange.
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7. All foreign financial transactions prohibited.
8. Establishment of Allied Military Financial Agency 
(AMFA) to provide pay and cash requirements for 
military formations and CAOs.
9. All banks to be closed, vaults sealed and inventories 
made of banks' assets.
10. National funds and Fascist Party funds to be 
impounded.
11. Banks to be reopened when deemed desirable by AMG.
12. Banks permitted to arrange loans.
13. Local banks permitted only lire accounts.
14. Existing tax laws to be maintained.
15. Branches of National Insurance Institute to be under 
military control.
16. Public services and government monopolies and their 
revenues to be under military control.
17. No revenues to be used to pay interest on national
government obiigat ions.
Economic Guides
1. Measures to be undertaken to enable the country's own
services of production to assure as far as possible
the provisioning of local population. Direct relief 
employed only where necessary.
2. Measures to be taken to procure essential materials to 
establish utilities and maintain agricultural 
production.
3. Maximum prices to be quickly established.
4. Associations of employers and employees may be 
temporarily continued but Fascist officers to be 
removed.
5. Control to be established over import and export of 
goods by local business concerns. (104)
When the Directive was in the planning stage Paragraph 4
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of the Political Guides decreed a benevolent attitude 
towards the civil population of Sicily and prompted a 
letter from Rennell to Col Maxwell at MGS in which he drew 
attention to General Administrative Instruction No.l. This 
had outlined a code of conduct for CAOs which began with 
the following words:"You will be guided in your attitude 
towards the local population by the memory of years of war 
in which the Italians fought against your people and your 
Allies." This statement was clearly inconsistent with the 
attitude of benevolence laid down in the Directive and was 
in fact later omitted from the printed manual given to 
CAOs.(105)
Rennell pointed out to Maxwell that his experience of 
British troops was not of having to restrain them from 
being vindictive but of trying to prevent them from 
immediate fraternisation with the local population. He 
feared that an invitation to the troops to be benevolent 
would encourage them in these habits. In a more serious 
vein he pointed out the difficulty of creating a fighting 
spirit among troops in a general atmosphere of 
benevolence. (106) Having made known his own views, 
Rennell obviously had no choice but to accept a Directive 
which came from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Reference has been earlier made to GAI No.l and its 
emphasis on the joint nature of Allied Military 
Government. These General Administrative Instructions, 
sixteen in all, dealt with general policy and attitudes 
towards civilians, and also the immediate duties of CAOs 
upon entering occupied areas. GAI No.l stressed the 
importance of assisting the troops in their operations in 
the early stages of the invasion, even if this was at the 
expense of efficient administration. (107) Combat troops 
can only carry limited amounts of field rations and depend 
on supplies from local sources, particularly if port 
facilities are lacking, as they were in the Seventh Army 
invasion zone. Helping combat units to procure food would 
become a far more difficult task for CAOs than their other
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specified task of maintaining order in the immediate rear 
of the advancing armies. This problem did not arise as the 
Allies were greeted everywhere as liberators,, much to 
Rennell's relief. Acutely aware of the limited number of 
CAOs at his disposal, he confessed:"We have got away with 
things here because the population was friendly and the 
Carabinieri have worked." (108)
Apart from the Directive and the GAIs, all AMGOT officers 
were issued with a detailed handbook, compiled by the 
Foreign Office, the Sicily Zone Handbook, which provided 
information on the people, their way of life, the island's 
administration, the organisation of the Fascist Party, 
economic conditions, and a comprehensive list of Who's Who 
in the nine provinces and in communes with a population 
over 5,000.(109) A section on the islanders' attitude to 
the war, to Germans, to Fascism and to the Allies was 
included but readers were informed that the information 
supplied was not necessarily up to date and that attitudes 
could have undergone considerable alterations.
The Foreign Office compilers of the handbook forecast 
that neither strong resistance nor active collaboration 
from the population was to be expected.(110) In the event 
there was very little resistance and in most areas there 
was active collaboration. The compilers were certainly 
accurate when they wrote:'Substantial improvement of the 
food situation and material advantages of this kind would 
undoubtedly do much to influence the behaviour of the 
population as a whole.'(Ill) For those CAOs unable to 
attend the courses at Chrea or Tizi Ouzou the Handbook 
provided much background information, which would be 
useful once the administration was established, but was 
not particularly relevant to the early situations 
encountered in which practical solutions were required, as 
will be described in later chapters.
The words of General Bradley, commander of II Corps of 
Force 343 succinctly sum up the military preparations for 
operation HUSKY: 'Seldom in war has a major operation been
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undertaken in such a fog of indecision, confusion and 
conflicting plans.'(112) He was referring specifically to 
the changes in the invasion plan brought about by General 
Montgomery, which aroused so much anger in the American 
camp, not only against the British influence on the 
planning process but what was regarded as Eisenhower's 
yielding to British pressure. As D'Este points out:'All 
the controversies which ensued in Italy and Northwest 
Europe had their roots in the planning for Sicily and in 
the campaign itself.' (113) He also cites Nigel Hamilton's 
biography of Montgomery, which states that the creation of 
two Allied Armies for Sicily ushered into Allied 
operations a principle that committed the Allies to 
failure, since no overall commander could be found with 
both the tact to combine the separate national wills of 
their forces and the military genius to command them in 
the field.'(114)
In contrast to the military planning, the preparation for 
Military Government was on a very much smaller scale and 
did not involve the logistical problems entailed by two 
armies with a combined total of almost half a million men. 
Even so, as previously pointed out, problems of a 
political and diplomatic nature between London and 
Washington prevented any firm planning until they were 
resolved. At AFHQ it became clear that the military 
authorities were not in the least concerned with the needs 
of a small minority, who although they wore uniforms, were 
not considered part of the military force. Even Rennell's 
requests were regarded by both AFHQ and Seventh Army HQ as 
a nuisance and very reluctantly granted. Harris rightly 
points out that the AMGOT planning group at HQ lacked 
experienced officers from Q Branch, (Quarter-Master- 
General ' s Branch whose remit includes the movement of 
forces). Their presence would probably have facilitated 
the inclusion of CAOs in the early landing schedules, 
which the military were reluctant to do. (115) The 
resulting problems are described in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
This chapter will give a brief account of the invasion of 
Pantelleria, which gave the Allies their first encounter 
with Italians on their home ground rather than in one of 
their colonies. It was also here that the first Allied 
Military Government was set up, albeit on a very limited 
scale. It also includes a description of the military 
measures which had been taken to defend Sicily, the role 
played by Germany in the defence of the island, and the 
relationship between the Sicilians and their Axis partners, 
which might determine the degree of resistance to the 
Allied invasion. An account of the landings will underline 
the fact that the strained relationships between the two 
armies in North Africa and during the periodv of planning 
operation HUSKY still continued.
Section 1. The Invasion of Pantelleria and Establishment 
of the first Allied Military Government
In June 1943 the Allies decided to send a force to 
capture the islands of Pantelleria and Lampedusa. The 
decision was mainly based on the fact that in the previous 
February General Marshall had informed General Eisenhower 
that the US Navy could not provide the eight auxiliary 
aircraft carriers requested for air cover of the American 
assault on Sicily. Pantelleria possessed an airfield from 
which Allied fighters could support operations in Sicily. 
This airfield was equipped with underground hangars and 
radio direction finder stations, (RDF), used to detect 
ship and air movements in the Sicilian straits.(1) Planners 
at AFHQ, however, were not in favour, believing that all 
available Allied resources should be kept for the attack on 
Sicily. Churchill had earlier suggested to the COS that 
the capture of the island would remove the threat to 
British convoys in the Mediterranean but the arrival of the
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German Air Force in the island caused the plans to be 
shelved.(2)
When the invasion plans for Sicily were changed with both 
Allied assaults scheduled for the south-east corner of 
Sicily, Eisenhower saw the advantages of acquiring the 
Pantelleria airfield. It would provide good air cover for 
the July landings, eliminate the enemy's use of the RDF 
stations and deny its port as a refuelling base for enemy 
ships. The C-in-C, supported by Admiral Cunningham and Air 
Chief Marshal Tedder, now decided that if the island was 
subjected to intensive air bombardment, the assault would 
be relatively easy. In three weeks 6,400 tons of high 
explosives were dropped on a small area of the island in an 
operation which D'Este describes as 'one of the greatest 
examples of overkill of the war.' (3)
The result was severe damage to housing, communications 
and roads, but above all to morale. On 11 June the island 
commander, Admiral Pavasi, and his staff decided that the 
lack of water and ammunition, and the danger of disease, 
made the island untenable and surrendered as the assault 
troops of the British 1st Division approached the landing 
zone.(4) David Hunt recalled that the garrison troops 
guided the Allied landing parties around the numerous
obstacles in the harbour. (5) The .following day the 
garrison of Lampedusa surrendered to a Fleet Air Arm pilot, 
forced to land on its airfield when he ran out of fuel. Two 
small islands nearby, Linosa and Lampione, were captured on 
13 June.
The surrender of Pantelleria and Lampedusa without a 
single shot being fired had implications for both the
Allies and the Axis partners. The fact that both islands 
were captured through concentrated bombing alone led many 
senior Allied air staff, particularly US General Carl
Spaatz, commander of the bombing operation, to believe that
air power and strategic bombing would be the key to final 
victory. (6) Garland and Smyth point out that for the 
Germans 'the loss of the islands meant not only a military
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defeat and a blow to Axis morale but also served as an 
indication of the performance they could expect in the 
future from their Italian allies.1 (7) The surrender of 
Pantelleria was also a great shock to the Italians. 
American historian, Martin Blumenson, stresses the decline 
of Mussolini's prestige among his own military 
establishment and his political colleagues, but most of all 
among his people.1 (8)
The will to resist of Pantelleria' s garrison had been 
overestimated by Allied Intelligence which predicted that 
an opposed landing would produce heavy casualties. (9) 
However, no chances were being taken with the invasion of 
Sicily, after Montgomery had predicted that resistance 
would be fierce, since Germans and Italians were fighting 
desperately in Tunisia and would do so in Sicily. (10) His 
prediction was later challenged by Hunt, who wrote that it 
was based solely on the battles at Enfidaville in April 
where the Italian infantry 'were putting up a good show' 
and from this Montgomery deduced they would do even better 
on their home ground.'(11) Whether his views regarding the 
strength of Italian resistance would prove accurate or not, 
this first large-scale amphibious operation into Europe 
would naturally, as Liddell Hart comments,'err on the side 
of security.'(12)
The capture of the islands was followed by the first 
experiment in Allied Military Government. Carried out under 
the supervision of an American SCAO, Lt Col Monfort, it was 
on a very limited scale with only three of the thirteen 
Proclamations published, Numbers I, 2 and 4, which 
respectively set up Military Government, detailed War 
Crimes and established Military Courts. For security 
reasons the occupying forces were issued with Italian lire 
and not the 'spearhead1 military currencies planned to be 
used after the invasion of Sicily until Allied military 
lire were circulated. (13)
Monfort's main problem was the amount of damage caused to 
housing, roads and communications by the intensive bombing.
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The existing administration had collapsed but all the 
administrators were retained in office. They proved to be 
cooperative, as were all the civilian inhabitants. Although 
Pantelleria and the smaller islands produced very little 
food, the garrison was normally well stocked, but civilians 
from the port town had looted most of the military 
supplies. For naval security reasons AMGOT was initially 
obliged to restrict fishing, an important source of food 
and income for the population, but was soon able to issue 
permits for a limited number of fishing zones. AMGOT also 
agreed to buy the crop of high quality raisins produced 
from the local grape harvest, and in so doing contributed 
to the island's economy.(14)
Harris points out that AMGOT's experience in Pantelleria 
did not provide a fair sample of the difficulties which 
would be encountered in Sicily, particularly in the field 
of civilian supplies. He draws attention, however, to the 
revelation of certain characteristic deficiencies, such as 
a complete lack of the basic materials needed to set up an 
administration, namely paper, ink and typewriters. A more 
serious deficiency, even though Pantelleria had a limited 
administration, was the absence of coordination between the 
operating forces and AMG officers. (15)
Four weeks after the fall of Pantelleria eight Allied 
divisions took part in the simultaneous assault landings on 
the south-east coast of Sicily, and a total of 478,000 
troops were ultimately involved in the invasion of the 
island. Before detailing the combat operations a brief 
outline of the state of the island’s defences will show 
that Mussolini's speech in Palermo after the summer 
manoeuvres of 1937, in which he declared:"Qui non sbarchera 
mai nessuno, nemmeno un soldato " would not stand the test 
of time. (16)
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Section 2. The Island's Defences
Liddell Hart comments that the complete capture by the 
Allies of eight Axis divisions at the end of the Tunisian 
campaign 'left Italy and the Italian islands almost naked 
of defensive covering.' Of the 225,000 prisoners taken, 
half were Italian, including 'the pick of the Italian 
army.'(17) The 'death march' retreat in Russia in 1943 
resulted in the loss of 175,000 Italian troops, killed or 
captured.(18) These losses, added to those suffered in the
earlier Middle East and East African campaigns and in the
Balkans, had reduced the Italian Army by almost 550,000 
troops.
By July 1943 these manpower losses had not only deprived
the Army of a large percentage of battle-tested troops who
would have been invaluable in defending Sicily but the 
series of defeats had gradually lowered the morale of the 
military. At the same time Allied morale was steadily 
rising. January 1943 had seen the German surrender at 
Stalingrad, with the loss of 250,000 men. (19) On 13 May 
the Tunisian campaign came to an end, making the Allies, in 
Alexander's words, "masters of the North African 
shores."(20) In the same month Admiral Donitz, commander of 
the U-boat force, withdrew all submarines from the North 
Atlantic after they had sustained heavy losses in convoy 
battles, and by September the battle of the Atlantic had 
been won.(21)
Two months remained for the Allies in which to organise 
the final preparations for the invasion of Sicily. 
Montgomery was still convinced that combat troops would 
encounter strong resistance on the island even though 
Allied Intelligence had no agents operating there to 
support this view. Hunt confirms that the Allies had 'no 
contact whatever with the enemy troops in Sicily and none 
of the formal means open to Intelligence.' (22) Even though 
their wireless security was good, the Italian military made 
much more use of internal telephone circuits giving little
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opportunity for Allied interception. However, as Hunt 
explains, a great deal of information was obtained from 
reading the mail sent to POWs by friends and relatives 
serving in the forces. All mail was routed via Cairo where 
letters were examined by a special Allied unit to check 
whether the writer had stated the location of his 
battalion, which in most cases he had. Either the Italian 
censors overlooked the service address or they hid it with 
easily removed Indian ink, which was replaced before the 
letter was sent on from Cairo. (23) Since there were 
hundreds of thousands of prisoners in Allied hands, a large 
amount of information was obtained as to troop numbers and 
division locations on the island.
In addition, photo-reconnaissance flights had enabled 
detailed maps of the 10,000 sqare miles of the island to be 
drawn up, which revealed locations of anti-aircraft and 
other gun emplacements and the continuing efforts of the 
Germans to strengthen the line of defences.(24) Apart from 
the relatively small number of airborne troops employed, 
the invasion was an amphibious operation and it was 
essential to ensure that the beach gradients in the landing 
zones allowed the various types of landing craft to beach 
close to the foreshore. Before the invasion landing parties 
had been launched in dinghies from submarines to check 
beaches and beach exits but if they were unable to land, a 
second method was used whereby a mathematical formula was 
applied to reconnaissance photos to ascertain the slope of 
the beach from the interval between the crests of the 
waves, which showed up plainly in parallel white lines on 
photographs taken from the air. (25)
Sicily's military capacity and the firm resolve of its 
inhabitants to withstand any enemy aggression had been 
vaunted by Fascist propaganda for some years. Historian 
Paolo Maltese points out that the island was regarded as 
the frontier of the Imperial Empire and for that reason was 
chosen as the venue for the 1937 summer manoeuvres, due to 
begin on 10 August. On the same day the " Giornale d ' Italia"
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observed that the Duce, on a rare visit to the island, 
would see "come i Siciliani sono ai suoi ordini per 
qualunque compito dell1 awenire." The "Corriere della 
Sera” stated that the manoeuvres would fully show the 
"efficienza raggiunta dalle forze italiane, sopratutto per 
cio che riguarda le armi piu moderne ...” (26)
The King, Prince Umberto and Mussolini declared their 
satisfaction with the performance of both men and machines 
in the final exercises of the manoeuvres. The Press 
referred to the perfect security of the island against any 
future invasion, adding that the warlike spirit of the 
people, combined with the geography of the island, made 
Sicily practically invulnerable. (27)
For the next few years Italy paid scant attention to 
Sicily's military needs. All three armed services were 
involved in the Spanish Civil War and the resources 
consumed there left the Army and Air Force seriously 
weakened. (28) Arms and equipment lost or left behind were 
not replaced. In addition much of the army's more modern 
equipment had been expended in Abyssinia. As American 
historian Douglas Porch has written, there was an almost 
complete neglect of elementary military preparations in 
Italy from the time Britain declared war on Germany in 
September 1939 until Italy joined in the conflict in June 
1940. More importantly, no proper structure for strategic 
decision making existed and the power of the Chief of 
Staff, Marshal Badoglio, had been reduced by Mussolini to 
purely advisory functions. (29)
Shortage of raw materials combined with industrial 
inefficiency starved the Army of essential modern weapons 
and transport. Porch points out that the shortage of 
vehicles (a 1:20 ratio of vehicles to men) explains the 
relative lack of mobility of Italian forces in the desert 
in 1940-41 and their consequent capture. (30) Gaetano 
Salvemini relates that when military parades were required 
in Rome, the Chief of Police provided the army with police 
armoured cars, repainted khaki, to cover up the shortage of
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transport. (31)
The lack of modern weapons (many units had rifles dating 
back to World War I), substandard uniforms, unsuitable for 
winter conditions, barracks without basic amenities, all 
contributed to the army's increasing loss of morale. But it 
was the military system itself which was mostly responsible 
for the collapse of morale, a system ascribed by Porch to 
the caste mentality of Italian officers, which 'caused them 
to look upon their soldiers with condescension'. (32)
The majority Of senior commanders were not up to date with 
developments in modern warfare and lower ranking regular 
officers sought the large number of desk jobs available, 
leaving field operations mostly to poorly trained reserve 
officers or World War I veterans. An average infantry 
battalion had only two regular officers and few non­
commissioned officers (NCOs).(33) Unlike their British army 
counterparts, the latter were not trained for their role 
and as a result lacked any initiative. A clear distinction 
was drawn between officers and other ranks, leading Field 
Marshal Rommel to deplore 'the differentiation between 
officer and man' which he saw in the field in North Africa, 
where the men's rations were so bad that they begged food 
from German troops, while officers were served meals of 
several courses.(34) Hunt points out that British officers 
and men drank the local water, as did Italian troops, but 
Italian officers had bottled water from Reccoaro Spa, of 
which thousands of bottles were imported into Libya and 
transported in vast quantities to far-flung outposts. (35) 
Of the three services the Italian Navy was better equipped 
and commanded. Its submarine attacks on British shipping 
in the area between Sicily and Tunis, the 'Cauldron', were 
very successful in the early years of the war.(36) In March 
1941, the fleet, having lost three battleships at Taranto
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in a torpedo-bomber attack the previous November, again 
suffered heavy losses after an engagement with British 
warships off Cape Matapan. (37) After this encounter the 
fleet became reluctant to leave port. Mussolini had not 
sanctioned the construction of aircraft carriers during the 
Thirties and the fleet was dependent on the Air Force for 
air cover. Unfortunately Italian pilots were not trained in 
coordinated exercises with ships and were of little 
assistance in combat. The fleet was also handicapped by the 
acute shortage of fuel affecting all services and 
industries after the outbreak of war. Italy produced only 
13,000 tons of crude oil annually and was thus heavily 
dependent on imports, but the war had cut off almost all 
her suppliers apart from Romania, and Germany took the 
lion's share of Romanian oil. (38) Fuel shortages and lack 
of raw materials also limited the production of new vessels 
and Italian commanders were reluctant to risk losing ships 
which they knew could not be replaced.
During the Thirties Italy's Regia Aeronautica had been at 
the forefront of aviation, setting speed records and 
winning international competitions. (39) In 1940 when Italy 
declared war on Britain she had over 3,000 aircraft at her 
disposal but only 900 bombers and 270 fighters were 
technically advanced enough to compete with British 
aircraft. By July 1943 when Sicily was invaded, only 620 
planes remained combat-effective. (40)
Since the autumn of 1941 the Italian Sixth Army had been 
based in Sicily and was responsible for its defence. When 
its new commander, General Rosi, made his first inspection 
of the island, he realised that there was a lack of almost 
everything needed for defence, from barbed wire to 
binoculars for observation posts and paint for camouflage. 
Oil lamps had replaced electricity in barracks but there 
was no oil. (41) Rosi soon recognised the low calibre of 
his officers who were mostly reservists with no battle 
experience since World War I. Many did not live at their 
stations but with their families, most of whom, according
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to D'Este, were not authorised to be on the island. (42) 
Discipline was almost non-existent and officers frequently 
took leave without arranging a replacement. Many troops 
were of Sicilian origin and chose to live at home or with 
relatives instead of in barracks. This made them more aware 
of the increasing misery of daily life for the population. 
By 1943 many were disillusioned and no longer prepared to 
fight for a cause they considered lost and for a state
which they felt had done nothing for Sicily. (43)
Memoranda continued to arrive from the General Staff in
Rome on measures to extend the defence system. Anti-tank 
obstacles were to be erected using metal beams but these 
were unobtainable on the island. More troop mobility was 
advised but there were no spare lorries. Small groups
trained to counteract enemy airborne landings had no 
transport. Rosi advised them to use the civilian buses, 
which were allocated to their garrisons. (44)
The king visited the island in December 1942, ostensibly 
to inspect the defences but in reality to boost the morale 
of the people, now subject to increasing air raids and food 
shortages. Newspaper reports referred to the "altissimo 
morale delle truppe" but this was clearly propaganda. (45) 
The New Year saw the recall of Rosi and the appointment of 
General Roatta as commander of the Sixth Army. He tried to 
improve the situation by establishing a unified command to 
make him responsible for all Italian service elements. 
Previously the command authority was divided among seven 
military and nine civilian agencies, based on a system of 
cooperation and persuasion, which had evidently proved 
unsatisfactory. The new unified command also made Roatta 
responsible for German ground troops on the island, and 
the civilian administration of the provincial Prefects.(4 6) 
The island was prepared for war, including measures for the
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evacuation of civilians from likely battle areas, the 
construction of air raid shelters and stockpiling food. 
Both soldiers and civilians were organised to improve the 
defence systems but nothing was accomplished because the 
necessary building materials were not forthcoming. (47)
At the same time Allied propaganda in the form of radio 
broadcasts and leaflets dropped by aircraft told the 
islanders that Italy was not really concerned about their 
fate. (48) When Roatta made a speech in May referring to 
"..you proud Sicilian citizens and we Italian and German 
soldiers.." it was interpreted as an insult to Sicilian 
patriotism and he was replaced by General Guzzoni.(49) 
Alfredo Guzzoni was sixty-six years old and had been in 
retirement for two years. It was a surprising appointment, 
as Garland and Smyth point out, since Guzzoni had neither 
visited Sicily nor displayed any interest in the island or
its military problems. (50) His Chief of Staff, Colonel
Emilio Faldella, was also a stranger to the island, and 
contrary to the Italian Army custom of keeping a commander 
and his Chief of Staff together, he had not previously 
served with Guzzoni.(51)
Although Roatta had succeeded in obtaining a unified 
command over the various service elements on the island, in 
practice the command structure had not greatly altered. 
German units were partially under German and partially
under Italian control, which naturally led to confusion in 
the command organisation and added to the mutual distrust 
between the Axis partners.(52) The German troops and airmen 
stationed in Sicily were becoming very unpopular and were 
openly cursed in the streets. Local officials did nothing 
to stop these verbal attacks, according to Baron von 
Neurath, who was in Sicily to report on the situation
there. More important was Roatta's declaration to* Neurath 
that it would be impossible to defend Sicily because of 
the damage inflicted by Allied raids on the railways. (53) 
Guzzoni soon discovered the inadequacy of the island's 
defences and the poor morale of the troops, especially the
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coastal divisions, who displayed 'an almost unbelievably 
low standard of morale, training and discipline1. (54) In 
June he informed Mussolini of the situation but to no 
avail. At this time Sicily's military defences consisted of 
six coastal divisions, two coastal brigades, one coastal 
regiment and four mobile divisions amounting to 200,000 
men, supported by a number of tactical groups deployed 
fairly close to the beaches. Special groups had been 
organised to defend the airfields which would be primary 
targets for the invaders. The mobile divisions were the 
most combat-effective troops but they too had the same 
antiquated equipment as the coastal divisions and lacked 
sufficient ammunition. Of the four, only one, the Livorno 
division, possessed its own transport. (55)
By contrast the two German divisions on the island, the 
15th Panzer Grenadier and the Hermann Goering Division were 
well equipped and trained and also relatively mobile. It 
was almost entirely on the island's ground forces that the 
responsibility for the defence of Sicily lay, since Allied 
bombing of airfields and a series of air battles had 
depleted the Axis air strength. (56) This in turn had 
prevented the main Italian battle fleet from leaving its 
base at La Spezia because it could not operate without air 
support. Although a few U-boats were still operating in the 
Mediterranean the main German naval contribution was the 
responsibility for the ferry service across the Straits of 
Messina to bring in supplies to the island.
Hitler had believed that the Allies would choose to invade 
Sardinia or Greece, an idea implanted in the enemy's mind 
by a British deception operation, codenamed MINCEMEAT.(57) 
Guzzoni, however, was convinced that Sicily would be the 
target, as was the German Commander-in-Chief South, Field 
Marshal Kesselring. The two commanders were not initially 
in agreement about the military tactics to be adopted or 
the order of battle but by the end of June mutually agreed 
plans had been drawn up. These involved immediate counter­
attacks by coastal divisions against the landings in order
81
to prevent the establishment of a continuous front, and the 
deployment of the four mobile divisions positioned near the 
coast. (58)
Guzzoni's intelligence sources reported early in July that 
Allied convoys with naval escorts were concentrated off the 
North African coast and that large numbers of planes had 
arrived in Malta. He thought the signs conclusive and 
alerted his forces to the possibility of an invasion during 
the period up to 10 July (by which date no moon would be 
visible). On 5 July he received reports of hospital ships 
assembling and convoys moving. Further convoy movements in 
the direction of Sicily were seen by German reconnaissance 
planes on 9 July. (59) That evening the HQ of the Livorno 
Division at Caltanisetta was bombed, as were Siracusa and 
Catania, where serious damage was caused to the command 
installations. At 22.00 hours Guzzoni ordered a full 
alert.(60) Weather conditions began to deteriorate to such 
an extent that many of the coastal division troops assumed 
that no landings would be possible and were off guard. 
Admiral Cunningham later wrote in his Dispatch that the 
unfavourable conditions had 'the effect of making the weary 
Italians turn thankfully in their beds, saying "tonight at 
any rate they can't come." But they came.*(61)
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Section 3. The Landings in Sicily
On 9 July convoys of nearly 3,000 ships and landing craft 
were assembling off the south-east coast of Sicily from 
ports throughout the Mediterranean and from as far afield 
as America and Scotland. On the airfields of Pantelleria, 
Gozo, Malta and Tunisia, 670 planes were ready to supply an 
immediate air cover 'umbrella' over the landing 
beaches.(62) The Allies were assured of almost total air 
superiority, as 3,000 aircraft had been made available for 
the campaign.
The Task forces numbered 115,000 British and Empire troops 
and 66,000 American.(63) The initial assault was on a 
larger scale than the Normandy landings in June 1944, and 
by the end of the campaign the total Allied force in Sicily 
rose to nearly half a million. (64) An estimated 200,000 
Italian and 62,000 German troops were defending the island. 
This number was reinforced by the German 1st Parachute 
Division, flown in from France, the Headquarters XIV Panzer 
Corps and the 29 Panzer Grenadier Division transferred from 
the mainland.(65) The invasion was spearheaded by the 
British 1st Airborne Division, whose objective was to seize 
and hold the Ponte Grande bridge near Siracusa. They were 
flown in by British and American pilots. Unfortunately, the 
American tug and glider pilots were not fully trained for 
night flying and this factor, combined with towing a 
heavily loaded glider in strong winds, and coming under 
flak for the first time, resulted in complete disaster.(66) 
The convoy of 144 gliders broke formation, and of the 137 
gliders towed in along the Gulf of Noto, 69 were released 
too early and fell into the sea. Of the remainder only 12 
landed in the dropping zone. These were all brought in by 
experienced RAF pilots who would have received full night 
navigation training unlike most of the other tug 
pilots.(67)
The commander of the Glider Pilot Regiment, Colonel 
Chatterton, had been most unenthusiastic when informed in
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April of the plan to use a glider force in advance of the 
amphibious landings. Examining reconnaissance photographs 
of Sicily, he saw that the beaches were strewn with rocks, 
fenced in by large cliffs and the designated landing fields 
were dotted with stone walls. (68) At that time there were 
no gliders, tow aircraft or pilots in North Africa. The 
time remaining before the invasion was insufficient to 
train tug and glider pilots or to develop the essential 
teamwork. However, Montgomery had accepted the plan 
proposed by the commander of the 1st Airborne Division, 
General Hopkinson, and in spite of strong opposition from 
Chatterton, the plan went ahead.
In the time remaining before the invasion, pilots had to 
be brought to Tunisia from Britain and America and then 
trained in the skills of night flying in variable weather 
conditions and of teamwork during combat. A number of the 
American pilots had not advanced beyond the first solo 
stage of instruction when they arrived in Africa. D'Este, 
however, comments that ’inexperience was only one of the 
problems that plagued the operation' and cites the views of 
a glider expert:'Even if all the pilots had nerves of steel 
and eyes like owls, many would have failed through an error 
in planning. The altitudes prescribed for the gliders were 
not sufficient to enable them to reach their landing zones 
against the strong wind...' (69) D'Este also points out the 
inevitable recriminations which once again threatened 
Anglo-American relations and began when one survivor of a 
crashed glider, ironically the instigator of the original 
plan, General Hopkinson, was rescued from the sea and 
'cursed the 51st Troop Carrier Wing with every breath he 
could muster.'(70) His men accused the pilots of flinching 
from enemy anti-aircraft fire, and these accusations later 
caused many brawls between troop carriers and airborne men.
From the 12 gliders a skeleton force of 8 officers and 65 
men captured and held the bridge for seven hours against 
heavy Italian mortar fire until the British ran out of 
ammunition. The Italians recaptured the bridge at the cost
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of very high casualties but it was lost within half an hour 
to British infantry units who had moved speedily up from 
their landing beaches. (71)
Meanwhile in the American zone the 82nd Airborne Division 
had encountered similar weather conditions and the same 
flak problems, resulting in 3,000 paratroopers landing over 
an area of 1,000 square miles and not in the 4 specified 
zones. High winds, salt spray and insufficient practice in 
night flying in an unfamiliar pattern broke up the 
formations, and planes in the rear found it difficult to 
remain on course. The airborne force 'was dispersed to the 
four winds.' (72) Individual groups of men made the best of 
the situation by assuming a guerrilla role wherever they 
landed, causing havoc over a wide area by cutting enemy 
communication lines and ambushing small parties of Italian 
troops. (73)
The amphibious invasion fared better in both zones even 
though a mixture of winds and high seas slowed down landing 
craft, causing many to lose their place in the convoy. This 
resulted in disruption of the unloading schedules on the 
beaches. Cargoes shifted on heavily-loaded ships and troops 
suffered badly from seasickness. Hunt described the storm 
as an advantage in two ways: 'First it convinced the
Italians that we would not try to land that night, and 
secondly, on the American beaches it helped the assault 
craft over some of the off-lying sand bars which we had 
feared might hamper their access to the beaches.' (74)
On 11 July (D-Day +1) the Americans were involved in very 
heavy fighting with the Hermann Goering Division and the 
Livorno Division at Gela. The requested air cover was not 
forthcoming but US naval guns were brought in to support 
the. land forces. The advancing columns of the Livorno 
Division were forced to retreat, suffering such heavy 
casualties that the Division was finished as a fighting 
force.(75) Survivors who evaded capture were forced to make 
their escape north on foot as no transport was available. 
One of these exhausted men described the scene at Gela: 'E
85
stato un inferno. Non avevamo piu che i moschetti contro i 
carri armati.' (76)
The Eighth Army landings to the south of Siracusa 
proceeded fairly smoothly and the stiff opposition which 
Montgomery had anticipated did not materialise until the 
approach to the Catania plain. Many coastal divisions were 
prepared to surrender immediately but others fought well. 
Signals Officer David Cole witnessed the surrender of a 
column of Italians after a tank battle in which a large 
number had been killed. Their commander delivered a speech 
of thanks and farewell to his men and the officers clasped 
his hand. British troops thought it 'a bit of a pantomime*. 
Cole was initially amused but then realised 'it was a sad 
scene, representing the not ungallant swansong of one 
battalion of the totally disillusioned Napoli Division of 
the Italian Army.' (77)
The naval garrison of Siracusa soon surrendered, followed 
by the garrison at Augusta, where hundreds of troops and 
sailors deserted after dismantling the guns. The commander, 
Admiral Leonardi, was taken prisoner and later condemned to 
death by Mussolini. All sentences imposed by the Duce were 
dismissed after the war and Leonardi*s death sentence was 
replaced by a Silver medal for gallantry in the defence of 
Augusta.(78)
The south-eastern part of the island had been cleared by 
British forces in three days and Montgomery ordered a major 
attack for the night of 13 July to break into the Plain of 
Catania. This involved the capture of both the Primosole 
bridge over the River Simeto by the 1st Parachute Brigade 
and the bridge at Malati over the Lentini river by No.3 
Commando.(79) Unknown to the British, large German 
paratroop reinforcements had landed in the area and they 
inflicted heavy casualties on the commando force. The 1st 
Brigade parachute drop was another airborne fiasco. 55 
aircraft and 17 gliders were fired on by Allied ships and 
of the 1,856 officers and men who set off from Tunisia only 
295 landed in the correct dropping zone. (80) The airborne
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force and the Durham Light Infantry (DLI) who had arrived 
to support them were involved in the fiercest fighting of 
the campaign.(81)
The tensions between the Allies which had characterised 
operations in North Africa and the planning of the invasion 
had already surfaced in Sicily, as General Hopkinson1s 
outburst against the tug and glider pilots had shown. Now 
the antipathy among the Americans towards Montgomery, who 
had persuaded his superiors to make a radical change in the 
invasion plan to the perceived disadvantage of the Seventh 
Army, was again aroused. As German reserves concentrated to 
cover the east coast route to Messina, Montgomery decided 
to send XXX Corps, which included the 1st Canadian 
Division, west in an effort to cut Sicily in two. His 
proposed route was Highway 124 (the Vizzini-Caltagirone 
highway) which, according to Alexander's pre-invasion 
instructions, had been reserved for use by the Americans. 
Montgomery decided to violate the army boundary and sent 
his XXX Corps directly across the line of advance of the US 
45th Division (Highway 124). He informed Alexander of the 
decision he had taken and General Patton was ordered by 
Alexander to withdraw the US 45th to new positions. General 
Bradley, commander of the 45th, was understandably furious, 
believing the decision implied that Alexander thought the 
Eighth Army better qualified for the main task. (82) 
Patton's reaction was to visit Alexander's HQ to request 
permission to use II Corps for a drive to the north coast 
in order to cut the island in two, while the rest of the 
Seventh Army cleared western Sicily. He did not reveal his 
intention to capture Palermo.(83) The Seventh Army made 
rapid progress, meeting little resistance, and took Palermo 
on 21 July. The capture of the city had little strategic 
importance but the immense press coverage restored American 
self-confidence. II Corps reached the north coast two days 
later and began an advance along the coast in the direction 
of Messina. (84)
Alexander's decision to accede to Montgomery's request to
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use Highway 124 was still rankling Patton, who was now 
determined to reach Messina before the British. At a 
meeting of the ground commanders on 25 July, however, 
Patton was taken aback by Montgomery's proposal that the 
Seventh rather than the Eighth Army should take Messina, a 
proposal repeated a few days later. Patton's mistrust of 
the British, dating back to the criticism of American 
troops in North Africa, was still deep and his diary entry 
for 28 July records his desire to get even:'This is a horse 
race in which the prestige of the US Army is at stake. We 
must take Messina before the British.' (85)
American sensitivity was also wounded by BBC broadcasts 
which referred to the Seventh Army front 'where the going 
was so easy that the troops were eating grapes and 
indulging in swimming' while the Eighth Army was facing 
stubborn resistance. (86) The Eighth Army had indeed faced 
very severe opposition from the German Schmalz Group in the 
early days of the invasion. When Schmalz received airborne 
reinforcements plus two infantry battalions for his Hermann 
Goering Division, Montgomery knew he had no chance of 
breaking through the German defences at Catania. (87)
Making use of Route 124, the Canadians of 30 Corps led a 
circuitous advance over a huge area of very rough, hilly 
country from Enna to Adrano, while the Highland Division 
advanced to Sferro. Fighting in both sectors was fierce, 
involving heavy losses. Meanwhile the American eastward 
offensive was slowing down as the 1st Infantry Division 
approached Troina against stiff opposition organised by 
General Hube, who had taken over control of Italian troops 
from General Guzzoni after the downfall of Mussolini. (88) 
Hube's task was now to conduct a delaying action on a 
shorter front to cover the evacuation of Axis forces to the 
mainland and he ordered the Hermann Goering Division to 
withdraw from Catania, which was finally occupied by troops 
of the DLI on 5 August. (89)
By 10 August the Eighth and Seventh Armies had joined up 
at Randazzo. Although a few small amphibious landings were
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made in an attempt to reach Messina and cut off the escape 
route of the enemy forces, they were too late to be 
effective. General Patton reached Messina on 17 August and 
was patently delighted to lead the American motorcade 
through the city to receive its formal surrender. 
Alexander's report to the Prime Minister at the end of the 
campaign stated: 'It can be assumed that all Italian forces 
in the island on 10 July have been destroyed, though a few 
battered units may have escaped to the mainland. .. By 10 
a.m. this morning, August 17, 1943, the last German soldier 
was flung out of Sicily and the whole island is now in our 
hands.'(90)
Liddell Hart refers to the well-planned 'get away' in 
which 100,000 Axis troops escaped to the mainland, as 
giving 'a rather hollow sound' to Alexander's report to 
Churchill. (91) The 'few battered units' included 60,000 
Italian servicemen transported to Calabria from Messina and 
other ports, including Taormina, without any loss of life. 
The battle for Sicily was over but D'Este rightly describes 
the end of the campaign as 'a dismal conclusion to one 
beset from the start by controversy and indecision.1(92) 
The carefully organised and phased evacuation of the German 
forces was linked to an efficient ferry service with a 
roll-on/roll-off system of moving cargo, an innovation at 
that time, which could speedily move large numbers of 
vehicles, tanks, guns and heavy equipment in addition to 
troops. (93) The movement of the ferries was protected to a 
great extent by the attachment to them of barrage balloons, 
which were towed back and forth across the Strait and 
prevented Allied planes from flying directly at them. (94)
Much has been written about the Allied failure to prevent 
the enemy withdrawal from Sicily in spite of the warnings 
given as early as 3 August by Alexander to both the Naval 
and Air Force commanders. (95) Although small craft 
operated from Augusta they were unable to disrupt the ferry 
service, and Royal Navy destroyers rarely ventured far into 
the Messina Strait. Admiral Cunningham was not prepared to
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risk his ships in a narrow channel and his staff ascribed 
this to his memories of the fate of some of the ships sent 
in to bombard the heavy gun batteries in the Dardanelles in 
1915.(96) Nearly ten thousand sorties were flown by the two 
Allied Air Forces from 29 July to 17 August but only one 
quarter of these were against targets in the Messina 
Strait. The concentration of anti-aircraft defences on both 
sides of the Strait was one of the heaviest experienced by 
bombers during the war, but in spite of this D'Este states 
that the air forces 'never made anything resembling an all- 
out effort to block the Axis evacuation.'(97) Since most of 
the bombing was carried out at night the German naval 
command switched most of its ferry services to daylight 
hours, thus speeding up loading and unloading operations 
and enabling more crossings to be made.
On 7 August Montgomery had written in his diary that he 
was unable to find out the combined Navy-Air plan to 
prevent the evacuation and had concluded that no formal 
plan existed because of the total absence of inter-service 
coordination: 'Cunningham is in Malta; Tedder is at Tunis;
Alexander is at Syracuse. It beats me how anyone thinks you 
can run a campaign in that way, with each of the three 
commanders about 600 miles from each other.'(98)
Hugh Pond cites the War Office after-action report which 
described the campaign in Sicily as a "strategic and 
tactical failure" and a "deplorable example of everything 
that planning should not be".(99) Given the overwhelming 
Allied strength in numbers, air and naval superiority, and 
the unwillingness of many Italians to resist, the campaign 
ought to have been short and decisive. Even though the 
geography of the island favoured defensive warfare, the 
generals showed little initiative in their offensives, and 
the ground forces were, in D'Este's words, 'left to fight a 
needless, frontal battle of attrition.' (100) This was most 
clearly seen on the approaches to Catania and in the area 
of Mount Etna, where intense bombing of villages, which the 
enemy had evacuated, resulted only in civilian casualties,
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blocked roads which severely hampered troop movements, and 
further damage to an already fragile infrastructure.
The policy of saturation bombing before a ground attack 
was heavily criticised later by General Fuller, who 
referred to the bombing of Pantelleria as a failure in so 
far as only two of the fifty-four shore batteries on the 
island had been completely knocked out. (101) However, the 
saturation bombing of Pantelleria, as earlier stated, had 
convinced the senior commanders that it would be the best 
method of attack in Sicily. War correspondent Christopher 
Buckley, who followed the advance of British ground forces 
through the island, wrote that each combat operation was a 
repetition of its predecessor. ’The preliminary bombardment 
from the air grew heavier and heavier. Villages like 
Regalbuto, and later Randazzo (in Catania Province) were 
blotted out by bombing from the air on a scale 
unprecedented in the history of war.' (102)
Buckley also stressed that the bombings, though frequently 
killing large numbers of civilians, as a rule did no harm 
to German soldiers because the latter seldom established 
defensive positions in the villages themselves but a short 
distance to the rear. This indiscriminate bombing of 
civilians was largely blamed on the Americans, particularly 
in Catania province, where the general impression seemed to 
be from my conversations with Catanesi who remembered the 
invasion that British planes bombed strategic and military 
targets only but the Americans dropped bombs anywhere. 
Charles Dobson noted in his diary that in Catania town 
’people are very cold to members of the American Air Corps. 
Sergeant Muller wears the Air Corps insignia and he has 
been cut dead in the middle of a conversation when they 
notice the badge.'(103) This type of bombing was also a 
self-defeating policy because when Allied troops entered 
the villages they had to spend hours clearing away rubble 
in order to continue the advance.
The CAOs, who followed the troops, had to deal with the 
dead and injured, the homeless and orphaned, the absence of
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power and water when public utilities had been destroyed 
as a result of this indiscriminate bombing, in addition to 
their military duties to the combat forces which took 
precedence. All CAOs had been issued with the sixteen 
General Administrative Instructions (GAI), which they were 
obliged to follow. The first dealt with the immediate 
duties of CAOs upon entering occupied areas. It stated that 
the most important thing 'is to assist the troops in their 
operations.' In this context CAOs would first have to 
organise working parties to clear the streets of debris to 
enable unhindered progress for troops and transport 
bringing up supplies for the advancing combat troops, and 
also to maintain public order in their immediate rear. It 
emphasised also that the rule of "first things first" must 
be observed and the first thing was to clear the enemy out 
of the territory. Therefore the first duty of a CAO was to 
help the combat units, 'even if this is at the expense of 
efficient administration....'(104)
The task was easier if more than one CAO was available for 
one could take responsibility for the immediate needs of 
the civilian population, such as arranging burials and 
locating food supplies, while his fellow officer worked 
with the combat troops. It frequently happened that CAOs 
were unavailable to help the forward troops because loading 
schedules and lack of their own transport prevented many of 
them from arriving in their destined area in time to 
accompany the combat force.
Army attitudes to Civil Affairs Officers and to AMGOT in 
general will be further addressed in the next section, 
which details the establishment of military government in 
Sicily after the setting up of a limited administration in 
Pantelleria.
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Section 4. The Establishment of AMGOT in Sicily
In the first section of this chapter reference was made to 
the Military Government set up in Pantelleria and to a 
comment by Harris concerning the absence of coordination 
between the operating forces and AMG officers.(105)
In the intervening weeks before the invasion of Sicily, 
coordination between these two arms of the military force 
showed no sign of improving, neither at AFHQ nor at junior 
command level. Reference has previously been made to Lord 
Rennell's problems at AFHQ before the invasion. (106) CAOs 
arriving in Sicily encountered similar attitudes from Army 
personnel, who seemed unaware of AMGOT's dual function of 
assisting the combat forces during the assault phase, and 
establishing law and order in the rear after they moved on. 
AMGOT officers, in particular those attached to the Eighth 
Army in a liaison capacity, had to assume the 
responsibility of informing army units with whom they came 
into contact of the role of military government. (107)
Reference has also been previously made to the reluctance 
of both Force 343 and Force 545 HQs to fit CAOs into 
landing schedules. Gr Capt Benson, in charge of CAOs in the 
Eighth Army sector, succeeded in landing 30 officers within 
3 days, most of whom, as Harris relates, 'had been smuggled 
on board.' (108) Within a fortnight 50 more CAOs, who had 
been assembled in pools at Malta and Sousse, arrived in 
Sicily.
The Army's initial refusal to include CAOs in their first 
landing schedules resulted in complaints from fighting 
formations that AMGOT did not do enough to help them. An 
irate Lord Rennell wrote to Col French, Deputy Director of 
Civil Affairs at the War Office, pointing out that the Army 
commanders 'grouse at having to transport AMGOT personnel 
and feed my miserable people and grouse because there are 
not enough of us to do everything we ought to do.'(109) The 
comment about 'feeding' AMGOT staff refers to Army ration 
packs issued to troops but frequently withheld from CAOs.
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General Montgomery himself sent for the CCAO to complain 
that there were never sufficient CAOs to take over towns as 
they were occupied. Rennell explained that CAOs had no 
vehicles of their own and Army staff refused to convey them 
on Army transport, in spite of clear instructions to do 
so.(110) Montgomery suggested that they got cracking on a 
bike. (Ill) Greatly offended by the General’s high-handed 
attitude, Rennell complained to Sir James Grigg, Secretary 
of State for War, who passed on the complaint to 
Montgomery. His reply to Grigg included the following: 
"Rennell, dressed as a Major-General, arrived at my TAC 
HQ.. . He was very pompous and rather superior; he gave the 
impression that it was good of him to come. I told him 
AMGOT was going very badly and hampering our operations. He 
disagreed and became rather argumentative. He resented any 
criticism of his show. In my opinion they have a poor lot 
of chaps in AMGOT; old school ties, the peerage, diseased 
guardsmen, etc." (112)
Montgomery and other senior officers seemed unable to
grasp the fact that it was the Army authorities who were 
responsible for the lack of CAOs. In the Seventh Army area 
the situation was even worse and it was not until 28 July 
that a reinforcement of 62 CAOs reached Palermo. In the 
meanwhile Lt Col Poletti and his second-in-command, Lt Col 
Rodd, took over the administration of Palermo city as well 
as being responsible for the whole of the Seventh Army area 
until this reinforcement arrived. Even when all CAOs were 
in their designated towns, many still had problems 
acquiring transport. One CAO, Capt Dyer, was in sole 
control of four towns in the province of Trapani, with
responsibility for a total population of 42,000. He had no 
office assistance, his provincial HQ was 40 miles away and 
transport was essential. In his report to the WO he pointed 
out the absolute necessity for efficient transport: 'CAOs
must get about as much as possible to check matters 
personally, the reports of local officials often being very
unreliable. Motor bikes are not satisfactory, as one can do
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little without taking the interpreter as well. The only 
solution is to requisition a car, if, of course, one is 
obtainable...'(113) Even if a car could be obtained, the 
state of the inland roads caused frequent punctures or 
other breakdowns, which were almost impossible to repair 
without the necessary spare parts or the accessibility of 
Army workshops.
General Alexander, summarising the situation on 14 July 
for General Brooke, reported that the shortage of transport 
was hampering the progress of infantry, who were forced to 
march long distances in very high summer temperatures.(114) 
Buckley describes the sight of British infantry marching 
mile after mile along perfectly good motor roads as
'anachronistic in modern war.' (The good roads to which he
referred were the main southern highways.) Landing at dawn 
on D-Day, he reported seeing officers riding 'sequestrated 
bicycles, horses and donkeys', because of the lack of
transport. (115) In the first stages of an invasion
priority is understandably given to tanks and weapons but 
once assault troops have landed and formed up, transport 
usually follows in the next wave. In Sicily the transport 
was slow arriving and when it did arrive, AMGOT was last in 
the queue.
The 'smuggling aboard', to which Harris referred, of extra 
CAOs in the Eighth Army sector enabled a complete AMGOT 
provincial administration to be organised for two southern 
provinces, Siracusa and Ragusa, in less than a fortnight, 
in spite of the fact that a number of British CAOs were 
spared to reinforce the Seventh Army AMG until their full 
force arrived.(116) In some areas, as military commanders 
complained, CAOs were not immediately available to take 
over a commune, through no fault of theirs. The occupying 
force then took responsibility.
This happened in the town of Biancavilla in Catania 
Province, when a battalion of the Queen's Own Cameron 
Highlanders occupied the town on 6 August. The troops were 
greeted by a very large crowd, waving white handkerchiefs,
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obviously delighted to see them. In the absence of AMGOT 
officers, the CO, Lt Col Munro, took over responsibility 
for the town. He arranged meetings with the Maresciallo and 
the commander of the Carabinieri at the Town Hall to 
discuss what needed to be done. There were no problems with 
law and order but the most pressing administrative work was 
in the hospital where, as Munro records, 'the local doctors 
having fled, no care had been paid to the patients for over 
forty-eight hours.1 The Battalion's Medical Officer (MO) 
immediately took over and gradually restored order. (117)
Munro gives no details of any other actions taken but the 
army personnel could obviously deal with emergencies. Not 
all Army officers, however, would be acquainted with AMGOT 
procedures on taking over a town, as detailed in the 
Directive for the Organisation of Military Government, e.g. 
the immediate closure of banks and sealing of vaults. When 
AMGOT officers were able to follow the Army into a commune, 
both Army and CAOs could be mutually helpful, although, as 
earlier stated, the lack of coordination between the two 
Army branches still persisted.
Munro, who kept a diary of the battalion's progress 
through Sicily, reports that, as in other areas, the 
retreating Germans had commandeered all food supplies and 
destroyed what they could not take away. Local citizens 
reacted by attacking the Germans with resulting casualties 
on both sides. (118) It is not clear what steps were taken 
to feed the population in Biancavilla unless army rations 
were used, and no reference is made in Munro's diary to the 
arrival of CAOs. The Battalion left the town on 13 August 
and the first CAO's Situation Report from this area is 
dated 15 August. It stated that Biancavilla was one of the 
less badly damaged towns in the Mount Etna region and was 
reverting to normal but stressed that the whole area was 
short of food. (119) By this date German forces had begun 
their withdrawal from the island and the entry of American 
troops on the night of 16-17 August into Messina signalled 
the end of the campaign. Within a matter of days the whole
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island was under the administration of AMGOT.
General Eisenhower had prepared a message for the Italian 
people to coincide with the launch of the invasion. The 
message announced the occupation of Italian territory but 
emphasised that the invading Allied forces had not come as 
enemies of the Italian people but as liberators to free 
them from Fascist and German tyranny. The Allied Military 
Government to be put in place would take all measures 
needed to eliminate the Fascist Party organisation, and all 
its appendages. The operation of discriminatory laws would 
be ended, political prisoners released, freedom of speech 
and the press instituted, as far as military interests 
allowed. Eisenhower ended his message with a reminder to 
the people of the Italian role in World War I: f It is 
therefore your interest, as men whose fathers fought for 
their freedom, not to resist the Allied Army but to 
facilitate their mission - the lifting of the Nazi yoke 
from Europe by quick and total victory.' (120)
Copies of the full text of Eisenhower’s message to the 
Italian people were given to CAOs to display alongside 
AMGOT Proclamation No.I, which announced the establishment 
of Military Government and was signed by the Military 
Governor, General Alexander. This Proclamation made clear 
that citizens' personal and property rights would be fully 
respected but that all orders given by AMGOT were to be 
obeyed. Citizens were warned to refrain from acts hostile 
to the troops or calculated to disturb public order.
A joint message from the American President and the 
British Prime Minister was planned to be delivered to the 
Italian people after the success of Operation HUSKY was 
assured and was actually broadcast on 16 July. Leaflets 
containing the message were dropped over Rome and other 
Italian cities. The message blamed Mussolini for taking 
Italy into a war fought by Italian soldiers for the 
interests of Germany and advised the people that their sole 
hope for survival lay in honourable capitulation.(121)
In connection with the text of this message, the comments
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made by Churchill on the original text, submitted by
Roosevelt, are worth noting. In the War Cabinet’s view, it 
did not give due account of the British role. The Prime 
Minister pointed out to Roosevelt that the British'were 
only mentioned once in the text, the emphasis being on the 
United States or United Nations. He expressed his concern 
that 'untoward reactions might grow among the British 
people and their forces that their contribution had not 
received sufficient recognition.' (122) He then sent an 
amended text to the President, who, as Churchill recorded 
'recognised the justice of our case', and accepted the
amended version. Although the matter was settled amicably, 
it revealed that a measure of uneasiness still existed in 
the coalition partnership.
Allied propaganda channels had earlier begun a campaign to 
convince the Sicilians that resistance was futile. BBC 
Radio London, Radio Algiers and the New York Voice of 
America broadcasts told the islanders that the mainland
Italians did not care about them, and that they would enjoy 
a better standard of living under Allied occupation. (123) 
Allied bombers also carried out leaflet raids which pointed 
out the ever-increasing German influence over the Italian 
nation, and warned the people that if Germany did win the 
war, Italy would become a province of Germany under Nazi 
rule. This was of special significance for the Catanesi
whose town had been the base for thousands of German 
servicemen, who by 1943 were treating their Italian 
counterparts with undisguised disdain. Hugh Pond refers to 
the brawls and scuffles which occurred daily in the streets 
and which the Carabinieri and the Italian Military Police 
were unable to control. (124) According to Macmillan, 
General Alexander attributed the weak resistance of the 
Italians in Sicily to 'the excellence of AFHQ leaflet and 
broadcasting work.' (125)
At the same time the Italian Government was waging its own 
propaganda war. Lurid posters were displayed, depicting a 
beleaguered Italy threatened by a malevolent spider with an
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innocent child in its clutches, or American planes bombing 
schools, churches and hospitals. (126) By early summer 1943 
it appears that few Sicilians were heeding Fascist 
propaganda. They were rapidly becoming disenchanted with 
the war, with the German presence on the island, with the 
deteriorating conditions in which they lived and with 
Fascism. Referring to the atmosphere of despair among the 
islanders at the time, Maltese states that it led them to 
wish only to "farla finita, non importa come. " (127)
This wish for the war and Fascism to be brought to an end, 
no matter how, raises the question of what exactly twenty 
years of Fascism had brought to the island. This will be 
considered in the next section.
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Section 5. Conditions in the Island
Denis Mack Smith has referred to the history of Sicily 
under twenty-one years of Fascism as ’surprisingly empty’ 
since Mussolini had given less thought to the island than 
most previous Prime Ministers.(128) He had achieved a 
measure of success in bringing the Mafia to heel under the 
leadership of the Prefect, Cesare Mori, and although 
murders and violent crime in the west of the island had 
decreased significantly, it was impossible to destroy the 
organisation completely. Judith Chubb points out that only 
minor and middle-level Mafiosi fell into Mori's net since 
the most influential Mafia leaders had become respectable 
and many were closely linked to noted politicians or 
influential members of Palermo society.(129) In the 1930s 
two large Cosche (organised bands of Mafiosi) had come to 
light in Agrigento province, and the arrival of the Allies 
in 1943 and the subsequent release of Mafiosi claiming to 
be 'political' prisoners showed that the organisation had 
by no means been destroyed. (130)
Apart from visiting the island or working there, (as had 
the CAO for Catania town), it was not always easy to obtain 
an accurate picture of conditions in Sicily during the pre­
war years from native sources. Journalism in Italy had been 
brought under Government control by special decrees in 1923 
and 1928, so that only approved journalists on the 
Professional Roll were employed. (131) The Foreign Office 
obtained most of its information via its diplomats and 
visitors' reports and much of this later formed the basis 
of the Sicily Zone Handbook issued to AMGOT officers. Among 
the reports in the early nineteen-twenties was one from the 
British Charge d'Affaires in Rome in October 1920 which 
stated that the Italian Government's attitude of almost 
total neglect of the island was largely responsible for the 
agitation in favour of Separatism, which although not a 
very strong movement, was not foreign to Sicilian 
sentiments.(132) The British Embassy's Commercial Secretary
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visited Sicily in 1927, and his report on the island was 
very negative. He stated that it was hopelessly behind the 
times as a business centre; 1 There are some honest men and 
traders but they are said to be few and far between.'(133) 
He added that an attempt had been made to bring Sicily up 
to date with the construction of roads and railways but the 
mental attitude of the people could not be changed in a 
day. The lack of progress made in the development of means 
of transport in the island was a striking contrast with the 
great progress being made on the mainland in electrifying 
principal railways and making them efficient. (134)
FO reports in the early 1930s revealed that trade was 
still stagnant, unemployment was increasing and the poorer 
classes were short of food. Poverty in the island was 
greater than in any other part of Italy, according to the 
British Ambassador.(135) The island census in 1936 revealed 
that day labourers had a maximum of 200-220 days of work 
I per annum. (136) The Provveditorato alle Opere Pubbliche 
per la Sicilia published impressive statistics for the 
'bonifica 1 in course of execution, citing over 300,000 
hectares between 1932 and 1938 which had been reclaimed and 
1 improved. These figures, according to Paolo Arena, were 
quite evidently "una delle solite mastodontiche 
esagerazione di pretto stile fascista".(137)
In the attempts to make Italy self-sufficient in cereals, 
marginal lands were brought under cultivation, and 
subsidies paid by the government to the landowners. Because 
of these subsidies the latifondisti saw no reason to change 
their traditional methods of production with the result 
that the same fields were sown with grain every year and 
there was no crop rotation. This led to decreased fertility 
as the dust bowl spread, the situation being compounded by 
the lack of fertilisers. Less pasture land was available 
for animals and by 1938 Sicily had only 2% of the cows and 
pigs in Italy, although possessing more than 20% of the 
horses and mules. Mack Smith points out that this was an 
index of poverty since it represented the many wasted hours
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travelling to work and back in the deserted Sicilian 
countryside.' (138)
One of the most urgent problems in the island had long been 
the control of water for irrigation and electricity but 
little action had been taken to remedy it. During his visit 
to Sicily in 1937 the Duce was reported to be much displeased 
by the backwardness of public works, particularly in regard 
to the water supply of Palermo. (139) Mack Smith reports that 
in four years only one aqueduct had been constructed in 
Sicily, compared with four hundred in the rest of Italy. 
(140) Large areas of land, including the plain of Catania, 
were affected by the lack of properly constructed water 
channels and suffered from floods when rivers broke their 
banks. The plain of Catania was drained after the war under a 
scheme promoted by the Cassa del Mezzogiorno. (141)
The FO's annual report for 1937 referred to the fact that 
Fascism was still less popular in Sicily than in other parts 
of Italy, which was probably one of the reasons for the 
Duce's decision to hold the annual military manoeuvres there 
and to pay a personal visit to inaugurate new works. The 
report stated that many promises had been given to the 
islanders but 'grinding poverty still continues, taxation is 
heavy and prices are rising; much show is made with the 
public works which have been put in hand but so far the 
problem of slum clearance has hardly been touched.' (142) 
During this visit, however, Mussolini promised not only to 
remove the shanty town still existing near Messina since the 
1908 earthquake, but also to liquidate the latifondi. He 
announced his programme for the settlement of large estates 
in July 1939 along with his proposal to house labourers on 
the land which they worked, saving them time and energy in 
travelling. Most Sicilians did not want to change their way 
of life and almost all the new villages remained empty. (143) 
The Assistant Military Attache to the British Embassy in 
Rome visited Sicily in April 1940, and formed the impression
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that 'feelings were running higher in Sicily on 
contemporary events than they were in Rome. The reaction 
to German aggression against Denmark and Norway was much 
sharper; there was a strong, outspoken desire to avoid war 
and equally strong feelings of resentment that produce from 
the island was being exported to Germany.1(144)
Once war had been declared, most information on conditions 
in the island came via foreign agencies, and although 
warning that reports of conditions in enemy countries must 
always be treated with reserve, the FO added that those 
received from different sources 'have largely corroborated 
each other.' Among reports cited by the FO was one from the 
Holy See in September 1940 which stated that anti-Fascist 
agitation was growing in direct proportion to British 
bombing. By August 1941 US sources in Rome indicated 
growing Sicilian disaffection and increasing pro-British 
sympathy. In October a Swiss source reported that a crowd 
in Palermo had torn up ration cards; in November the Greek 
Minister in London, citing what he termed a reliable 
source, stated that the sympathies of the people, always 
rather indifferent to Fascism, were being influenced partly 
by propaganda made by relatives in the USA and partly by 
British bombing. This 'reliable source' also reported that 
over two-thirds of the officials of Sicilian origin serving 
in the island had been moved to other parts of Italy. (145) 
A report prepared by the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) 
also referred to the expulsion from Sicily of government 
officials who openly expressed anti-Fascist sentiments, but 
stated that the order had later been rescinded. There are, 
however, further references in later PWE reports to 
Sicilian officials who had been transferred to Northern 
Italy. (146)
Between September 1942 and March 1943 morale-boosting 
visits were made to the island by members of the Royal 
Family and by Vidussoni, Secretary-General of the Fascist 
Party. A special Mass for Peace was celebrated in Catania 
Cathedral in December 1942. The propaganda campaign reached
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its peak on 31 March 1943 when the anniversary of the 
Sicilian Vespers in 1282 was commemorated. The campaign 
did little to raise the morale of the population. Letters 
sent during this period from Sicilians to relatives in the 
armed forces reveal not only the extensive food shortages 
but the difficulties among the farming communities of 
finding workers. (147)
It was clear that none of these morale-boosting 
endeavours could remedy the essential causes of the 
island’s malaise. Fascist propaganda had proclaimed the 
island invulnerable, and to preserve an illusion of 
normality, no steps were taken to evacuate the coastlines 
so that fishermen and contadini, as well as other workers 
in the coastal towns, continued to work there, and were 
well aware of the paucity of coastal fortifications. (148) 
Air raids on industrial towns, airfields and railways had 
further lowered morale and disrupted the transport of badly 
needed supplies. As an island, Sicily relied heavily on 
imports, not only coal, steel and cement for war purposes 
but foodstuffs and medical supplies for day-to-day living. 
Ferries from the mainland were obliged to give priority to 
military traffic and by March 1943 an already serious 
civilian supply situation was becoming precarious. Maltese 
points out that even the basic ration of 200 grams of 
substandard bread a day was soon unobtainable and only 
oranges were available to those who could not afford Black 
Market prices.(149)
Richard Massock, Rome correspondent for The Associated 
Press until his expulsion from Italy after America entered 
the war, describes Italian anger at the flow of foodstuffs 
to GermanyThese food products were the principal means of 
payment for the supplies of coal, machinery and munitions 
from Germany.'(150) The Agenzia Economica Finanzieria 
answered critics by publishing figures to show that Germany 
received 'only one-fifth of Italian citrus foods and 
cauliflowers and even less of other products.'(151) Most of 
the citrus foods and vegetables, however, came from Sicily.
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Reynolds and Eleanor Packard, of the Rome Bureau of the 
United Press, wrote an account of life as correspondents in 
Italy until, like Massock, they were repatriated. They list 
the number of items rationed even before Italy went to war; 
coffee, gasoline, coal, sugar and soap. The first three 
items were rationed because of the effect of the war on 
overseas shipping. Sugar was being used to manufacture 
alcohol to supplement the limited supplies of gasoline, 
while increased production of armaments caused a shortage 
of fats formerly used in making soap.(152) Shortly after 
Italy entered the war, a number of foods were added to the 
list. These included rice, flour, butter, lard, pasta and 
olive oil. By May 1942, when the Packards left Italy, the 
food situation was 'immeasurably worse1 and even chestnuts, 
lentils and beans were very scarce. These shortages also 
applied to Sicily, particularly in the large urban areas. 
Here, too, the Black Market flourished as in Rome. The 
Packards comment that the aptitude of the Italians in 
bootlegging rationed products 'showed almost a national 
characteristic.'(153) In spite of the attempts of OVRA to 
stop the house-to-house peddling of contraband produce, 
bootlegging flourished and the only people who did not buy 
contraband goods on the Black Market were those who could 
not afford them. (154)
Shortage of food was not the only hardship. In Sicily 
winters can be very cold and the lack of heating in homes 
and office buildings added to the general malaise. Clothes 
rationing had been introduced in October 1941 and shops and 
factories were suddenly closed on 30 September to allow for 
stocktaking. However, shopkeepers were keen to sell their 
goods before a price ceiling was introduced and those with 
available money rushed to stock up on clothes, starting, as 
the Packards wrote, 'a bootleg regime of a magnitude far 
overshadowing anything that had thus far occurred on the 
food market.'(155) This was the situation in Rome and in 
the large towns in Sicily but villagers in the interior of 
the island lacked both shops and money to stock up.
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By May 1943 rations provided barely 1,500 calories a day 
for the normal consumer in Sicily, with a supplement for 
those in heavy manual work. Fruit and vegetables were 
fairly abundant in some areas but transport problems often 
prevented them from being available across the island. 
Basic rations were 1,050 grams of bread per week, 625 grams 
of sugar and 100 grams of fat, with extra bread for workers 
in heavy industry.(156) The Black Market flourished but the 
workforce, the operaio and the impiegato, whose wages were 
frozen on the outbreak of war, were unable to pay the ever- 
increasing prices. Contadini, however, who possessed their 
own plots of land, could sell produce at Black Market 
prices to those who could afford to pay, and consequently 
became better off than they had ever been. (157)
Newsreels and photographs taken by Army film units, 
directed by Capt Alan Whicker, show the reception given to 
British troops, whose arrival signified an end to bombing 
and the German presence. Ezio Costanzo described the reason 
for the welcome given to the soldiers marching through 
Catania town: 'La gente continuava ad applaudirli e lo
faceva perche quegli elmetti a forma di padella 
significavano la fine delle privazioni e della fame. 
Rappresentavano anche la fine del fascismo ma questa era 
1'ultima considerazione che i Catanesi facevano, dato che, 
per prima cosa, quei soldati significavano cibo.' (158) 
AMGOT officers had been instructed to 'put first things 
first', the first thing being to help combat units clear 
the enemy out of the territory. The next was to 'bury the 
dead and feed the living'. In Catania the dead could not be 
buried because the cemetery was under constant bombardment 
and there was no food in the town. (159) Flour arrived the 
next day but it was a temporary measure and obtaining food 
supplies became the main preoccupation of AMGOT staff in 
almost every town. Burials continued to be a problem and 
one RASC officer, who arrived at Catania on 14 August after
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spending a month in the south of the island, described 
Catania as 'the most unhealthy location we had had so far. 
There were German and Italian corpses lying about all over 
the place. Most had not been buried, some hastily buried 
under a small heap of earth including on our location. The 
smells were frightful.' (160) The situation had not 
improved at all by 2 September, when an Infantry officer, 
waiting on the quay at Catania to board his LCI for the 
invasion of the mainland, wrote of sniffing 'the odour of 
decomposing corpses.1 (161)
The whole island would suffer from the underestimation by 
the planners at AFHQ of the chaos and disruption which 
would be left behind at the end of hostilities, and which 
led to a shortfall in available supplies. In particular 
Catania, as the second largest province in Sicily, had 
more problems to be solved by AMGOT than most other 
provinces, since its capital had been bombed 67 times, 
compared with Palermo and Messina, both bombed on 50 
occasions, and consequently had suffered more damage to 
its infrastructure. Even those plans which AFHQ had made 
were not properly carried out, so that the population's 
belief that the Allied soldiers signified food would soon 
prove erroneous.
The occupation of the province took exactly one month, 
from 14 July, when Vizzini fell to the Eighth Army, to 14 
August when British troops entered Castiglione. The 
immediate problem faced by AMGOT staff in every town they 
entered was that of finding sufficient food supplies and 
finding ways of distributing them, as will be examined in 
the next chapter.
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Introduction to Chapters 4 and 5
Allied Military Government in Catania Province 
July 1943 - February 1944
The province of Catania has been specifically chosen for 
this study of Allied Military Government in Sicily because 
it presents a distinctly British (and Empire) element in 
the joint Anglo-American administration of the island. It 
was the British Eighth Army who fought across the plain of 
Catania and took the surrender of the provincial capital 
and it was a British officer, Lt Col Lord Gerald Wellesley, 
who became the SCAO of the province. The nationality of the 
SCAO determined the ratio of British and American CAOs in 
each province so that AMGOT in Catania had a higher 
proportion of British staff. When Lord Wellesley resigned 
from his post in October, he was replaced by another 
British SCAO, Lt Col Charles French, who had been SCAO of 
Siracusa province since the invasion.
Catania had suffered more than any other province from 
Allied air raids and had borne the brunt of ground combat. 
Civilian casualties were consequently much higher and 
damage to the infrastructure considerably greater than in 
other provinces. This could well determine the attitude of 
the local population towards the occupiers in spite of the 
historical connections which Sicily, and the province of 
Catania in particular, had with the British. The Sicily 
Zone Handbook (SZH), a manual produced by the Foreign 
Office and issued to all military government officers, 
pointed out that these connections dated back to the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, when Nelson rescued 
Ferdinand I from Naples and was rewarded by the King's gift 
of the abbey and estate of Maniace in Bronte in Catania 
province. Some years later, in 1811, Lord William Bentinck 
arrived in Sicily as C-in-C British forces. He drew up the 
Constitution of a national government for the island, the 
first in its history. The SZH pointed out that Bentinck had
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created a great love for England among the Sicilians and 
English laws had given them a great sense of security, of 
which a memory still remained. The SZH added, however, that 
it would be rash to suppose that the population would 
welcome a British invasion.(1)
Another reason for the choice of Catania province is that 
the deterioration in the relationship between the local 
population and its Axis partner is most clearly seen here. 
Catania was host to thousands of German servicemen based in 
the provincial capital and nearby bases. By the summer of 
1943 these relations had become openly hostile, the Germans 
now being regarded more as occupiers than coalition 
partners. Would the Catanesi regard the British, who unlike 
the Americans, were a relatively unknown quantity, as the 
liberators announced by General Eisenhower in his message 
to the Italian people or as yet another set of occupiers?
For many years there had been very close relationships 
between the Americans and Sicilians because of the large 
number of emigrants to the USA, particularly from the 
western provinces of the island, where the American Seventh 
Army was scheduled to operate. The Seventh contained an 
estimated fifteen per cent of men of Sicilian origin, and 
the SCAO, Lt Col Poletti, was also of Sicilian background. 
Emigrants and their families in Sicily maintained close 
contact and many of the older islanders, having worked for 
years in the USA, had returned to the island. Sicilian 
connections with Americans were therefore far closer than 
with the British. The SZH, however, forecast that pro- 
British feelings would be found in certain circles of the 
higher aristocracy and among traders with long-established 
business connections with Great Britain.[The reference to 
the aristocracy was taken up by Professor Mangiameli of 
Catania University in his preface to an Italian publication 
of the SZH when he pointed out that SCAO Lord Wellesley 
retained in office the Podesta, the Marquis Di San 
Giuliano.](2) The reactions of the average Catanese would 
be more difficult to assess.
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Two towns in the province have been chosen to illustrate 
the variety of problems and difficulties which faced AMGOT 
officers. The first is Catania, the provincial capital, an 
Archdiocese and University town, seat of the provincial 
administration and corporative organisations, a thriving 
port, whose population of almost 260,000 made it the second 
largest town in the island. The second is the rural town of 
Caltagirone, with a population of 40,000, situated in a 
commanding position 2,000 feet above the south-western edge 
of the Catania plain, 50 miles from the provincial capital. 
Its livelihood was based almost solely on agriculture and a 
small number of ceramic workshops. For AMGOT administrative 
purposes after its capture it became the HQ for fourteen 
other villages in the south-west of the province, forming 
'Caltagirone district'.
The Senior Civil Affairs Officer and his staff, including 
specialist officers who regularly visited the communes in 
their province, were based in the provincial capital, where 
possible in the same offices used by the previous
administration. Apart from its role as provincial capital, 
Catania was an important military and air base,
particularly for German servicemen, and its port, used to 
transport Axis troops and supplies to North Africa, had 
been one of the main targets for Allied bombers, resulting 
in heavy damage to the city's infrastructure. Since the 
port facilities were needed for the forthcoming invasion of 
the Italian mainland and the import of supplies, CAOs 
setting up the AMGOT administration had the additional 
task of finding suitable warehouse and storage facilities. 
They also had to deal with the return of thousands of
refugees once the war had passed beyond Catania and this
led to ever-increasing shortages of supplies for which the 
Allies were unprepared.
Many of these refugees were returning from Caltagirone or 
its neighbouring villages. Although considered a safe area 
in the province, the town had been subject to two air raids 
on the eve of the Allied invasion. These refugees became a
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problem for both towns. They needed housing and employment 
but many lacked the relevant documentation necessary to 
register for work or to obtain state benefits in the town 
to which they had fled, and when they returned home, they 
often found their houses destroyed. Since Caltagirone was 
one of the first towns in the province to be captured, 
AMGOT became involved in the refugee problem at an early 
stage of the invasion but the real difficulty for the 
administration in this wheat-growing area proved to be the 
collection of grain from producers determined to hoard 
their crop.
The efficiency of the provincial SCAO, his ability to work 
with the local Italian municipal staff and his capacity to 
support his CAOs largely determined the degree of success 
of AMGOT administration in each province. However, the role 
of AFHQ was crucial in providing essential supplies, not 
only basic food but medical requirements and other 
materials to rebuild the local economy. Unfortunately the 
organisation in Algiers was not always up to the task and 
inevitably the local people blamed AMGOT officials for 
shortages for which they were not responsible.
The senior AMGOT officer in charge of the early months of 
AMGOT administration in Catania province was Lt Col Gerald 
Wellesley, third son of the fourth Duke of Wellington. In 
common with all SCAOs, he was subject to the directives, 
instructions and orders issued by the CCAO, Major General 
Lord Francis Rennell, second Baron of Rodd. Since these two 
officers played important roles in the administration of 
the province and, as will be demonstrated in the next 
chapter, did not always share the same views on matters of 
interpretation of regulations, some biographical details 
of both men are included in this introduction. Rennell, son 
of a well-known diplomat, had spent much of his childhood 
abroad, and was fluent in French, German and particularly 
Italian, his father having served on three occasions in 
Rome, the last as Ambassador from 1908 to 1919. Rennell had 
served in the Royal Field Artillery during World War I, in
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both France and Italy. In 1918 he was involved in the 
military administration of Syria. In 1919 he entered the 
Diplomatic Service and held posts in Rome and Sofia. He 
resigned after five years to begin a new career in banking. 
During periods of leave he explored areas of the Sahara and 
Libya, and the books he produced on his studies of tribal 
life there gained him awards from the Royal Geographical 
Society (RGS), of which he was later appointed President.
He returned to the Army in World War II as Major the Hon 
Francis Rodd. His previous experience in Syria in 1918 and 
his successful career in banking led to his appointment as 
the Controller of Finance and Accounts at HQ, Middle East. 
In July 1942 he was appointed Chief Political Officer at HQ 
Nairobi, and was also responsible for the administration of 
Madagascar. He was appointed Chief Civil Affairs Officer 
for AMGOT in March 1943, and served in this post until 
January 1944, when he returned to England. After the war he 
resumed his banking career and worked actively for the RGS. 
In 1948 his British Military Administration of Africa was 
published.(3)
Lord Wellesley, ten years older than Rennell, entered the 
Diplomatic Service in 1908, and served as Secretary in Rome 
and St Petersburg, before resigning in 1919 to study 
architecture. He became a FRIBA specialising in decorations 
to existing buildings and was appointed Surveyor of the 
King's Works of Art. He shared Rennell's interest in desert 
travel, publishing accounts of his journeys to Sinai and 
Judea. Although in his mid-fifties, he enlisted in the 
Grenadier Guards when war broke out, serving with the 
British Expeditionary Force in France. He then attended the 
first 'politico-military' training course in Cambridge, set 
up to train officers for liaison duties, and was posted to 
the Middle East, serving in Cairo until his departure for 
Sicily, where he had been appointed SCAO of Catania in the 
AMGOT administration.
In September 1943 his nephew, the then Duke of Wellington, 
was killed at Salerno and he inherited the title. This led
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to his resignation the following month and his return to 
England. After the war he published a number of books 
relating to the first Duke, and generously gave the Duke's 
London house and its contents to the nation as the 
Wellington Museum. (4)
Both officers had similar educational backgrounds and 
diplomatic careers. Their families were well acquainted, 
Rennell's father being godfather to Wellesley's son, the 
present Duke. Their personalities, however, appear to be 
quite dissimilar. Rennell's official reports and letters 
give the impression of a forceful personality with a wide 
variety of interests, ready to speak his mind and prepared 
to upset colleagues if necessary. Harold Macmillan, British 
Resident Minister at AFHQ, who was in regular contact with 
Rennell during the planning phase of AMGOT, states in his 
War Diaries (22 August 1943) that 'Francis (with occasional 
lapses into a 'prima donna' mood) is really awfully good at 
his job. He is quick, intelligent and persistent. His chief 
fault is that he is sometimes impulsive and makes decisions 
almost too rapidly.' (5)
Wellesley appears to have been a determined and dedicated 
officer, who took his work very seriously. He kept a diary 
which provides a great deal of information both on his 
experiences after landing in the first assault wave on the 
island and his day-to-day work. As SCAO his reports to HQ 
are detailed and the dedication to his work is evident. He 
appears to have had a good working relationship with his 
staff and the municipal authorities, (but not with the pro- 
German Archbishop of Catania). He followed administrative 
instructions to the letter as far as local circumstances 
allowed. Although always aware that an AMGOT officer's 
first obligation was to the military, (his province had the 
largest military presence), he was always conscious of the 
needs of a population which had endured more hardship than 
any other as a result of war.
There were, however, clashes of personality between the 
two men which could have arisen from any number of reasons,
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and which will be described in the next chapter. Here the 
focus will be on the problems associated with a large town, 
a provincial capital, in the immediate aftermath of a 
bitterly fought war.
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Chapter 4
AMGOT Administration in Catania Town
5 August 1943-10 February 1944
Section 1. The Arrival of AMGOT in Catania
The Sicilian historian Salvatore Nicoiosi, who has written 
a number of books on Catania, begins his account of war in 
Catania with a description of the scene in front of the 
Cathedral in the Piazza del Duomo, where, on Monday 10 June 
1940, a huge crowd had gathered to listen to Mussolini's 
declaration of war on Great Britain and France. The Dues 's 
speech was relayed by loudspeakers to the crowds in the 
Piazza and in the neighbouring streets. On the balcony of 
the Fascist Party HQ were the Prefetto, T omnia so Ciampani, 
Podesta Emanuele Giardina and Party officials. Telegrams 
sent to the king and Dues described the local reaction as 
'una grandiosa dimostrazione popolare di esaltante certezza 
nella vittoria.1 (5)
This apparent euphoria did not last long. In less than a 
month the reality of war came to Catania. On 5 July its 
airport was bombed. 17 people were killed, 12 seriously 
injured. Nicolosi, points out that the Catania newspaper, 
II Fopolo di Sicilia, recorded only a few casualties. This 
was in line with the policy of minimizzazione, introduced 
by Minculpop, to minimise enemy victories and play down the 
scale of Italian defeats and losses, a policy specifically 
designed to 'sostenere il fronte interne'. (7)
More than three years and sixty air raids later, on 5 
Aucjust 1943, the AMGOT team, led by the SCAO, Lt Coi 
Wellesley, entered the provincial capital. The SCAO had 
arrived on rhe island in the first assault wave of combat 
forces on 10 July and, not having his own transport, begged 
a lift on an army lorry to Siracusa, which had been quickly 
captured. At the Casa del Fascio he met the mayor and local
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authorities and took the first steps in setting up an AMGOT 
administration. Although no food was apparently available, 
some stores were later found and the SCAO ensured that the 
Carabinieri, who had been disarmed by combat troops, were 
rearmed to guard these stores. (8) A British sailor, later 
describing conditions in Siracusa at the time of the
invasion, recalled seeing local people searching dustbins 
for left-overs from army rations - the first indication of 
Sicily’s chronic food shortage. (9)
On 12 July the AMGOT party of CAOs assigned to Siracusa 
arrived and Wellesley and his team made their way north to 
Lentini in readiness to move on to Catania following
General Montgomery's planned attack across the Plain of 
Catani^. The General had hoped to take the provincial 
capital by 14 July but, thwarted by the unexpected strength 
of the Axis resistance around the Primosole bridge, changed 
his strategy to divert his troops to the west around Mount
Etna. Wellesley was obliged to stay in Lentini, where he
carried out typical AMGOT duties; organising bread queues, 
issuing travel permits and finding billets for CAOs and 
Army officers. He also had the unusual task of settling a 
strike of local grave diggers. (10) Wellesley’s diary says 
little about Lentini, described by historian Paul Ginsborg 
as a typical agro-town in the rural south of Sicily, where 
80% of the male workforce were day labourers and most of 
the population suffered from malaria. Roads were unpaved, 
without drains, and 'were an evil smelling muddy mess in 
winter and a dust pit in summer.' (11)
A number of towns in the southern half of Catania province 
were soon captured in a secondary attack inland by Eighth 
Army units, including Vizzini, Grammichele, Scordia, Mineo, 
Militello and Caltagirone. On 25 July the SCAO was told by 
Gr Capt Benson, head of Eighth Army AMGOT, to take over the 
administration of all Catania province already in Allied 
hands. Wellesley visited these communes and sent in CAOs. 
By the end of July most of the specialist officers of the 
six Divisions were in place, except for the Legal Division,
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which had only one officer attached to each Task Force, 
both employed as CAOs for a month following D-Day. At 
Lentini Capt Ball of the Public Health Division (PHD) and 
Major Spencer of Civil Supply, were kept very busy, Ball 
dealing with anti-malaria precautions and an outbreak of 
typhoid, and Spencer with a serious food shortage. (12)
On 5 August Catania town was captured. As Capt Gardner of 
the Durham Light Infantry led his troops into the Piazza 
del Duomo, he was handed a note from the mayor stating that 
the municipal authorities awaited orders at the Carabinieri 
HQ in Piazza Giovanni Verga. When he arrived there with 
other British officers, the mayor, the Marchese Di San 
Giuliano, surrendered the town. Lt Col Wellesley could now 
set up his administration. He had a staff of six CAOs; 
Majors Rolph and Monk, Capts Carr, Liddell and Thornitt- 
Smith, Lt Hunter, and two Civil Affairs Police Officers 
(CAPOs), Majors Battersby and Gould. (13) Units of the RE 
and Signals were also available to deal with technical 
problems. The capital had no water (the mains had been cut 
by the Germans), and no electricity. Heavy bombing and 
shelling had resulted in streets blocked with masonry and 
buildings in a dangerous state. Wellesley noted in his 
diary that he had met the mayor and Prefect and arrested 
the Questore (Chief of Police), presumably for political 
reasons. He was later reinstated. (14)
Two days later a more formal meeting was held with the 
SCAO, CAOs, Major Battersby, and the municipal authorities. 
Nicolosi reports that the Prefect, Salvatore Azzaro, 
requested the mayor to present him to the SCAO as the 
nomination of Badoglio and not of Mussolini.(15) Azzaro was 
Vice-Prefect to the former Prefect, Emilio Grazioli, who 
fled to Rome on 14 July on learning from a foreign news 
broadcast that he was wanted by the Allies as a war 
criminal on account of his activities when he was High 
Commissioner of Ljublyana. (He later served as the Prefect
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of Ravenna under the Italian Social Republic until October 
1944 and then Turin until April 1945). When Mussolini heard 
of Grazioli's hasty departure, he appointed Azzaro to 
replace him. (16)
Presumably the SCAO retained the Prefect in post because 
he had been presented as a Badoglio nomination. The mayor 
and his deputy, Russo, were retained on a temporary basis. 
Capt Thornitt-Smith, who had worked for a firm of sulphur 
exporters for five years in Catania before the outbreak of 
war, became the town CA0.(17) The Catanesi were informed of 
the appointments and the fact that all municipal offices 
had reopened via the local newspaper.
Catania town had been regularly bombed before the invasion 
but from 13 July to 5 August it was subject, with other 
towns in the province, to concentrated attacks not only 
from the air but from heavy ground artillery and off shore 
naval guns. Damage to property was extensive and 
compensation claims to the War Damage Department of the 
Provincial Finance Office numbered nearly 50,000. (18) The
Prefecture's estimate of the number of casualties in the 
province from 23 June 1940 to 31 December 1943 was 4,918 
killed and 4,054 injured, many of these resulting from an 
Allied raid on 14 July on the town of Paterno.(19) Situated 
at some distance from military targets, this town was 
considered a safe haven for refugees and more than 6,000 
inhabitants of Catania had moved there. Although an Allied 
leaflet drop had warned people to stay away from road 
junctions, hundreds of local residents and refugees became 
casualties when the junctions there were bombed. (20) It is 
difficult to ascertain the accuracy of figures supplied by 
the authorities, not only from the government policy of 
under-reporting casualties but because not all victims were 
identified. Names and addresses of refugees were not always 
known to the local commune authority. For various reasons 
many people did not carry identity documents and were not 
registered for legitimate employment or state assistance. 
Although relatives were asked to report any missing family
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members, not all did so. Historian Alfio Caruso suggests 
that if a victim was in receipt of a sussidio (state 
benefit) his family would be reluctant to report his death 
and lose the only source of income they received.(21)
When the Eighth Army entered Catania, only 60,000 of its 
population of nearly 260,000 were still in the town. Of 
these 12,000 were living in what Wellesley described as 
'huge underground shelters', lacking both sanitation and 
light. (22) These were the sunken remains of the Anfiteatro 
Romano, built from lava blocks in the second century AD, 
much of which lies under Piazza Stesicoro in the Via Etnea. 
Wellesley closed these shelters during the day to have them 
thoroughly cleaned, and moved the homeless who had been 
living there into an empty army barracks, considered too 
insanitary to billet British troops. (23)
Christopher Buckley described his entry into Catania as 
'the gloomiest, most profoundly depressing entry' of any 
town he had known as a war correspondent. 'The people were 
hungry and tired, frightened and nerve-ridden.' When he 
entered the Piazza del Duomo, the city seemed frozen into 
immobility and not a soul was in the streets. Within ten 
minutes a 'haggard, wild, cheering mob appeared and broke 
into a German-owned drapery store nearby, which they began 
to loot from top to bottom. ' (24) Their actions were
probably a form of revenge for the looting carried out by 
the Germans in retreat but also an opportunity for the 
poorest to acquire an item normally out of their reach. As 
Buckley wrote:'Only the poorest remained in Catania.'(25) 
Constant bombing, shortages of food and basic items such 
as soap, damaged or destroyed homes, all these factors had 
taken their toll on the population. Morale was very low and 
would take some time to improve, as the SCAO's report on 
progress up to the end of September reveals. He writes that 
a Catanese, recently returned from Palermo, had observed 
that life in the island's capital had almost returned to 
normal and people looked gay and happy, whilst in Catania 
there appeared to be an air of general depression as though
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the city had not yet recovered from the impact of war. (26) 
The SCAO adds his own comment:'Possibly the military 
control is more thorough in Catania than in Palermo and 
this may account for the slower return to normal.1 The 
large number of servicemen in the Catania area and the 
strategic importance of the town in the build-up to the 
invasion of the mainland clearly necessitated strict 
military control.
The town was a staging post where combat troops and their 
back-up units were waiting to embark, using the port as the 
Allies' main channel for transporting men and supplies. It 
was AMGOT's task to provide accommodation, arrange leisure 
facilities and help the army in every possible way. In the 
SCAO's report, cited above, he had written:'Every day large 
numbers of fresh troops come into the town requiring 
billets. This leads to evictions and requisitions on a 
large scale.'(27)
The day after AMGOT's arrival in Catania town, General 
Montgomery appeared and instructed Wellesley to clear the 
streets immediately to allow tanks and lorries to pass 
through. This was in accordance with Directives which 
stressed that the needs of the military took priority over 
everything else. As no POWs were available, Wellesley 
arranged a work force of local men to clear the vast amount 
of masonry lying in the roads and noted in his diary that 
it was an important point, after feeding the population, to 
clear the streets.1(28)
He had, in fact, put the needs of the Catanesi first when 
he arrived because there was no flour in the town and he 
had immediately made arrangements to procure some grain and 
transport it to the mill by horse-drawn carts because he 
could not risk losing army lorries since the mill was still 
under enemy fire.(29) Wellesley was very aware of military 
needs and devoted a large proportion of AMGOT's efforts to 
meet them but he was also very concerned with the 
humanitarian aspect of AMGOT's work and noted in his diary: 
'My supply officers and I did our best to grapple with the
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terrible problem of feeding the refugees.1(30) At the same 
time it was vital to establish law and order in the local 
society so that the new administration could function 
properly. This was the task of one of the administration's 
six specialist divisions, the Public Safety Division, led 
by a team of CAPOs, who, when necessary, could call on the 
services of Military Police and CAOs.
Section 2. The Public Safety Division
In a large urban conurbation of over 250,000 inhabitants 
and a mobile force of servicemen of equal number passing 
through, the presence of a strong Public Safety Division 
was imperative. The AMGOT planners had initially deferred a 
decision on the establishment of a police force to maintain 
law and order until the debate on Direct v Indirect Rule of 
the occupied territory was settled. (31) The planners were 
aware that in the first stages of occupation, Allied MPs 
would be in short supply because of duties with formations, 
and military personnel with no police training would not be 
suitable. (32) A report from the Prime Minister's Office 
stated that an AMGOT police force for the whole island 
would have required 10,000 men, who could only have been 
obtained from the combat forces. (33) The choice was to use 
Italian police forces, either commanded by Allied CAPOs or 
by their own Italian officers, supervised by CAPOs. The 
latter alternative was chosen, thereby solving the manpower 
problem and ensuring an experienced force with local 
knowledge.
The functions of CAPOs, many of whom were recruited from 
the London Metropolitan Police Force or from a large city 
force such as Birmingham or Manchester, were as follows: To 
take over and supervise the administration and control of 
the existing police forces; to set up patrols for security 
in conjunction with combat units; to coordinate with 
Military Intelligence and Military Police officers; to 
assist CAOs in enforcing military law locally (e.g. obeying
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instructions set out in the Proclamations) and civil laws; 
to assist in requisitioning billets for combat units and to 
help organise military courts. (34)
The first of the General Administrative Instructions, GAI 
No.l, had listed the principles of good administration and 
emphasised the preservation of law, order and justice. (35) 
The presence of a CAPO was of great help to a hard-pressed 
CAO in achieving this objective but in the early stages of 
the invasion CAPOs were frequently not available and a CAO 
was obliged to supervise the local police in addition to 
his normal duties. On the other hand, it could happen that 
the only AMGOT official in a commune was a CAPO, who then 
undertook all the duties of a CAO.
The Carabinieri Reali (CCRR) formed the basis of the 
Public Security force employed by the Allies. They were a 
military organisation, housed in barracks, and subordinate 
to the War Ministry for recruitment, organisation, pay and 
discipline, and the Ministry of the Interior for Police 
duties. Urban police, Agenti di Sicurezza Pubblica and 
Guardie Municipali were also utilised, although Wellesley's 
September report to AMGOT HQ stated that it was difficult 
to impose discipline on them. (36) There was criticism in 
the British Parliament and press at the decision to employ 
'the chief agents and instruments of Fascist dictatorship', 
as MPs Aneurin Bevan and Ivor Thomas described the CCRR. 
These views were refuted by the CCAO, who pointed out the 
impossibility of establishing a new police force from 
Allied sources, or of using untrained troops and reducing 
the strength of the combat forces. He chose to rely on the 
CCRR because of their past tradition and because they were 
deemed less corrupt than other police organisations.(37) 
Their service dress was almost identical to that of the 
regular army, apart from insignia, and many were mistakenly 
taken as Prisoners of War by Allied combat troops. As a 
result the prestige of the force was soon diminished, and
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many of the less law-abiding citizens concluded that the 
Italian police force would be abolished. This led to a 
number of minor disturbances and looting but when the 
force's authority was restored, conditions returned almost 
to normal. Harris comments that the restoration of the 
morale of the CCRR was 'the notable achievement of the 
Metropolitan Police officers'.(38) General Alexander also 
commended their work and issued an Order of the Day to the 
CCRR's commander in Sicily. (39)
The senior CAPO, Major Battersby, a former Birmingham 
Police Officer, was assisted by Major Gould from Croydon 
and both did much to boost morale among the CCRR by 
introducing patrols in which an Allied MP and a Carabiniere 
worked together. Apparently instruction needed to be given 
to the local police in crowd control, to ensure that bread 
was fairly distributed to people, who by nature were not 
inclined to form orderly queues. Until the police were 
trained the crowds were supervised by AMGOT officers and 
enlisted men, whose time was needed for more pressing 
matters. (40) After some training from MPs, CCRR personnel 
also proved their usefulness as traffic controllers.
Nicolosi relates the story of a local Catania policeman, 
Warrant officer Rosario Torrisi of the Guardie Municipali, 
who was the first to report to Battersby for orders after 
the surrender of Catania. The senior CAPO promptly promoted 
him Lieutenant. This promotion was not in Battersby's power 
to confer but such was the latter's presence and authority 
that Torrisi's promotion was never disputed.(41)
Problems of military indiscipline soon arose in both 
Catania town and in the surrounding country areas, and was 
noted in Wellesley's first report to AMGOT HQ. He referred 
to the waning popularity of British troops, who 'frequently 
insult respectable women and go into shops and simply take 
anything that pleases them... One report indicates the 
serious popular feeling against the British Army and the 
local Catanesi now compare their behaviour unfavourably 
with that of the Germans.1 (42) Instances of drunken troops
123
lying in gutters were becoming common. When AMGOT's 
Educational Adviser arrived in Catania on 5 September, he 
was shocked by the 'drunkenness throughout the place among 
British, Empire and American troops. Catania is in a 
terrible state, much of it a shambles, rubble lies across 
to the town everywhere.' (43) Catania was indeed in a sorry 
state 'with the population still cowed' as Wellesley had 
stated in his report. However, he adopted a more optimistic 
tone in a letter to friends in which he explained the 
reason for the amount of debris in the streets: 'As the
houses have thick walls built of large stones this is much 
greater in volume and has been more difficult to remove 
than it is at home. Now after one month life has almost 
returned to normal. A few shops have even opened and some 
parts of the town have water and electric light. You cannot 
imagine the excitement as these things gradually 
return.'(44) Taking into account the extensive damage to 
the town, a return to complete normality would be very 
gradual indeed.
The full support of the CCRR in maintaining law and order 
was essential to every SCAO. Wellesley had at first 
expressed some reservations about the quality of the force: 
'There is no reason to suppose that the CCRR are less loyal 
to this Administration then they were to the former. But it 
cannot be maintained that they are an efficient police 
force. They are very slack in enforcing curfew, preventing 
the return of refugees to the town and taking action 
against the Black Market. Not one serious Black Market case 
has been brought to light by their efforts.' (45)
However, it seems that the efforts of Majors Battersby and 
Gould were paying dividends. The next monthly report from 
Wellesley refers to a considerable improvement in the 
Carabinieri's efficiency 'and as a consequence of energetic 
instructions' there were a large number of Black Market 
prosecutions and sequestrations of Black Market goods. The
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urban police and the Customs and Excise officers, (Guardia
di Finanza), although not up to the standard of the
Carabinieri, had done much useful work in suppressing 
trading offences.(46)
Although Wellesley was pleased to report an improvement in 
the CCRR's performance in Catania, their full cooperation 
was lacking, as Harris indicates, in AMGOT's attempts to 
suppress black market activities. (47) The main reason for 
this was the inadequacy of police pay in a time of 
increasing inflation. This led to frequent acts of police 
connivance with black market operators. AMGOT HQ ascribed 
the low morale of the police not only to insufficient wages
and a rising cost of living but to their loss of prestige
resulting from military occupation and interference with 
police functions, and other attendant circumstances. It was 
decided to alleviate the problem by increasing wages. 
Consideration was also given to increasing their bread 
ration but it was thought that this would provoke prejudice 
among the public against the force. A request was made to 
AFHQ to supply cloth for new uniforms for the police. They 
were also given priority on local leather stocks to repair 
boots. More requisitioning of vehicles for the use of the 
CCRR was also ordered. These measures restored a degree of 
independence to the force but they had little effect on 
black market operations and more stringent measures were 
later introduced.(48)
The CCRR had proved their reliability in dealing with 
infringements of AMGOT!s Proclamations and they were made 
responsible for the collection of all civilian 'firearms, 
ammunition and explosives', which had been surrendered by 
local people in accordance with Proclamation No.2. This 
listed the possession of such items without an AMGOT permit 
as an offence punishable by death. (49) As agents for the 
collection, they were obliged to issue receipts and compile 
lists of all weapons handed in. Guards were posted to 
prevent weapons from being stolen from the collection 
points, a necessary measure since much looting of unguarded
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firearms took place in the early days of the invasion. (50) 
The latter were found along with mines, shells, bombs and 
ammunition ’littering the countryside after the tide of war 
had moved on', as one CAPO reported. He was able to get 
small amounts collected and stored with the larger dumps 
but some items were too dangerous to allow untrained men to 
collect them. Military bomb disposal units were too busy 
dealing with explosives that affected military operations 
to deal with objects left on farm lands. Accidents occurred 
daily to children and farmers and it was inevitable that 
many explosives found their way into the wrong hands. (51) 
Forty-two deaths due to abandoned explosive devices or 
accidents involving military vehicles were recorded in the 
province, many occurring after the end of hostilities. (52) 
No instances of serious crime occurred in the provincial 
capital but there were many cases of looting from damaged 
buildings. Curfew prosecutions were numerous but had very 
little effect on the public's observance of curfew hours, 
when most looting took place. Wellesley reported that it 
was almost impossible to stop curfew-breaking in so large a 
town as Catania. Curfew hours brought an extra problem to 
the town, that of clandestine prostitution, a problem 
arising from the closure of brothels by the Military 
authorities. As this involved Allied troops, the Military 
Police gave valuable help to the civil police forces.(53) 
The Prison Section of the Public Safety Division had been 
divided into six regions for the supervision of prisons 
with one inspecting Police officer for each region, to whom 
CAPOs and CAOs were required to give details of prisons in 
their area. These were then forwarded to the Prison Section 
HQ in Palermo. In each large provincial town there was a 
state prison but locations of the smaller 'Mandamentale ' 
(district) prisons were not always known. An early AMGOT 
inspection of Palermo prison carried out by Capt Brown, a 
London Metropolitan Police Inspector, revealed deplorable 
conditions of overcrowding and verminous cells, totally 
inadequate food rations and air raid debris still uncleared
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from the prison buildings. Capt Brown found soap for the 
men to wash themselves and to clean the cells, thus 
improving both their morale and living conditions.(54)
No details about Catania prison in Piazza Pietro Lupo were 
available but given the heavy bombing, broken water mains 
and shortage of food and soap in the town, conditions were 
probably similar to those in Palermo. The Mandamentale 
prisons, maintained by local authorities, were equally 
overcrowded and Capt Brown reported that the local judges 
responsible for their administration had mostly 'flown to 
safer regions.'(55) The slow judicial process often 
resulted in prisoners spending months, or years, in jail 
awaiting trial. To prevent these delays re-occurring 
Proclamation No.13 was issued. Entitled "Legal Rights of 
the Italian People", it decreed that no person should be 
put in prison by an Italian official unless charged with a 
specific crime and no person was to be detained in prison 
without a trial taking place as soon as circumstances 
permitted.(56)
The basis of Allied administration was equal partnership 
of both Allies and before the preparation of the 
Proclamations and General Orders necessary to set up 
legislation in Sicily it was essential to ensure the unity 
of the legal procedures in use in Britain and the United 
States at the planning stage of HUSKY. Much of the work 
which this involved fell to the Legal Division, headed by 
Lt Col W. Chanler.
Section 3. The Legal Division
As Coles and Weinberg point out, there are universally 
recognised means of dealing with economic, financial, 
medical and other problems of government, but in the field 
of international law and procedures relating to military 
government, there could be considerable differences of 
opinion as to the proper course to follow. (57) It was the 
responsibility of the Legal Division to ensure that unified
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planning and unified action was implemented in this area. 
All points of view had to be considered before the 
Proclamations were drafted but agreement was soon reached 
as both British and American views regarding an occupying 
power's duties and rights were very similar.
By the end of June after two months of deliberation, the 
twelve Proclamations were ready for D-Day. Only the first 
three were taken ashore initially; the announcement of 
occupation, the definition of crimes against the Allied 
Military Government and the creation of the currency 
carried by the troops as legal tender. The remainder would 
be distributed after the assault troops had moved on from 
the area. While the Proclamations were being written, a 
group of Legal officers planned a system of military courts 
and rules of procedure, which were a compromise between 
British and American practice. All Legal officers attached 
to AMGOT were given a period of training in procedures at 
Chrea to ensure that the operation of the courts in Sicily 
would be uniform. (58)
The closure of all Italian civil and criminal courts was 
announced in Proclamation No.l, Article 4. This suspension, 
as Harris explains, ’was to allow time for an examination 
of the records of the existing judicial officials, in order 
to ascertain whether they could be relied on to dispense 
justice impartially.(59) Law and Order would be maintained 
by Allied Military Courts, established to deal with 
offences against Proclamation No.2, which detailed war 
crimes which might be committed against the Allied forces. 
These Courts were graded according to the gravity of the 
sentence which they were allowed to impose. General 
Military Courts were the highest and could impose a death 
penalty; Superior Military Courts could impose sentences up 
to ten years; Summary Military Courts were limited to 
maximum sentences of one year and fines of 50,000 lire.(60) 
Summary Courts could be set up by any AMGOT or Allied 
officer. Nearly 1,300 cases which involved lesser offences 
against Proclamation No.2 were brought to Summary Courts in
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the first six weeks of Allied occupation. These were mostly 
connected with curfew and black market offences.
Wellesley opened the first Summary Court in Catania on 10
August only five days after entering the city. He recorded
that ’proceedings were rather muddled’ and remanded most of
the prisoners.(61) At the first meeting of SCAOs in Palermo
on 20 August he complained that he had held further Court 
sessions but no Legal officer had been present at any of 
them.(62) Reference has earlier been made to the employment 
of these officers as CAOs during the first month of the
invasion, making them unavailable for their specialist
work. In addition the HUSKY planners had failed to provide
a sufficient number to meet the requirements of the Courts. 
The shortage was highlighted in a report from Major Rowell, 
in which he suggested that Legal Officers should be allowed 
to carry out their specialised functions from the start ’in 
order that sanctions may be imposed justly, quickly and 
decisively in serious cases and deserving prisoners 
released without delay/(63)
General Alexander had announced in Proclamation No.l that 
all Italian civil and criminal courts would be closed until 
further order of the Allied Military Government. During the 
suspension of these courts, enquiries were made by AMGOT 
into the extent of Fascist influence in the Italian
judiciary. Some of the higher judicial officials had 
already fled to the mainland, and these vacancies needed 
to be filled but the enquiries showed that Fascist 
influence was less than originally feared. Nevertheless, 
officials were carefully vetted and all committed Fascists 
removed before the courts were permitted to reopen. All 
Fascist-controlled Bar associations were abolished and free 
ones took their place at the request of Italian lawyers. 
Harris points out that, considering the poor state of 
communications which made the service of papers and 
documents very difficult, and the dispersal of witnesses, 
of whom many were refugees or POWs, restarting the courts 
so quickly was a very creditable achievement.(64)
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One difficult problem for Legal officers was investigating 
pleas for release from prisoners who claimed to have been 
detained for purely political reasons. The first waves of 
Allied troops had frequently freed those prisoners claiming 
to have been jailed for anti-Fascism. When Legal officers 
were available, prisoners could be more thoroughly checked. 
Relatively few Catanesi had been imprisoned locally for 
offences against the Fascist regime between 1926 and 1943. 
According to Carbone and Grimaldi, only 74 arrests were 
made in Catania town for offences against the regime. They 
ranged from selling fish below the official price, reading 
anti-Fascist poetry in cafes, to making defeatist remarks 
about the war. In Catania province 61 cases of similar 
subversive activities occurred. Their case histories show 
that many were only cautioned. Of those assigned to 
confino, the majority had their time reduced by two- 
thirds . (65)
One of the many topics discussed at the first meeting of 
SCAOs in Palermo was the state of health of the population. 
Although aiding civilians where possible, the priorities of 
the Army Medical Corps clearly lay with battle casualties
and the general health of Allied troops. Local civilian
medical services might well be short of resources and it 
had therefore been considered imperative to set up a 
Division in the island concerned with Public Health.
Section 4. The Public Health Division (PHD)
A number of specialist officers had been trained to serve 
in the Public Health Division. Their brief was to deal with 
general health problems among the population and with any 
outbreaks of disease which might follow military operations 
at the height of summer. Lt Col Cheyne, the PHD Director, 
stated its purpose:'The Division exists primarily to 
maintain the health of the people in order that this may
never be a menace to the health of the Armies passing
through the country or actually engaged in active warfare
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in the vicinity of such people.1 (66)
In many towns in the eastern sector of the island, and 
particularly in Catania province, a large number of public 
utilities including water mains, aqueducts and sewers had 
been destroyed or put out of action. If power stations were 
also damaged, the problem was compounded even if water was 
available, since the pumps could not be worked without 
electric power. The invasion took place at the height of 
summer during Sicily's seasonal drought and it was feared 
that a combination of widespread damage and a lack of clean 
water would provide conditions for epidemics to flourish.
A detachment of REs repaired the mains in Catania town but 
to the north-west the towns of Adrano and Biancavilla could 
only obtain restricted water supplies from local springs at 
public fountains since the mains near Bronte serving them 
were broken. The local people were told to boil water but 
the CAO thought it highly unlikely that they would do 
so.(67) Both towns were housing thousands of refugees from 
Catania and a large number of both local civilians and
refugees had been injured. An Italian Army medical unit had 
been recently captured by British troops, and were set free 
to tend the injured in Biancavilla, doing what the CAO
described as 'a splendid job under appalling conditions.' 
The major in charge of a unit of the 30 Corps Hygiene
Section formed what the CAO described as a 'local AMGOT 
PHD' and detailed one of his NCOs, who spoke Italian, to 
liaise with the Italian commander. It was made apparent in
this report that AMGOT officers had to take the initiative,
as the local Podesta and his staff were 'completely devoid 
of leadership or drive.' (68) [Reference was earlier made
to Biancavilla, which until the arrival of AMGOT officers, 
was administered by British troops, who reported that
patients in the local hospital had been left unattended
when the Italian medical staff fled.]
Major Rowell's report referred to the local sanitation
units as 'having ceased to function. As in the case of 
other local officials, the ufficiali sanitari had to be led
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back to their jobs and told what to do.'(69) Similarly in 
Catania town it was the SCAO who had immediately arranged 
for the underground shelters to be cleaned. Nothing had 
been done by the local authorities. These examples from 
Catania are typical of the local lassitude which ensued 
when municipal authorities were not given instructions to 
carry out tasks by those in higher authority. It appears 
that when Sicily was cut off from the central government in 
Rome, local authorities were incapable of making their own 
decisions on actions to be taken. A report from MGS to 
General Hilldring in Washington stated that 'In places 
where the administrative machinery was more or less intact 
it was in neutral. Officials and populace alike seemed to 
be unable to do anything to help themselves. (70) Similar 
reports of municipal inertia came from the Foreign Office, 
which referred in particular to Messina, where people were 
living in 'indescribable filth.' In spite of these 
conditions the same report, collated in mid-September after 
a tour of the island by the AMG's Director of Health, 
described the post-war health situation as surprisingly 
favorable as a whole. Diseases were the ones usually 
prevalent; typhoid fever, dysentery, malaria and 
scabies.(71) Major Rowell's report had drawn similar 
conclusions, although expressed in perhaps slightly cynical 
terms:'I gathered the impression that public health 
problems were rather less difficult than might have been 
expected in a country devastated by war. Standards of 
sanitation and public health are notoriously low in Sicily 
and it would be an Augaean (sic) labor to raise them. On 
the other hand, their very lowness makes it easier to 
restore normal (pre-war) conditions after disruption.'(72) 
Scordia, in the southern part of Catania province, had a 
confirmed outbreak of typhoid fever on 29 July. There were 
no drugs available and all Wellesley could do was to insist 
that patients were collected together and isolated from 
their homes. This outbreak was not attributable to war 
conditions since the disease was endemic in Sicily, and was
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in fact in a village where the incidence was only 30% of 
what it had normally been over preceding years. (73) The 
incidence of the fever was attributed to ’the neglect of 
elementary observation of sanitary laws in the smaller 
towns and villages’, and AMGOT's PHD planned to give health 
advice to the public via the press and radio.(74)
Catania town seems to have escaped these diseases but had 
some cases of malaria, which was endemic to Sicily and was 
responsible for 11,500 casualties among Eighth Army troops, 
many more than were injured in battle. Most cases occurred 
in the malarial areas of Lentini and the Catania plain. 
While in Lentini, Wellesley had checked mosquito numbers at 
Lentini Lake, estimating that they were negligible, and 
also visited anti-malaria stations with an officer from 
PHD.(75) Under battle conditions it was not always possible 
to take anti- malaria precautions, and the SCAO’s estimate 
of ’negligible' mosquito numbers was not very accurate.
The civilian population had long suffered from malaria in 
this area and it was one reason for day labourers returning 
to their hilltop villages every evening. Although a civil 
administration to deal with malaria treatment was already 
in place, it had not worked effectively for some time. It 
was reorganised by the PHD to concentrate its work under a 
single authority in each province. Dusting with an 
insecticide, Paris Green, was resumed and Allied Anti- 
Malarial Control Units sprayed the areas of breeding 
mosquito larvae. (76) By Spring 1944 DDT had become 
established as an anti-malarial agent, bringing, in the 
words of Mack Smith, ’the centuries-old scourge under 
control.' (77)
The PHD was also involved with the treatment of venereal 
diseases. Clandestine prostitution has previously been 
mentioned as a cause of curfew breaking but unlike licensed 
prostitution it was also a punishable offence under Italian 
law. Harris points out the virtual impossibility of dealing 
with the enormous volume of clandestine prostitution in the 
large towns. Those offenders detected were always subject
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to medical examination and, if necessary, compulsory 
treatment.(78)
During the planning phase of the invasion it was arranged
for a number of jeeps to be allocated to the PHD to
transport three tons of medical equipment to the island.
Under the supervision of AFHQ's Director of Medical
Supplies, drugs and dressings were assembled in Tunis and 
divided into parcels known as 'bricks1. An advance party of 
three Health officers took a consignment in the first wave 
of landings. Their initial task was to locate hospitals, or 
buildings suitable for conversion into hospitals, for the 
Army Medical Corps. (79) Many Italian hospitals were still 
functioning in spite of bomb damage. Others had been 
improvised. The Bishop of Agrigento, for example, had 
turned a large part of his palace into an emergency 
hospital before the CAO arrived there.(80)
In spite of heavy Allied bombing, two of Catania’s five 
hospitals, the Ospedale Vittorio Emanuele and its dependent 
Sanatorio Farrarotto, and the Ospedale Garibaldi continued 
to function. Many doctors and staff left their homes and 
moved into the hospitals to ensure continuous medical care 
for patients. The Vittorio Emanuele had the town’s only 
Accident and Emergency Department and was soon overcrowded. 
Unlike the Garibaldi it was well provided with solidly- 
constructed air raid shelters but ironically many of its 
staff and patients were killed by Allied shelling, whereas 
the Garibaldi suffered no casualties, in spite of being 
shelled as heavily. (81) With the arrival of the Eighth 
Army, the Army Medical Corps took over the monastery of La 
Cabella near Catania and adapted it for surgical cases.(82)
Both the town and province of Catania were relatively well 
supplied with medical staff in the post-invasion months 
since all Italian doctors and medical orderlies captured by 
the Allies were released to work in civilian and military 
hospitals. The problem was the already existing shortage of 
general medical supplies in the local hospitals, initially 
supplemented from some Allied army stocks and from a supply
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of Italian army stores, captured at Caltanisetta. These 
supplies could not be sent where most needed since, as 
Major Rowell reported,'distribution across the island was 
seriously hindered by insufficient transportation.'(83) By 
the end of August many hospitals were without essential 
drugs and dressings.
Rowell had the impression that public health problems were 
less difficult than might have been expected in a country 
devastated by war. (84) At this early stage of the 
occupation, and although aware of existing food shortages, 
AMGOT was relying on the stockpiles in North Africa for the 
'topping-up' that had been promised by the AFHQ planners. 
That these did not materialise would radically change the 
situation later.
Apart from food supplies there were other shortages, as a 
document from the Prime Minister's Office acknowledged: 
'Problems of Public Welfare develop almost before any 
others after territory has been liberated.'(85) Commodities 
such as shoes and clothing had been almost unobtainable for 
some time before the invasion. In September the chairman of 
the American Red Cross visited Sicily and made stop-gap 
arrangements to supply 100,000 sets of second-hand clothing 
and shoes from stocks in North Africa, to arrive before the 
onset of winter. Few people had the means to heat their 
houses and needed warm clothing. The chairman also made 
arrangements to provide Red Cross staff to assist AMGOT in 
the distribution of food and medical supplies.(86)
Harris underlines the fact that the dissolution of the 
Fascist Party contributed to the welfare problems which the 
PHD faced, since the Dopolavoro movement had been involved 
in various social welfare schemes for the benefit of their 
members.(87) This movement had been the first major Fascist 
attempt to organise the leisure hours of the working 
population, providing venues and equipment for recreational 
activities for its members. Established in 1925, it had a 
large following in Catania, according to Nicolosi. Sport, 
especially football, was a very popular activity, but music
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and drama also attracted much support. Concerts and plays 
were regularly presented to audiences in Catania and other 
towns in the province. In 1940 a rest and information 
centre was established in Catania railway centre for 
Italian and German servicemen, both those stationed locally 
and others en route for North Africa, and Dopolavoro 
members were on hand to provide entertainment. (88)
Other welfare schemes operated by Party organisations for 
the specific benefit of.children included summer camps run 
by the Opera Nazionale per la Maternita ed Infanzia (ONMI), 
the Balilla and the Gioventu Italiana del Littorio (GIL). 
One such was the Duke of Catania camp, inaugurated by the 
Fascist Federation of Catania in 1938, which was attended 
by two thousand children aged four to twelve as day guests, 
and two hundred as boarders for a month. Every child was 
given a medical test to identify contagious diseases and 
vaccinated against typhus, diptheria and smallpox. (89)
The advent of war put an end to much of this charitable 
work. A Foreign Office document, compiled in September 1943 
after an official visit to study the welfare problems in 
the main towns in the island, including Catania, underlined 
the chaotic state of the organisation and administration of 
welfare activities encountered by the PHD, the situation 
being even more confused by the number of agencies 
involved, the complexity of health and insurance schemes 
and the loss of records.(90) There were serious housing and 
refugee problems in many large towns but particularly in 
Catania, where bombing had been at its heaviest. Many 
refugees returning to Catania had no ration books and many 
found their homes had either been completely destroyed or 
were in need of extensive repairs which could not be 
carried out.
The provision of temporary shelter for so many people was 
not easily solved and some unfortunate Catanesi were still 
living in former military bunkers on the town outskirts in 
1956, the year in which they were finally demolished. (91) 
Extra food had to be brought into the town for the incoming
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refugees with a corresponding decrease of supplies to the 
communes from which the refugees were returning. This often 
caused traffic chaos as the incomers' carts, loaded with 
household goods, blocked the narrow mountain roads leading 
into Catania causing much disruption of deliveries.(92) As 
early as 21 August Lt Col Kellett, on an official visit to 
Catania from the War Office, reported the lack of transport 
due to the Army's failure to return captured Italian trucks 
to AMGOT in spite of the C-in-C's order to do so. (93) 
Three weeks later the daily food needs for Catania town had 
risen to one hundred tons but the trucks had still not 
arrived.
Returning refugees also added to the numbers of those in 
need of financial and material help. Sicilians had close 
relations with the Catholic Church, and the clergy helped 
the poorest as much as possible. Most CAOs had close 
contact with the clergy, but the Archbishop of Catania, who 
had been conspicuously absent from the initial meeting with 
the AMGOT team responsible for Catania, was described by 
Wellesley as 'a very unpleasant old man', who asked for the 
release of all Fascists who had been interned. (94) In 
keeping with the traditional role of the Catholic Church, 
all churches, convents and monasteries in the town's twenty 
parishes would still provide all possible aid to the needy. 
However, there are no references to this in the SCAO's 
reports. AMGOT's Relief Policies, set out in GAI No. 6, 
continued to operate those relief and assistance programmes 
already in existence, as far as was practicable. Relief was 
defined as 'aid to those with insufficient purchasing power 
to buy the minimum food, clothing, shelter, fuel, soap, 
medecines and household necessities to support life.'(95) 
Ironically some items were unavailable even to those with 
the means to buy them.
The PHD's Welfare Section created a Provincial Social 
Welfare Office to provide a means-tested system of family 
relief through the existing machinery of the Ente Comunale 
di Assistenza (ECA), which had supervised the distribution
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of relief in each commune since 1937. The payment of 
military pensions, even to veterans of World War I, and of 
allowances to serving military dependants was discontinued 
by the Allies, forcing many service wives to rely wholly on 
relief payments from the commune. (96) Relief rates for 
each province were set by the respective SCAO, within 
certain limits. Maj Rowell thought that this was fair and 
reasonable because the cost of living varied between 
communes under normal conditions and the war had increased 
the differences. The rates set by SCAOs varied between 15 
and 25 lire a day, the lower rate being set by Wellesley 
for Catania. Rowell later acknowledged that 'some manifest
injustices' occurred, especially since the price of bread
was fairly uniform across the island when Allied 
administration began. It was difficult to justify the rate 
discrepancy, which, as Rowell admitted, did no good for 
AMGOT’s reputation. (97)
Rennell had asked all SCAOs at their first meeting in 
Palermo to submit their recommendations to him, and asked 
them to bear in mind the approach of winter conditions.(98) 
Setting a fair rate across the second largest province in 
the island was a rather delicate decision for the SCAO. 
Conditions in the capital town of Catania varied widely 
from those in a small country commune. Produce grown and 
sold locally would obviously be cheaper than that taken to 
the capital town by the time transport and handling costs
were added but Wellesley deemed the lowest rate to be
sufficient.
As one of the main reasons for the payment of relief was 
unemployment, GAI No.6 had stated that the numbers out of 
work had to be reduced to a minimum by the closest possible 
cooperation between relief and employment agencies and 
individual employers. (99) There had been a relatively low 
rate of unemployment in the island before the occupation, 
due to conscription and the recruitment of workers to 
Germany. Once the Allied campaign was over, Sicilian POWs 
were freed. Many returned to their former jobs on the land
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or found work with the Allies, who paid 50 lire a day for 
casual labour. This rate was later recognised as too high 
and Wellesley reported the anomaly of an overseer of the 
works, 'who may be a permanent official of the Municipio or 
the Civil Engineers and who receives less than casual 
labourers working under him.'(100) Anomalies of this kind 
frequently occurred and specialist officers of the Finance 
Division would be called in to try and resolve the 
situation.
Section 5. The Finance Division
The Finance Division had a number of specific tasks, which 
included the regulation of Italian banks and financial 
institutions, the supervision of the island's revenue 
collection and expenditure, provision of funds to make 
loans to local communities for immediate repairs to war- 
damaged utilities and properties, and for relief needs, but 
their first task was to provide currency. (101) The Allied 
Military Financial Agency (AMFA) was set up as part of the 
Finance Division to be the chief office of financial 
transactions for the Allied Military forces and to provide 
a source of funds from which to make loans to 
municipalities, businesses and individuals. AMFA was 
responsible for keeping complete accounts of all financial 
transactions entered into by AMGOT.(102) As the production 
of Allied Military lire was postponed until after the 
invasion of Sicily for reasons of security, US forces used 
'yellow seal' dollars and British troops used either 
Italian lire, acquired during the North African campaign, 
or British Military Authority (BMA) sterling, also used in 
Africa. These so-called 'spearhead' currencies would be 
replaced by Allied Military (AM) lire, printed by the US 
Treasury, as soon as the latter became available. The AM 
currency was not intended to replace local lire, merely to 
supplement the existing circulation.(103)
As in many of the other spheres of Allied joint planning,
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there had been a divergency of views on the exchange rate 
before a decision was finally taken. The British wanted a 
realistic rate of 480 lire to the pound sterling (120 to 
the US dollar), whereas the Americans suggested 240 to the 
pound. To support this Poletti had cited the President's 
decision that the military administration should reflect a 
benevolent attitude to the people and that the rate should 
reflect this.(104) The inevitable compromise was reached of 
400 lire to the pound. Proclamation No. 3 informed the 
islanders of the financial measures which the Allies 
intended to impose, and which they were required to accept, 
including the prohibition of transactions at any other 
rate. When an area was taken over by either AMGOT officials 
or the military, all banks and other financial institutions 
were to be immediately closed, vaults sealed and an 
inventory taken of each bank's assets. This would prevent 
panic withdrawals and money being diverted into enemy 
hands. Funds of Fascist organisations were to be 
transferred to AMFA.(105)
Harris points out that AMFA was not intended to be an 
independent bank to transact AMGOT business. The Bank of 
Sicily, whose head office was in the island, would be 
designated as AMFA's agent, provided that the Bank itself 
was under adequate control. When this was verified, AMGOT 
would use the bank for official business.(106) The Bank of 
Sicily building in Catania housed the office of the Finance 
Officer (FO) for the province. Lt Col Wellesley reported at 
the meeting of SCAOs on 20 August that he had 'a most 
excellent FO in the person of Major McFadzean.’ The 
official Finance report sent to the War Office by the FO, 
however, was written by a Major Rudd, who described his 
arrival in Catania two weeks after AMGOT's entry in the 
town and makes no reference to the presence of any other 
FO. This seems to be an instance of HQ's frequent personnel 
changes since Major McFadzean's name appears in the CAO's 
report from Adrano on 14 August.(107) These sudden changes 
among AMGOT staff inevitably caused disruptions and brought
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confusion to the local Italian municipal staff.
Existing tax laws were kept in force and tax revenues 
deposited in AMFA. All branches of the National Insurance 
Institute, railways, telephone and postal services, radio 
and all government monopolies came under the control of 
AMGOT, which received the revenues. It took some months to 
restore the financial machinery of tax collection and the 
resulting revenue covered only a small percentage of AMGOT 
expenditure, but, as Harris comments, 'budget deficits on 
an enormous scale had been Mussolini's normal practice 
since the beginning of the Abyssian war.'(108)
In his final report to the War Office Rudd stated that the 
amount of work was too much for one Finance Officer. 
Revenue officers were needed in large districts. CAOs 
lacked time and technical knowledge to be sub-accountants, 
in charge of expenditures and revenues. Their other duties 
prevented them from keeping financial records up to date 
and many gave advances which a qualified officer would not 
have allowed. The lack of ORs added to the work-load, (all 
Rudd's letters and memoranda had to be written in long 
hand), and because much of the work was of a very 
confidential nature, local labour could only be used on a 
limited scale. (109) Although most bank officials were in 
post when Rudd arrived, the Italian Provincial Finance 
Officer, the Intendente di Finanza, had left the town and 
did not return for several weeks. Communication by 
telephone was virtually non-existent, the postal service 
was not functioning and, as Rudd comments, the condition of 
both the provincial roads and the requisitioned cars caused 
considerable delays to officers as they visited communes in 
the province.(110)
The HUSKY planners' failure to provide transport affected 
all branches of the administration but it was the Finance 
Division's lack of advance planning in practical matters, 
such as the provision of official forms for financial 
dealings, that at times caused problems for CAOs. Rudd also 
points out that CAOs often obtained receipts on scraps of
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paper and because of their insufficient knowledge of 
procedures, did not obtain signatures from the appropriate 
officials when making advances. No secure cash boxes were 
supplied and in remote districts CAOs acting as sub­
accountants had only a desk drawer in which to place cash. 
As there were no ORs to man their office when they were out 
on essential visits, money was frequently at risk.(Ill)
The SCAO had already drawn attention to the anomaly of 
wage scales and the discrepancy in the level of salaries 
paid by the Army and civilian employers. Rudd cites the 
discontent in Catania during the first months of occupation 
when the Army was the largest single employer of labour and 
the various branches of the services competed with each 
other and with civilian employees to obtain the best 
workers by offering higher wages. In the adjoining province 
of Siracusa the Army was paying employees of a telephone 
company double the wages paid to employees of the same
company in Catania through regular civilian channels. The 
situation only improved when AMGOT introduced a new uniform 
wage-scale, which obliged all branches of the services to 
pay the same rates, classified for 170 jobs. The new scale
brought about a considerable reduction in the rates
originally paid but as inflation spiralled, the wages of 
both civilian and government workers had soon to be
increased. (112)
By early autumn inflation became one of the most serious 
problems faced by AMGOT. It was not a product of the Allied 
invasion but had begun in the Thirties as a consequence of 
the war in Abyssinia, the intervention in Spain, the 
campaign for self-sufficiency and the expenditure of the 
current war. A combination of declining revenue from taxes 
and a shortage of consumer goods had already begun to push 
up prices before the Allies arrived but the situation had 
been exacerbated by the spending power of Allied troops and 
the continuing growth of the Black Market. Finance Division 
HQ in Palermo arranged to set up a Finance Intelligence 
Office to collate information on inflation, and to devise
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measures to deal with it. An index produced in mid-August 
showed that in Palermo black market prices of many food 
items had risen to 1000% of Italian prices using 1940 as a 
base, and 500% of AMGOT prices.(113) A similar situation 
existed in all the island's large towns. By early September 
the SCAO of Catania had published fixed prices of fish, 
meat and eggs, wines and spirits and even a list of prices 
for barber shops, graded according to an official category 
(extra, prima, seconda, terza). (114)
Major Rowell's report on his visit to Sicily in mid-August 
had stated that sanctions against violations of price 
controls were not being enforced by CAOs in Military Courts 
and that in many towns no military tribunals had even been 
constituted. (115) This was not the case in Catania where 
the SCAO had set up a Military Court in less than a week 
after AMGOT had taken over the administration, and 
subsequently held two sessions a week. Nicolosi refers to 
the Court's dealings with 'gli evasori al razionamento' and 
other wrong-doers as 'sempre inflessibile.' Many people 
protested at the tribunal's harsh penalties but the local 
paper, the Corriere di Sicilia, took the line that they 
were 'condanne esemplari e ammonitrici.' (116)
The programme drawn up for the control of inflation had a 
number of recommendations. These included an increase in 
tax revenue; resisting pressure for wage increases; 
continued appeals to troops to use discretion in local 
spending; the restoration of savings channels; energetic 
enforcement of all price and rationing orders and 
systematic supervision of distribution channels.(117) These 
measures had little real effect since there were too few 
CAOs to carry them out, in particular those requiring 
enforcement and supervision. As more shops gradually 
reopened, so troops spent more money. Rudd reports that 
personnel were not available in Catania to set the tax 
machinery in motion, and although he received considerable 
help from bank managers and senior permanent government 
officials, the local government employees and officials, in
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his opinion, 'were a poor class and of little use.'(118) 
The Financial Division's report, however, states that 
Italian Revenue officials received little help from FOs and 
CAOs and that the Revenue authorities almost completely 
lacked the transport necessary to reassemble dispersed 
offices and to collect records from damaged buildings. The 
report also points out the considerable language 
difficulties both sides encountered in such a technical and 
specialised subject as Revenue.(119)
The recommendation to resist pressure for wage increases 
was withdrawn in November and a General Order issued to 
grant salary increases to government employees and to 
permit employers to make increases in the private sector. 
The following month, however, Col Spofford instructed AMG 
officers to resist further demands for wage increases, 
which were 'powerful inflationary forces'. (120) Inflation 
still increased, however, and the black market continued to 
flourish in the city. The prefect, Azzaro, had informed the 
mayor and the Commander of the CCRR on 14 September that 
'il commercio clandestino di generi alimentari a prezzi 
veramente proibitivi continua su larga scala. ' (121) Bread 
sold on a ration basis was reasonably priced but the ration 
was only 100 grams a day, so recourse to the black market 
was inevitable for those who had the means.
At the beginning of October the CCAO informed SCAOs that 
he required their full cooperation in the implementation of 
a police programme to suppress black market operations. The 
CCRR were chosen as the enforcement agency, although the 
SCAO could call on other police groups to reinforce their 
efforts. The programme would involve house-to-house 
searches and the sequestration of unlawful excesses of 
various commodities, in particular grain. Shipments, 
however small, of any of these goods, (specified in General 
Order No.5), could now only be made if the local Consortio 
provided a 'manifest' giving full details of the goods. All 
police officers who sequestrated goods were required to 
give receipts to every person from whom the goods had been
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taken, detailing their exact type and amount. The officers 
were also obliged to add their own signature, rank and 
organisation. Each week SCAOs were responsible for sending 
returns to HQ, and copies of returns to the police Group 
Commanders. (122) In spite of AMGOT’s efforts the measures 
achieved very little success and Black Market dealings 
continued unabated. They were by no means a product of 
Allied administration as the last section of Chapter 3 has 
shown but were nevertheless exacerbated by the spending 
power of Allied troops and would continue long after the 
main body of Allied forces had left.
Within a fortnight after AMGOT was established in Catania 
the influx of Allied troops into the area and the need for 
storage facilities for military supplies necessitated the 
requisition of local properties to accommodate them. This 
involved one of the Specialist Divisions, whose remit will 
be examined in the next section.
Section 6. The Enemy and Allied Property Division
C.R.S. Harris, author of Allied Military Administration in 
Italy, was AMGOT1s Controller of Property in Sicily and 
then Head of the Property Control Sub-Commission of the 
Allied Control Commission in Italy until July 1944. The 
functions of the Controller were stated in Article V of 
Proclamation No.6. Firstly he had the power 'to take into 
his control any Enemy State property not for the time being 
required by any other branch of the Allied forces.(123) 
This accorded with the stated aim that the requirements of 
the combat forces would take priority over any other 
consideration. The Controller’s second function emphasised 
this priority. It was 'to assist all other branches of the 
Allied Forces to ascertain, secure and take possession of 
all Enemy State property which is susceptible of military 
use that they might require.'(124) All property taken into 
control was to be recorded and accounted for.
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The Controller was empowered to exercise on behalf of the 
Allied Forces all rights and powers which they might have 
under international law. He was also accorded other powers 
under the direction of the CCAO. He could take under his 
control the private property of any company, institution, 
corporation, body or person, whose activities were deemed 
prejudicial to the safety of the Allied Forces or to public 
order, and whose property might be used or applied, without 
such control, in furtherance of such activities. Similarly 
he could take control of property considered essential to 
the needs of the Allied Forces or to the needs of the 
inhabitants of the occupied territory.(125) Using these 
powers many buildings in Catania town were requisitioned as 
temporary shelters and hospitals for homeless and wounded 
civilians. Wellesley, as stated earlier in this chapter, 
had taken over an Italian army barracks to accommodate 
civilians previously living in the Anfiteatro Romano.(126) 
Many refugees returned to Catania only to find their homes 
destroyed or so badly damaged that they were no longer 
habitable and temporary shelter had to be found for them.
In Catania most AMGOT staff and specialist divisions set 
up their offices in buildings previously used by the 
Fascist Party if they were still inhabitable. Offices for 
the various branches of the administration were, however, 
widely scattered across the town, and Finance Officer, 
Major Rudd, reported the difficulties in communicating with 
other HQ staff and the wasted time going to and fro for 
discussions and conferences because of the lack of 
transport. (127)
Requisitions of houses were made to accommodate military 
personnel and AMGOT staff. No details are available of the 
SCAO’s residence but it appears that most CAOs lived in 
fairly basic accommodation, both in the town and the nearby 
communes. The CAO of Adrano, Major Holmstrom, reporting to 
Wellesley on 14 August, stated that two CAOs were sharing 
quarters with members of the Field Security Service in the 
one and only habitable house in the town, while he and his
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fellow CAO lived in the AMGOT office. (128) Not all AMGOT 
staff, however, lived in such conditions. Macmillan, when 
visiting AMGOT HQ in Palermo, noted the 'magnificent villa' 
of Lord Rennell, and the 'still more magnificent Palazzo' 
of SCAO Lt Col Poletti. (129) When Lt Col Gayre, Education 
Adviser for AMGOT, was able to move into the former British 
Institute in Palermo after working in one cramped 
windowless room, he wrote in his diary;'I shall have to 
fight to keep other people out. If the Army get their hands 
on it, they will ruin it.'(130)
AMGOT kept the local population informed of all decisions 
made by the administration which would affect their day-to- 
day lives by publishing Proclamations and Orders displayed 
prominently in the town and also in the daily newspaper, 
which published all notices from AMGOT and the municipal 
authorities. One of the less welcome announcements appeared 
on 28 August, a few weeks after AMGOT's arrival: "Sgombrare 
la zona portuale". A list of streets in the port zone was 
published under Wellelsley's signature, and the occupiers 
of the properties in these streets were warned that they 
would have to evacuate their homes and business premises to 
provide accommodation and offices for military units.(131) 
Unfortunately members of the Allied armed forces soon 
acquired a reputation for not respecting property they had 
taken over. Within a few days of entering Catania the 
British took possession of the main University palazzo, one 
of the most prestigious buildings in the city, allowing 
only a few rooms to be used by the Secretariat. The 
presence of troops in the Siculorum Gymnasium was regarded 
by the rector, Professor Orazio Condorelli, as an act of 
profanity. Nicolosi relates that the professor went to 
AMGOT HQ where he protested so vociferously that the SCAO 
had him removed from the premises. Shortly afterwards he 
was sent to Prioli internment camp for his suspected 
Fascist leanings. The Prefect appointed a new rector, 
Professor Mario Petroncelli, who resigned when Condorelli 
was released two months later, in order to return the post
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of rector to him. This was not permitted by the military 
authorities who insisted on Petroncelli remaining in post. 
They agreed, however, to his request that the academic body 
should be involved in a formal election. This took place in 
February 1944 when he was elected almost unanimously.(132) 
The military transformed the aula magna into a recreation 
centre, complete with dance floor, orchestra and bar. The 
hall also served as a venue for variety concerts by
visiting entertainers from Britain and the USA. The 
adjoining court-yard was used as a field kitchen. 
University staff and office personnel were banned from the 
main building and students and members of the public could 
only communicate with office staff via the ground floor
windows on the far side of the University, the window sills 
being used as office counters. Lectures and seminars were 
held in various buildings in the town and the Senatus
Academicus met in the Rector’s house. (133)
The inauguration of the University's new academic year was 
always held on 4 November in the aula magna and AMGOT
agreed to clear the hall to allow the ceremony to take 
place there as usual. The Rector's address was followed by 
one from General Mark Clark, who apologised to the 
gathering for the Army's need to requisition the University 
palazzo to provide accommodation for military needs and 
promised it would be returned as soon as possible.(134) It 
was eventually derequisitioned on 29 October 1944.
The Universities of Palermo and Messina were also taken
over by military units and, like Catania, suffered damage
and looting. Cesare Sanfilippo, then Professor of Roman Law 
at Catania, later wrote about the requisition as 'II piu 
triste capitolo della storia 'guerra-universita' referring 
to the theft of historical documents, research notes, books 
and geological samples from both the main palazzo and the
other buildings in the town used by the University. There
was apparently a great deal of damage done to furniture, 
furnishings, lamps and ornaments. (135)
Former Professor of Agrarian Studies, Sebastiano Di Fazio,
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a student at the University in 1943, and whose father was 
an AMGOT interpreter, confirmed to me the details of the 
British military occupation of the palazzo but was of the 
opinion that much of the damage to the premises had been 
caused by German troops before they left the town. He also 
praised the British army units, who played a very positive 
role locally, including organisation of football matches 
with student teams.(136)
By the end of 1943 the process of repairing the damage to 
universities was underway. Catania had been granted the sum 
of 2,000,000 lire for urgent repairs. Messina was granted 
a larger sum of 8,000,000 lire but repairs in Palermo had 
been carried out by the Civil Engineer of the city without 
a special grant. Since all three universities in the island 
had been occupied by troops, it was difficult to restore 
normal conditions in the field of higher education but in 
spite of the military presence, every faculty in each 
university was functioning.(137)
In a memorandum sent to Brig-Gen Holmes, Chief of MGS at 
AFHQ, by Col Spofford, Chief Staff Officer, in September 
1943, concerning the administrative lessons to be learned 
from operations in Sicily, it was stated that a lack of 
sufficient instruction with respect to the procedure of 
requisitioning property had caused considerable confusion 
and therefore more definite instructions would be provided 
in future. (138) No details were supplied but most of the 
property taken over in the early stages of the invasion 
involved CAOs acting as Assistants to the Controller of 
Property. These CAOs, some of whom were working entirely 
alone, were more concerned with the practicalities of 
feeding the living, burying the dead and finding billets 
for troops and homeless civilians. The procedures for 
requisition of property were very time-consuming and the 
directions to AMGOT staff that all Enemy State property 
taken into account was to be recorded and accounted for 
involved much form-filling and typing of reports. Few CAOs 
had AMGOT clerical staff to help them. One CAO spent eight
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months in Sicily and Italy as the sole AMGOT officer in his 
area. He reported being 'snowed under' with typing and
clerical work which entailed working beyond midnight. (139) 
Senior staff were aware of this and Col Spofford's report 
to MGS, referred to earlier, commented on the insufficiency 
of clerical staff provided for CAOs. (140)
Following Italy's declaration of war on Great Britain in 
1940, steps were taken by the Italian government to 
sequestrate British-owned properties in the island. One of 
these was the estate of Bronte in Catania province, 
consisting of the Abbey of Maniace and its surrounding
area. The estate was given to Admiral Nelson by King
Ferdinand IV of Naples, together with a dukedom, as a 
reward for rescuing the royal family from the French army 
in 1798 and for assisting in their restoration in Naples in 
1799.(141) The estate was the property of Nelson's heir, 
Viscount Bridport, and was looked after by the Viscount's 
agent in Sicily, Cav. Luigi Modica, Director of the Bank of 
Rome in Catania. Bronte had been handed over to the Ente di 
Colonizzazione del Latifondo Siciliano but once the estate 
was in Allied hands, the Controller of Property took formal 
custody of it. In February 1944, the Italian Government, to 
whom Region 1 had now been returned, was asked to repeal 
the decree expropriating the estate and agreed to take the 
necessary measures. The Prefect, Antonino Fazio, signed a 
decree cancelling the sequestration and the estate was
returned to Lord Bridport's agent in Catania.(142)
Bronte was an exceptional case because of its size and 
historical importance, but over 120 Allied properties in 
the island were eventually taken over, ranging from large 
business premises, such as Shell and Standard installations 
which had been acquired by AGIP, to small parcels of land, 
whose owners had left the island. It was often difficult to 
trace the legal representatives of these owners but in all 
cases the sequestration records were examined and in some 
cases the expropriation measures taken by the Italian 
government were rescinded and the property returned to the
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Allied owners.(143) Harris points out that all persons who 
had in their possession any property referred to in Section 
1 of Article IV of Proclamation No.6, were obliged to 
declare it immediately to the Controller of Property and 
continue to maintain and safeguard it until it was taken 
into Allied custody or transferred to persons designated by 
the Controller. This procedure in his view was ’of 
questionable wisdom, since it tended to interrupt the 
continuity of responsibility of the Italian Government, 
which it was important in this case to maintain.1(144)
From a practical point of view it was impossible to take 
possession of all Allied property in Sicily. The manpower 
was simply not available (the staff consisted initially of 
only four officers at HQ and five in the field). (145) The 
most that could be done was to keep a watchful eye on the 
Italian administrators and make regular enquiries into the 
state of the properties. The difficult task was to prevent 
Allied troops from causing damage to them after an area had 
been occupied. CAOs and Property Control Officers located 
Allied property as soon as possible and instructed all 
members of the armed forces not to enter that particular 
building. Notices signed by the Allied C-in-C were posted 
on the property stating it was under Allied protection. 
Summing up the role of his officers, the Controller of 
Property stated that their most important function was 
perhaps ’the defence of these properties from abuse by the 
Allied armed forces.’ (146)
There were problems of a different nature arising from the 
Controller of Property's responsibility for semi-statal 
concerns, including the property of the Fascist Party. The 
dissolution of the Party and all Fascist organisations made 
the Controller responsible for their liquidation. Since a 
total of over a hundred organisations were involved 
throughout Sicily a direct undertaking of this was not 
possible. It was decided to appoint a Judge from the 
Tribunale at Palermo as liquidator. (147)
The control of para-statal property was described by one
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member of the Property staff as 'a very considerable 
responsibility, which made demands on the ingenuity, 
knowledge and all round ability of the Property
Controller.' One of these properties was ENIC, a national 
organisation responsible for the distribution of films to 
the island’s cinemas. Most of the cinemas not destroyed 
were reopened by the Controller in conjunction with the 
PWB. The Olympia cinema in Catania, which had closed down 
on 9 July, reopened with an American musical on 8 September 
and shortly afterwards two other local cinemas re-opened, 
both with American films. (148) Apart from providing
entertainment for the islanders, the cinemas made a net 
profit of two million lire in less than five months. (149) 
The Controller of Property also operated the local Catania 
newspaper, the Corriere di Sicilia, although he was not
responsible for its policy, which involved the SCAO, PWB 
and Army Censor. This newspaper also produced a profit of 
over two million lire. (150)
It was stated at the beginning of this section that the 
Controller of Property had the power to take into his
control any enemy State property 'not for the time being 
required by any other branch of the Allied forces' . 
Wellesley, however, took a firm line with an army commander 
who had billeted his troops in Catania museum, from which a 
few items had disappeared. It was to prevent any possible 
damage to the museum and to forestall further looting that 
Wellesley removed the troops and sealed the building. It 
was then handed over to the museum Director and the SCAO 
asked to be informed immediately if any further attempt was 
made to billet troops there. He reported this incident to 
AMGOT HQ. (151) Since the activities of the Controller of 
Property were confined to properties of the enemy 
government not already in custody of some other branch of 
the Allied forces, the SCAO had acted on his own 
initiative, to conform with the regulations of a newly 
established AMGOT department, which will be described in 
the next section.
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Section 7. AMGOT Measures to protect the Cultural Heritage
of Sicily
The inevitable destruction and looting which occurs in a 
combat zone had led to pre-invasion discussions on measures 
which could be taken to protect the cultural heritage of an 
invaded country. The President of America's Archaeological 
Institute petitioned the US Government to create a 
commission for this purpose. At the same time the Director 
of the Metropolitan Museum of Art pointed out that more 
than fifty museum directors, curators and archaeologists of 
distinction held commissions in the armed forces and most 
of them were doing desk jobs as intelligence officers. He 
suggested that their expertise should be utilised. (152)
Meanwhile instructions had been issued from Britain to 
officers charged with the third and final military 
administration of Cyrenaica to take immediate steps for the 
preservation of any archaeological monuments which might 
come into British possession during the occupation. (153) 
As Donnison points out, no list of these monuments was 
provided and nobody was required to search them out. (154) 
By chance among the officers in the advancing Eighth Army 
were two professional archaeologists, Lt Col Wheeler and 
Major Ward-Perkins. They reported their concerns about the 
need for protective measures and Ward-Perkins was charged 
with the salvage and care of all monuments discovered in 
the combat zone. (155) He was officially seconded to the 
military government organisation in April 1943.
In London the Directors of the British Museum, the 
National Gallery, the Victoria and Albert Museum, and the 
Chairman of the Fine Arts Commission had written to the War 
Office, voicing their concerns on possible damage to works 
of art and monuments on the European continent, and 
submitting lists of items and buildings at risk. (156) Both 
Allies agreed the necessity to create a new department to 
deal with this issue, and by May 1943 the Office of Adviser
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on Fine Arts and Monuments to the CCAO of AMGOT was 
included in the functions of the Civil Affairs Division. 
American Capt Mason Hammond was appointed to the post and 
was joined in September by his British deputy, Capt F. 
Maxse. (157)
The duties of CAOs in respect of safeguarding monuments 
were set out in AMGOT GAI No. 8. The term ’monument' 
designated any site, building or structure, whose historic, 
cultural, artistic, traditional or sentimental value 
rendered its protection and preservation a matter of public 
interest. Objectives would include museums, collections, 
libraries, universities, colleges, churches and similar 
installations. CAOs were instructed to inspect all the 
monuments in their areas, to keep open the churches in 
daily use, to prevent damage and defacement by military or 
local personnel and to punish any person proven to have 
caused damage.(158) In some areas of Catania it would have 
proved difficult for a CAO to keep a church open for daily 
worship since eighteen had been either totally destroyed or 
badly damaged in the capital. (159)
The level of saturation bombing first employed in 
Pantelleria and then Sicily would inevitably cause vast 
destruction to towns like Catania and, over sixty years on, 
the evidence still remains in certain areas of the city. 
Some churches, including the Duomo, have been restored but 
many other Sicilian Baroque buildings were beyond repair. 
Damage to the University, Seminary and Civic libraries in 
the town, both buildings and contents, was severe. (160) 
There is no evidence of any large-scale looting as later 
happened in Naples and which prompted a General Order from 
Eisenhower to military commandersThe prevention of 
looting, wanton damage and sacrilege of buildings is a 
command responsibility. The seriousness of such an offence 
will be explained to all Allied personnel.’ (161)
Referring to Sicily, Lt Col Wheeler later stated that ' no 
major monument of art or antiquity is known to have 
suffered seriously there, owing to the absence of fighting
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in most parts of the island and the restricted number of 
historical buildings in the battle area.'(162) A letter, 
based on Wheeler's notes, was sent to the Secretary for Air 
by an MP, Squadron-Leader Keeling, which urged the RAF to 
refrain from the so-called "Baedeker" raids in retaliation 
for such raids on a number of British towns and thus avoid 
damage to historic buildings. (163) The situation on the 
Italian mainland was considered by the War Cabinet on 20 
January 1944 when the Secretary of State for War explained 
the measures that had been taken before the invasion of 
Sicily and the Italian mainland for the protection of 
monuments and the limitations upon what the army could 
do:'The Army is concerned with the enemy's destruction to 
the exclusion of all other considerations... it will not 
exercise any nice discrimination in the selection of its 
targets, since the enemy would be quick to take advantage 
of the sanctuary offered by any such doctrine. ’ He added 
that the situation was different in the rear of the 
advancing armies but even here the prime object 'was to 
facilitate military operations by attending to certain 
necessities, of which the safeguarding of objects of 
historical interest is not one.’(164)
This statement appears to contradict the instructions 
given to CAOs in Sicily, among whose duties was the 
constant checking of buildings and monuments listed in 
AMGOT GAI No. 8. By this date, however, the number of CAOs 
in Sicily was gradually dwindling, and the responsibility 
for the maintenance of monuments and artefacts soon passed 
to the relevant SubCommission of the Allied Control 
Commission, in place on 11 February 1944.
Reference has earlier been made to the Catania newspaper, 
il Corriere di Sicilia, which, in addition to Proclamations 
and Orders displayed in public places, was also an organ 
for the distribution of AMGOT information and instructions 
to the people of Catania. The role of the newspaper and 
other ways of communicating with the public will be 
examined in the next section.
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Section 8. The Media in Catania during AMGOT Administration
Radio played an important role in communicating news to 
the Italian people and broadcasts had been promoted by 
Mussolini as a means of spreading Fascist propaganda. 
Radios in public places were tuned to official news 
bulletins twice a day. Listening to foreign channels was a 
punishable offence, but as war progressed Italians 
increasingly tuned their radios to Radio London broadcasts, 
presented by Col Stevens, to Radio Algiers and to the Voice 
of America.(165) These stations played an important role in 
bringing news to Italian listeners before the invasion and 
in counteracting Fascist propaganda. After the Seventh Army 
established control in Palermo, the PWB set up Radio 
Palermo, which reached a wide audience. Directed by an 
American sergeant, the station first broadcast material 
from London and Algiers from 8 pm to midnight. Transmission 
time was soon extended to nine and a half hours a day, the 
content consisting of news items, war commentaries, 
interviews with touring entertainers, music programmes and 
morale-boosting talks.(166)
The first part of the programme was for Allied forces, but 
distinctly American in character, being introduced by the 
Stars and Stripes. Then came a 'British Programme for 
Troops'. The second part was for Italian listeners, the 
station announcing itself as 'Radio Palermo, l'avamposto 
dell'Italia liberata'. Each day time was allotted to a 
specific subject, e.g. religious commentaries on Sunday. On 
other days programmes giving Allied points of view and 
opinions on contemporary Italy, or discussions on Italy's 
future, were broadcast. On Friday a programme was dedicated 
to II Popolo del Nord and each week the latter included a 
message to specific categories of citizens such as trade 
employees, industrial workers, farm labourers etc., which 
was delivered in the dialect of the region selected for 
that week. Aware of the difficulties of Italians living in 
enemy-held territory, the PWB made sure that news bulletins
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were punctually broadcast on the hour.(167) Lt Col Spofford 
at AMGOT HQ considered the impact of these broadcasts on 
the Italians to be very important and requested information 
about any 'jamming1 which might take place. He also asked 
for loudspeaker systems installed by the previous 
government to be reactivated to transmit proclamations, 
notices, and special announcements. (168) This does not 
appear to have taken place in Catania but one CAO in 
Trapani informed the WO that the 'dissemination of BBC 
foreign broadcasts by public loudspeakers proved a great 
asset and prevented rumours.' (169)
In his history of Sicily under Allied administration, 
Lamberto Mercuri cites the research carried out into the 
listening habits of the islanders during the administration 
of AMGOT. 10% of the 4,000,000 people (the population of 
Sicily at that time) apparently tuned in each day. 64% of 
radios were equipped with short wave. 87% of the population 
listened to local stations, 61% to New York, 47% to Palermo 
once it was under Allied Control. The latter was considered 
by listeners to be the most reliable source of information, 
although the 22% who tuned in to Radio London thought this 
channel the most reliable. 50% listened to broadcasts from 
North Italy, under German and Fascist occupation. Mercuri 
draws attention to the shortage of electricity in the 
island which affected the people's listening habits:'La 
penuria di elettricita fu il piu grave deterrente ad un piu 
generale ed esteso ascolto.' (170)
References have already been made to the role played by 
the Catania newspaper, il Corriere di Sicilia, in bringing 
AMGOT notices and information to the public. AMGOT had no 
direct responsibility for the control of the Italian press, 
which was directed by the Information and Censorship 
Section (INC) at AFHQ and its organ, the Psychological 
Warfare Branch (PWB). It was arranged that any local 
conflict of opinion between PWB and AMGOT would be referred 
to AFHQ.(171) AMGOT made no attempt to control the contents 
published in the two island newspapers. Wellesley, however,
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voiced his misgivings to Rennell that the Corriere had on 
several occasions published articles which criticised the 
Administration or led the population to believe that there 
would be an early restoration of public utilities and 
schools etc., which would be impossible to realise. (172) 
Rennell's response to AFHQ's cable to him re this matter 
emphasised that relations between PWB and AMGOT were most 
cordial and that no problem existed. He added that the SCAO 
of Catania province had perhaps taken ’too rigid a view on 
the latitude to be allowed to the local press', but, in his 
opinion, one of the main difficulties of the administration 
in Sicily was to deal with the disappointments caused by 
undue optimism as a result of official pronouncements 
regarding the advent of a reign of plenty.(173)
PWB officers first arrived in Sicily on 13 July, made 
their way to Siracusa and produced an English-Italian news 
sheet - the Corriere di Siracusa. When PWB discovered the
acute shortage of newsprint it was decided that only two
daily newspapers could be produced. One was the Sicilia 
Liberata in Palermo, the other the Corriere di Sicilia. 
Some other towns, Ragusa, Caltanisetta and Enna, attempted 
to produce their own newspapers but these were mostly 
restricted to weekly news sheets. On 23 October the 
Notiziario di Messina made its first appearance and was 
subsequently published three times a week.(174)
There was a chronic shortage of all types of paper in the 
island which not only restricted the printing of newspapers 
but also affected offices, businesses, and private 
correspondence. (The Prefect's file in the Catania archives 
contains letters from members of the public written on 
scraps of paper torn from posters and AMGOT Proclamations). 
It was not until the capture of Naples in October when 
paper stores were found there that the press in Sicily
could expand. By the spring of 1944 the Corriere was
printing about 25,000 daily copies.
The research by Mercuri into the role of the radio, cited 
above, also encompassed people's reading habits. 61% read a
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newspaper the day following its publication, 55% were 
informed of AMGOT's notices and decrees via the newspaper 
within two days, or five days if living in a rural area. 
50% obtained information via posters, 44% by word of mouth 
and 23% via radio broadcasts. (175) Many people would 
obtain their information through more than one channel, 
especially if living in either Catania or Palermo, where 
papers were printed daily and electricity had been 
restored. Since transport remained in such short supply, it 
was not easy to send copies to surrounding villages.
Eisenhower's message to the Italian people had promised 
that freedom of speech and of the press would be instituted 
provided that military interests were not prejudiced. In 
spite of Wellesley's qualms about the Corriere di Sicilia, 
the PWB seemed to have no problems with the paper's 
contents but, even when AMGOT handed over the island to the 
Italian Government on 11 February 1944, the PWB remained in 
nominal control. Various political parties began to produce 
weekly papers, such as the Catania Separatist Repubblica di 
Sicilia. This did not appear in the list of publications 
approved by the PWB. Quintero implies that it was a 
clandestine publication but without too many obstacles put 
in its way, 'vista la tolleranza che gli Alleati mostravano 
nei confronti del Separatismo'.(176) The Separatist 
movement is discussed later in this chapter but the next 
section will address a problem which affected all the 
island's children, that of the closure of all educational 
establishments apart from universities, which continued to 
provide a drastically reduced level of service to students.
Section 9. AMGOT's Efforts to re-establish Education
Provision
In an island with a high rate of illiteracy a serious 
problem for the AMGOT administration was the total lack of
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education available for those of school age. There had 
been no official closure of schools before the arrival of 
the Allies, who in Proclamation No.l. decreed that schools 
would be immediately closed but Nicolosi writes that from 
17 April most schools were already empty:' I ragazzi non ci 
andavano, i professori vi fecero qualche apparizione, poi 
anche loro si ecclissarano. Cosi, di fatto, l'anno 
scolastico termino in anticipo. '(177) Many school buildings 
in Catania had either been damaged during air raids and 
combat, or requisitioned for barracks and hospitals by the 
local authorities and later by the Allies.
AMGOT planning for HUSKY did not include a specific 
division for Education but Lt Col Harris was sent to 
Algiers in June to take charge of AMGOT's educational 
responsibilities.(178) However, he was soon transferred by 
Rennell to the Property Control Division, with the result 
that no designated staff had any part in the planning stage 
at AFHQ to prepare the reorganisation of Sicily’s education 
system.(179)
General Eisenhower's message to the Italian people had 
made clear that all measures necessary to eradicate Fascism 
would be taken by the Allies. This would necessitate a 
complete review of the education system, the removal of 
Fascist staff and the replacement of school textbooks, 
which were mostly based on Fascist propaganda, particularly 
in the elementary sector. Lord Rennell soon realised that 
an Education specialist was urgently needed, not only to 
get children back into school and to prepare new textbooks 
but to remove prominent Fascists from senior positions in 
the education system. He cabled the War Office for an 
Education Adviser and Major George R. Gayre of the Army 
Education Corps, then serving as a Staff Officer at Oxford, 
was selected. It took him some time to reach AMGOT HQ in 
Sicily, and the account of his journey via Algiers, Tizi 
Ouzou and Catania to Palermo gives a graphic picture of the 
incompetence of AFHQ. He was kept waiting for days because, 
in his words,'MGS could tell me nothing, seemed unconcerned
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over telling me anything, had no instructions, was 
uninterested in getting any instructions about an 
educational officer for Italy and generally blamed the War 
Office.'(180) Gayre was also amazed at the attitude of the 
Civil Affairs Division in London, which was just as casual 
as the MGS section in Algiers. He was given no information 
at all and thought it inexcusable 'how any planners sitting 
in London and Washington could have overlooked the fact 
that Italian education could not be reformed without new 
school textbooks.' (181) Meanwhile Capt Mason Hammond, 
Adviser of Fine Arts and Monuments at Palermo HQ, had 
carried out some improvised education measures, in addition 
to his own work.
According to the Sicily Zone Handbook the latest figures 
available to the Foreign Office in 1943 showed that in the 
academic year 1940-41 there were approximately 415,000 
pupils and 10,500 teachers in the island's elementary 
schools. A considerable number of these pupils lived in 
rural areas and attended school only in the winter months, 
remaining at home all summer to help with agricultural and 
pastoral work. Others were enrolled on school registers but 
did not attend regularly. In the same year just under
45.000 attended some form of secondary school, ranging from 
Ginnasi to Licei, roughly equivalent to the lower and 
higher levels of British grammar schools, and the Scuole 
Medie, lower secondary schools, established in 1940. Of the 
three universities in the island Catania was by far the 
oldest, having been founded by Pope Eugenius IV in 1444. In 
1941 it was a State University with a total of more than
5.000 students, of whom a large proportion were in Arts 
faculties, in particular the faculty of Jurisprudence. 
This was also the most popular faculty in Palermo. (182)
Catania town was well equipped with secondary schools; the 
Liceo Ginnasio "N.Spedaliere", Liceo Ginnasio "M. Cutelli", 
the Liceo Scientifico, and four Istituti Tecnici: Agrario, 
Industria, Commercio, Commercio e Industria. In addition 
there was a Nautical School, two schools for Professional
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Training in Agriculture and Commerce and one specifically 
for Professional Training for girls. (183)
Gayre began his work in Palermo on 7 September in one room 
without glass in its windows, no typewriter, no clerk, no 
telephone. All educational establishments were closed by 
Proclamation and many teachers and lecturers had fled their 
posts. The new Educational Adviser began his work with an 
examination of the complete series of textbooks for the 
five grades of the elementary school. This series was 
written and printed under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Education and used throughout Italy. There was a great 
variety of these books and teachers were free to choose the 
ones they preferred. Each one was found to be permeated 
with propaganda, although in some cases the number of pages 
of overt propaganda was relatively small and could be 
removed. Book shops were ordered to cut out the offending 
pages before selling them and when schools reopened, 
teachers were told to check that they had been removed 
before pupils used them. If the number of offending pages 
was too great, the books were ordered to be confiscated and 
then deposited with the nearest Sindaco. He would arrange 
for them to be shipped to a paper mill for pulping when a 
mill became available. (184)
There was no complete listing of secondary school books 
and the nine provincial Directors of Education 
(Provveditori agli Studi) were authorised, subject to the 
approval of their SCAO, to use their discretion in 
approving Latin, Greek and purely technical books but had 
to send a list of the books to the Education Adviser. In 
other fields the title of the book requested by the school 
was submitted to the local Proweditore for approval. All 
history books were discarded and new ones produced. As 
Italian teachers were accustomed to working to a curriculum 
laid down for them and since new text books were not 
immediately available, instructions and a course of study 
were prepared for them by the education committees set up 
under the guidance of SCAOs, in keeping with Gayre's policy
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of granting as much responsibility as possible at a local 
level.(185)
As Gayre did not arrive in Sicily until September, he was 
working under great pressure, as his diary reveals:’To get 
the schools reopened, new texts printed and teachers 
examined for their political history, are tasks which, with 
an adequate staff, ought to take a year, and by hook or by 
crook I must get it done by Christmas if I can.'(186) Gayre 
was delighted when Major C. Washburne arrived on 8 October. 
He was an experienced American school administrator and the 
designated Education Officer for Rome and had been sent to 
Palermo for a short while to understudy the work being done 
there. As Gayre was working alone with only an interpreter 
and the typist he had acquired, Washburne offered to assist 
him. Soon he was in charge of elementary and secondary 
education, freeing Gayre to concentrate on policies, 
universities and the elimination of Fascist personnel.(187)
In the latter task he was greatly assisted by Major Aldo 
Raffa, an Italo-American officer, who worked directly under 
the Chief of Staff, Lt Col Spofford, and whose job was to 
investigate the background and past history of all public 
officials. Raffa had drawn up a Scheda Personale which 
every official was obliged to fill in with full details and 
precise dates of his past history and connections with 
Fascism. Heading the Scheda was a warning 'N.B. Penalita
severissime, di prigione e di ammenda, sono previste per 
chiunque faccia delle dichiarazioni false nella presente 
scheda. ' After completing the Scheda the writer was 
required to write ’Giuro che le precedenti dichiarazioni 
sono vere.’ Then he was told;’Rileggete prima di consegnare 
la scheda, e se avete scritto il falso, correggete. Vi
ricordiamo che le superiori dichiarazioni sono state fatte 
sotto giuramento e che pene severissime sono stabilite per 
il falso giuramento. ' (188) The CAO would then add his
comments and recommendations as to whether the person in
question should be retained in post, suspended or
dismissed. Gayre commented on the unlikelihood that anyone
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would deliberately lie on this questionnaire, as he had 
never seen a document so covered with threats before.(189) 
Making full use of the Scheda personale, Gayre proceeded 
to check all teaching staff. Out of a total of 1,676 copies 
of the Scheda used in all divisions of Military Government 
in Sicily to sift Fascist personnel, 1,100 were used in the 
field of education. (190) A beginning was always made with 
key administrators - Proweditori, Rectors of Universities, 
Directors of Higher Institutes - and it was in these 
categories that most dismissals and substitutions were 
made. As the War Office report points out, only evidently 
serious cases of overt Fascist activity among the lower 
teaching grades were immediately dealt with, since 'all 
efforts were made to recommence scholastic functioning with 
all despatch, allowing for the necessary first revisions of 
syllabus, organisation and material.1(191)
In December Gayre visited Catania to preside at a meeting 
of the Senatus Academicus, and to carry out the completion 
of the dismissals and suspensions of the fascist 
professors, one of whom, Gaetano Zingali, was causing a 
great deal of trouble. Zingali had been suspended for six 
months for his overt Fascism, and 'had created pandemonium 
in Catania, accusing the rector, Petroncelli, of being a 
Fascist.' The latter's innocence was proved and he was 
delighted to obtain a forthcoming transfer to Naples 
University, where he could relinquish the post of rector 
and resume his studies. Before leaving the University Gayre 
expressed his regret that the building had been turned into 
a NAAFI when it was badly needed for its proper purpose. He 
acknowledged, however, that it was being very well looked 
after, unlike Palermo University, which had tended to 
disintegrate under military occupation. (192)
On 25 November Gayre, with other AMG officers and heads of 
subcommissions of the Allied Control Commission had visited 
Brindisi for a conference with Italian Government 
ministers. He met Badoglio's Minister for Education, Cuomo, 
'an old and weak man who had been out of office for twenty
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years and had only come back as an ex-deputy and patriot to 
serve his king and country.' (193) The official minutes of 
the conference reveal that the Minister had not formulated 
any plans for the internal working organisation of the 
Ministry of Education and that he needed more time to 
consider the matter. He wished the Allied Education 
Advisers to continue to be responsible for education until 
Rome was taken. It was clear that he had given no thought 
to the matter and had no sense of urgency but he did state 
that his purpose would be to get rid of Fascist 
influence.(194)
Later events rather belied this stated aim. Gayre learned 
that Cuomo was securing appointments for Italian education 
officials after they had been dismissed from their posts by 
Allied officers. Capt Vessolo, British Education Adviser 
for Region II, informed Gayre that the Proweditori agli 
Studi in Calabria, and several other Fascists dismissed 
from their posts, had been given new positions. As Gayre 
wrote: 'It means that someone who has been got rid of by us 
as a Fascist only needs to walk across the 'frontier' into 
Apulia, where the King's Government of Badoglio rules, and 
get a job from Cuomo'.(195)
Reference was made above to the presence of officers of 
the Allied Control Commission (ACC) at the conference in 
Brindisi. Details of this Commission, which was formed to 
replace AMGOT in February 1944, will be provided later but 
brief mention is made now of the impact of the somewhat 
premature arrival in October of ACC personnel on the 
Education section at AMGOT HQ. It caused, in Gayre's words, 
'a moral collapse' of the AMGOT staff, because the incomers 
immediately took over their posts. (196) Gayre admits his 
shock when Lt Col T.V. Smith, a professor of Philosophy at 
Chicago University, arrived unexpectedly to take over his 
job. However, after discussion with General McSherry and 
General Joyce, head of the new Commission, Smith said he 
was willing to serve as Gayre's deputy. (197) Gayre 
continued to head operations at Palermo HQ, and Smith went
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to Brindisi to liaise with the Italian Government.
Meanwhile American Major Koopman, an experienced school 
administrator, had come from Tizi Ouzou via Charlottesville 
to join the Education section and subsequently took over 
responsibility for Sicily, where he remained as Regional 
Education Officer. By the beginning of December, with the 
help of the extra officers in his department, Gayre had 
produced Educational Directives for all schools, laid down 
general policies, rewritten school programmes, ensured that 
text books had been expurgated and new elementary textbooks 
prepared, ready for the official reopening of schools.(198)
The damage to educational buildings was estimated at 25% 
for Sicily as a whole, with coastal cities suffering most. 
The repair of school buildings was given a very high 
priority and minimum repair work was done on most of those 
that were partially damaged. Where buildings were 
completely or nearly completely demolished, other buildings 
were requisitioned to serve as school premises. (199) All 
schools in Sicily were scheduled to open on 1st December. 
By this time most of the buildings occupied by troops and 
refugees had been evacuated and were available for schools 
again but it was not possible to obtain details for the 
availability of Catania schools.
Considering the difficulties and problems he encountered, 
Gayre had achieved a great deal in a short time but he was 
justified in taking a very pessimistic view of the future 
of Italian education. After his return to Britain in 
February 1944, he was informed by ACC that the Italian 
Government had been released from any obligation to honour 
appointments made by him in his capacity as Education 
Adviser, and that in fact all AMGOT appointments would be 
terminated with the end of the military occupation. (200)
AMGOT staff had removed Fascist personnel from the 
Education system, making full use of the Scheda Personale. 
The next Section will deal with the removal of Fascists in 
other professions.
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Section 10. The Removal of Fascists under AMGOT
Administration
The previous section referred to the use of the Scheda 
Personale, the method employed by AMGOT*s Education staff 
to discover those in administrative and teaching posts who 
were committed Fascists, not just nominal Party members. 
The Scheda Personale was not drawn up until September and 
therefore unavailable during the actual invasion and the 
early days of AMGOT administration. Although it was obvious 
that the Party Machine could not be broken up or Fascist 
influence eliminated in a day, certain steps had been taken 
to identify those in public administration who held high 
appointments because of past services to the Party, or who, 
for example, had been Squadristi or part of the March on 
Rome. (201)
Since almost all administrative officials were members of 
the Party, if only nominally, removing them would cause a 
breakdown not only of the whole administration but also of 
all public and technical services. The removal of Fascists 
was essentially the responsibility of AMGOT officers in 
cooperation with the British Field Security Personnel (FSP) 
and the American Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC). They 
held the 'Black List* of Fascists considered to be a threat 
to military security and, when a town was entered, FSP or 
CIC staff checked the list with the local Carabinieri. If 
an arrest was made, the nearest CAO was to be informed but, 
because of transport difficulties, it frequently happened 
that the security personnel arrived in a town before AMGOT 
staff, made some arrests and moved on without leaving any 
records. By the end of August 1,500 Sicilians were in local 
prisons without charge sheets. (202)
A Cabinet document on Field Security emphasised the 
importance from the security point of view that AMGOT 
should arrive in a town at the same time as the FSP, not 
only in connection with the arrest of Fascists but because 
the civilian authorities expected FSP personnel to provide
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all the same services as CAOs, such as providing food, 
directing traffic and imposing discipline.(203) The Cabinet 
document also pointed out the need for closer collaboration 
with AMGOT in the employment of former Fascist town 
officials:'Numerous occasions have occurred when FSP have 
refrained from arresting such undesirable persons at the 
request of AMGOT who stated that they were essential for 
the restoration of order and the civilian services.1(204) 
As the same document recorded;'It must be admitted that 
there have been occasions when FSP and AMGOT have not seen 
entirely eye to eye.... Those responsible may consider 
taking steps to remove any causes of friction...if our 
Administration is to be the most efficient possible.'(205) 
Rennell had already made clear that AMGOT's first aim was 
not defascistisation but the avoidance of administrative 
breakdown:1 Initial arrests for obstruction, hostility or 
strong Fascist sentiments were few in the first two weeks 
owing to lack of information and a desire to do nothing 
which would cause a breakdown in the administration while 
AMGOT officers were trying to get something running.1(206) 
He later reiterated AMGOT's intention to find a controlling 
staff over an Italian administrative machine from which the 
'most undesirable Fascist element had been, and would 
progressively be, weeded out, without a breakdown.1 (207) 
It was only when the Scheda Personale was available that a 
more accurate assessment of a person's past connections 
with the Party could be made. As stated previously, the 
SCAO of Catania had the Questore, Molina, arrested at 
AMGOT's first meeting with the municipal authorities. 
Presumably Wellesley was in possession of the local Black 
List, which contained the Questore's name. Molina was later 
reinstated after further enquiries were made by FSP.(208) 
After the Scheda Personale was introduced it became much 
easier to examine the facts about an individual's past 
associations with the Fascist Party. Major Raffa, who had 
devised the Scheda, pointed out that the concerns of CIC 
and FSP were with Allied military security of an immediate
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character, whereas AMGOT!s concern was with the long-range 
necessities of military government. (209) In Catania, after 
investigation and the examination of each Scheda Personale, 
a number of local public figures were sent to an internment 
camp at Priolo, or imprisoned in the old Pietro Lupo jail 
in the town. The names of six professors, removed from 
their University posts, and seven teachers dismissed from 
local secondary schools, were published under an AMGOT 
announcement in the Corriere di Sicilia, even though it did 
not appear until 1 March 1944, after the island had been 
returned to the Italian authorities. The dismissals had 
been made months earlier and included the head of the 
Liceo-Ginnasio Cutelli, Rosario Verde, who had actually 
been dismissed on 19 November. Verde then disappeared from 
the town and was not found until September 1945, when he 
was arrested for spying activities in collaboration with 
OVRA. He had betrayed an anti-Fascist teacher on his staff, 
who was subsequently deported to Germany, where he died in 
a concentration camp. (210)
On 27 October a new Proweditore agli Studi for the 
province was appointed. No reason was given but presumably 
the previous post-holder had a Fascist past, verified by a 
Scheda Personale. (211) In other areas of public life 
individual checks were being made but it was quite clear 
from the very beginning of AMGOT's administration that it 
was impossible to attempt to remove all ex-members of the 
Fascist Party, since membership had been an imposed 
necessity for employment, particularly for those in State 
employment. A War Office document points out that the 
criterion employed was one of active participation and ’how 
far in the lower ranges, participation could be held to be 
forced or deliberate.’(212)
Rennell had emphasised the progressive nature of weeding 
out Fascists. The process would take longer than the actual 
term of AMGOT administration, and was hampered by the 
withdrawal of many CAOs from their communes before the 
scheduled date of 11 February 1944, leaving many areas with
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no AMGOT representation in January.
In the Allied plans to eradicate Fascism from the island 
the Fascist Corporative Syndicate system was dissolved and 
all Fascist officials removed. The various workers' unions 
were also dissolved and replaced by a provincial Labour 
Office. (213) All individuals were banned from promoting 
any aspect whatsoever of Fascism, but as stated above, it 
would take time to remove every single Fascist in a 
position of authority and, at the same time, find a 
competent replacement while the war continued on the 
mainland. Many Sicilians holding public office had been
transferred from the island to various towns in Italy by
order of Mussolini. It was not until May 1944 that a 
provincial Commission for Defascistisation was formed, 
months after AMGOT had ceased to exist in Sicily.
The CCS Directives for the Military Government of Sicily 
had stated that no political activity whatsoever in the 
island would be tolerated but that freedom of speech and 
the Press were to be instituted in so far as military
interests were not prejudiced. Harris points out the
difficulty in reconciling these two freedoms with a 
complete prohibition of all political activities. (214) In 
spite of the ban, the political vacuum remaining after the 
dissolution of the Fascist Party soon began to fill, as is 
indicated in the next section.
Section 11. The Re-emergence of Separatism and other
Political Parties
In Catania town the SCAO had become the target of Avv. 
Prof. Andrea Finocchiaro-Aprile, head of the Comitato per 
1 1Indipendenza della Sicilia, a movement which had existed 
for many years in the island and whose aim was to separate 
Sicily from mainland Italy and to establish it as an 
independent Republic. Finocchiaro-Aprile was not himself a
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Sicilian but hailed from Tuscany, and before the advent of 
Fascism had been Under-Secretary for War and for the 
Treasury in the Nitti Government.(215) According to a 
Sicilian journalist, working in Rome, who sent a document 
on the 'Separatist Point of View on Sicilian Problems’ to 
Col Switzer, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 
the movement had a strong following in the island, and was 
supported by both intellectuals and the working classes, 
'since everyone looks to it as the only protection of real 
democracy against a possible future Social-Communist 
dictatorship.' The writer insisted that Sicilians were 
tired of being ruled by the Italian peninsula which had 
never protected the island's interests.(216)
Finocchiaro-Aprile collaborated closely with Concetto 
Gallo, son of a former mayor of Catania, and both had links 
with Catania University. According to Gavin Maxwell's 
account of the life of the Sicilian outlaw, Salvatore 
Giuliano, the Separatist movement was actively fostered by 
American Special Services after the invasion, and involved 
a guerilla army under the control of Professor Canepa, a 
lecturer in Law at Catania University. The army was known 
as EVIS (Esercito Volontaria Indipendenza Siciliana). (217) 
However, the sequence of events after the invasion bringing 
the downfall of Mussolini, the Armistice, and the King's 
declaration of war on Germany resulted in the Americans no 
longer wishing to be involved in the movement. They adopted 
a negative attitude, of neither condemnation nor official 
support.
Nicolosi relates that when the British entered Catania, 
they knew the exact whereabouts of certain locations in the 
town and immediately found Professor Canepa, who, after 
carrying out an act of sabotage at Gerbini, had taken 
refuge in the home of Professor Petroncelli, his colleague 
at the University. He apparently provided the British with 
a great deal of information about the town and its 
residents. (218)
On 30th September Finocchiaro-Aprile wrote to Rennell. He
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wished to draw his attention to the situation in Catania 
'che appare anormale da molti punti di vista.1 He alleged 
that the SCAO was excessively tolerant towards the Fascist 
elements who were continuing to serve in the municipal 
offices. In particular he referred to the CAO, Thornitt 
Smith, who had worked for the sulphur exporters, Bailer 
Saraw, for many years and had now renewed contact with his 
past Fascist acquaintances. He pointed out that the vice 
podesta, Russo, was a former Squadrista and supporter of 
the regime. He named Cesare Polizzi, head of the town's 
Industrial Technical Secondary School, as one who had 
denounced non-Fascist teachers.
The Commissioner of the local Consiglio dell'Economia, 
Luigi Carnazza, was also identified as a leading Fascist. 
Carnazza's father was a former Minister for Public Works, 
and his mother was the sister of General Enno von Rintelen, 
German Military Attache in Rome. Carnazza was apparently 
trying to reorganise former Fascists into a new Liberal 
Party. Finally Finocchio-Aprile directed his attention on 
the Sindaco, the Marquis Di San Giuliano, whom he accused 
of being a former Fascist Party inspector, who had achieved 
office through his connection with an illustrious ancestor 
and was now intent on replacing non-Fascist staff in the 
Municipio with former Fascists.(219)
The ancestor was his uncle, a former Italian Foreign 
Secretary. War correspondent, Christopher Buckley, decided 
to call on the Sindaco and described him as 'a small, 
pleasant, English-speaking gentleman, dressed in immaculate 
Bond Street suiting, who received us courteously.' During 
the conversation the Sindaco claimed that his uncle had 
been responsible for Italy entering World War I on 
Britain's side. Buckley knew this was not true but did not 
contradict him 'because he seemed so nice.' However, he 
found himself wondering how the Marquis had been appointed 
if he really was as anti-Fascist as he claimed during their 
conversation. Since he was one of the biggest landowners in 
Sicily, Buckley wondered if Mussolini appointed him without
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exacting more than lip service to the Fascist creed. (220) 
Finocchiaro-Aprile then turned his attention to Wellesley, 
alleging that the latter had declared in the presence of 
other Allied officers that the Anglo-American forces had 
not come to Sicily to fight Fascism. On hearing this the 
faith of Catanesi in the English was badly shaken. (221) 
Rennell would have paid scant attention to these
complaints. In his view the leaders of the Separatist 
movement were 'certainly anti-Fascist but were an
embarrassment all the same.' (222) Finocchiaro-Aprile was 
obviously keen to publicise his own anti-Fascism and hoped 
to exploit the growing unpopularity of the Allies who had 
neither removed all Fascists nor brought the promised reign 
of plenty. He had written a series of letters putting 
forward the case for Sicily's independence, beginning with 
an open letter to the people of Sicily, dated 12 June 1943, 
in which he denounces the Axis leaders:'Vogliamo far sapere 
al mondo che la Sicilia e la prima a non riconoscere piu la 
loro autorita e il loro arbitrio.' He wrote to a number of 
Western leaders, including Roosevelt, Churchill, Eden, 
Cordell Hull, King George VI and Pope Pius XII and 
persisted in his correspondence to them, even writing to
Eleanor Roosevelt after the President's death. (223) 
Although it had been made clear that while AMGOT was 
responsible for the island's administration no political 
parties would be tolerated, the SCAO of Palermo province 
permitted the Separatist Party to hold public meetings,
which he and other officers attended. In September the 
Separatist Lucio Tasca was nominated Sindaco of Palermo, 
the vice-Sindaco, Di Napoli, also being a member of the 
Party. (224) Rennell had realised that the ban on political 
activity was not welcomed in the island and told the 
Foreign Office that many groups had already formed and even 
produced handbills. His attempts to stop these activities 
had been unsuccessful. (225) Apart from the Separatists in
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Catania it appears that other groups were making discreet 
moves to organise themselves but were in no particular
hurry in the first few post-war months. It was not until
January 1944 that the CCS informed Eisenhower that 'the 
Italian people may be permitted to participate in such 
political activities as do not lead to rioting or 
disorder... they have the right to peaceful assembly, 
attendance at meetings of political committees, and 
publication and distribution of political works.' (226) ACC 
officers were told to ensure that the Italian Government 
permitted similar freedom of political activity in parts of
Italy restored to Italian jurisdiction.
The decision of the CCS was transmitted to the Italian 
people on 10 January 1944 by Lt Col Poletti when he issued 
Order No.17. They were to have freedom of political 
activity within certain bounds. (227) Finocchiaro-Aprile
was the first to take advantage of the new freedom. He 
wasted no time in hiring the Massimo Theatre, one of the 
largest and most impressive buildings in Palermo, and on 16 
January delivered his first officially permitted public 
speech on Separatism. As previously mentioned, the
Separatists had already been active in Palermo province and 
Rennell had readily admitted the impossibility of
preventing political meetings. As it was now legal to hold 
them an anti-Fascist committee meeting was arranged in 
Catania on 24 January. It included representatives from
groups of Socialists, Communists, Christian-Democrats,
Social-Democrats and Republicans. The first meeting of the 
Socialist Party took place a week later and Domenico 
Albergo was made responsible for reorganising the Party in 
Sicily. The Liberal Party decided to set up its own 
provincial section and all political groups began to plan 
their future activities.(228) Since the AMG was due to hand 
over responsibility for the island on 11 February, little 
progress in the development of the various political
parties was made during the remainder of AMG
administration.
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Section 12. The Slow Return to Normality
Previous Sections have revealed the extent of the problems 
faced by the AMGOT administration in Catania. Chronic food 
shortages, a flourishing Black Market, rising inflation and 
wage anomalies, and lack of accommodation for large numbers 
of homeless, which was exacerbated by requisitions to 
house Allied forces. Added to these was an acute lack of 
transport for both CAOs and civilians. The SCAO's first 
report to HQ at Palermo, which covered the first month of 
AMGOT administration, was not encouraging. (229) The first 
popularity enjoyed by the British troops had waned due to a 
number of incidences of deplorable behaviour and the 
Corriere di Sicilia was publishing various public 
grievances. There was still a shortage of lire currency, 
which, as Wellesley pointed out, was affecting prices, but 
there was no shortage of well paid labour. (230) It was not 
all bad news, however, as the only reminder of the war had 
been a few German air raids which caused little damage. The 
UNPA units (Unione nazionale di protezione antiaerea) were 
now being used to clear away the vast amount of debris in 
the streets. All branches of the Municipality were now open 
and a list of the location of their offices published. 
Electricity and water supplies had been restored, if only 
partially, in most areas of the town. By the end of August 
water would be available in the neighbouring Etna 
communes.(231)
Wellesley's report for September begins with a reference 
to 'an air of general depression in Catania as though the 
city had not yet recovered from the impact of war.' (232) 
Although some shops had opened, the majority remained 
closed. However, fresh funds had been received from AMFA, 
banks had reopened and there was no sign of panic 
withdrawals, in fact, most banks had received new deposits. 
Meetings with Finance Officers, Mayors and Tax Collectors 
had taken place to discuss a tolleranza for Catania town.
There was a growing need for labour due to the approach of
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seasonal occupations such as harvesting citrus fruit and 
grapes. Wellesley also reported the return of a postal 
service in the province. This would use the already 
existing service which delivered the Corriere di Sicilia in 
the province.(233) The return of this civilian postal
service, albeit with a number of conditions attached to it, 
was announced to the public in the Corriere on 10
September. Only postcards would be accepted, written in 
Italian or English, destined to addresses in Catania town. 
Postcards addressed to other towns would be destroyed.
AMGOT stamps costing 15 centesimi would be on sale on 
weekday mornings at the Ufficio della Corrispondenza, 
(Palazzo delle Poste e Telegrafi) (234) This was not quite 
the same information as given by the SCAO in his report. 
After the island's surrender AMGOT had organised a 
collection service for letters written by families to POWs. 
The envelopes, bearing the last known address of the
prisoner^ were placed in a special box in the central post 
office of each town and notices to this effect were 
displayed at the usual AMGOT sites such as the Town Hall, 
AMGOT HQ and municipal buildings.(235)
Relations between AMGOT staff and municipality officials 
appear to have flourished during these difficult times. 
Presumably the presence of a town CAO, with fluent Italian 
and long acquaintance with the local people and their 
particular characteristics, would have been a great 
advantage to the administration, as was an Italian-speaking 
SCAO. In addition the Mayor's ability to speak excellent 
English would have been very useful with members of AMGOT 
staff. Nicolosi refers to the efforts made and recorded in 
the Cronaca di Catania column of the Corriere, towards the 
step by step rebirth of the town:'Fu una faticosa ma alacre 
attivita, nella quale tutti i Catanesi e l'autorita alleata 
si impegnarono con una unita di intenti ed efficacia di 
resultati quali negli anni successivi non si sarebbero piu 
viste.' (236)
Concern about the slow reopening of shops would presumably
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have been the reason for an announcement from the 
Commissariato per gli Affari Economici della Provincia di 
Catania, stating that shops were to be reopened in the 
town. A stern warning was issued to all wholesale and 
retail shopowners who had left the town to return 
immediately with any goods they had taken with them, or 
they would be severely punished. (237) On a lighter note 
the reopening of cinemas in September was another step to 
normality, even though the presence of the PWB was evident 
since cinema managers had to obtain a permit and provide 
the name and details of the film.
Progress was still very slow in restoring the town because 
of the amount of rebuilding needed and the total lack of 
building materials available.(238) Food and clothes were 
still in short supply in spite of Red Cross deliveries. 
With the gradual departure of troops for the mainland, the 
Army no longer required as much labour but the surplus 
could not be absorbed by local industry, which was still 
inactive and inevitably unemployment would result,
It would be a long, slow process to rebuild the city, and 
the lives of its inhabitants. AMGOT seems to have done all 
it could to speed that process within the limitations 
imposed on it. One area, however, would prove extremely 
difficult to implement because it depended on thorough 
planning on the part of AFHQ and on the total cooperation 
of the Sicilian grain producers. This will be addressed in 
the following Section relating to supplies and resources to 
provide for the needs of the civilian population.
Section 13. The Civilian Supply and Resources Division
Before the invasion the Allies had anticipated a possible 
need for civilian supplies arising from the effects of air 
raids and combat and to this end had drawn up plans for the 
stockpiling of essential commodities in North Africa. AFHQ 
had informed the War Department in May 1943 that the island 
produced adequate food and 'when the whole area is occupied
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there should be no need, on the basis of the existing 
standard of living, for the import of essential food.'(239) 
Nevertheless it was thought prudent to establish reserves 
to avoid local shortages if urban centres should be cut off 
by military operations from their rural sources of supply, 
or if the grain harvest should prove insufficient. The CCS 
had charged the United States with the main responsibility 
for obtaining and shipping civilian supplies to Italy but 
the MGS assumed that sufficient stocks would be available 
in North Africa, if needed.(240)
It had become clear, however, even during the first days 
of the occupation of an urban centre, Siracusa, that the 
Allies had underestimated civilian food requirements to a 
serious degree. It appears that the planners lacked 
reliable Intelligence reports and had based their 
calculations on the misrepresentation of yields and imports 
published by the Fascist government, which, in the words of 
Major A. Alexander, Acting Chief of the Economic and Supply 
Division, 'were designed to make its self-sufficiency 
programme appear more successful than it was.1 (241) AFHQ 
also failed to take into account the potential damage to 
crops from military operations. This, together with the 
almost total lack of fertilisers available in 1943 led to a 
significant reduction in the yield of the grain crop. In 
addition, the effect of the black market and the reluctance 
of farmers to deliver grain to the ammassi (warehouses), 
greatly reduced the amount available to implement the bread 
ration. (242)
During the planning stage provision had also been made for 
shipping to bring civil supplies to the island. 
Arrangements made in North Africa were later changed and 
instead of operating through the HQ of Fifteenth Army Group 
as planned, the administration of civilian supplies was 
transferred to FORTBASE in Siracusa, the British supply 
district for the Eighth Army. This change in the 
administrative set-up contributed to the difficulties 
experienced by AMGOT's supply organisation in acquiring the
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food needed for the island, but the main cause of the 
problem was the inadequacy of the MGS at AFHQ. They failed 
to keep a watchful eye on the French authorities, with whom 
they had made an arrangement to provide a reserve of 32,000 
tons of flour, milled and bagged, from the Tunisian and 
Algerian grain crop. (243) Far from supplying the flour, 
ready bagged, the French had not even collected the grain.
MGS had also stockpiled 13,600 short tons of provisions 
ready to be shipped in stages from D+15 to D+60. Although 
mostly made up of foodstuffs, it also included medical 
stores and items such as soap. When the Deputy Director of 
Civilian Supply from Palermo visited AFHQ in October, he 
discovered that most of the 13,600 tons had been stockpiled 
by MGS in ports where convoys did not load. (244) The 
consequent delay in delivering the shipments, caused by 
this mismanagement, resulted in only 3,200 tons of the 
13,600 tons reaching Catania by coaster on 30 August. Of 
this amount, all but 500 tons was diverted to Reggio di 
Calabria in early September to relieve the mainland's food 
shortage, exacerbated by the retreating Germans who 
destroyed much of the 1943 grain crop on their way north. 
Over the next two months a further 6,800 tons were brought 
in but only 5,800 tons of flour commissioned from the 
French authorities materialised. (245)
The Civilian Supply Division originally consisted of seven 
sections dealing with civilian requirements - Agriculture 
and Fisheries; Industries; Mines and Resources; Public 
Utilities; Communications; Transport; and Labour. After the 
occupation it was reorganised into four separate divisions 
and on 24 October taken over by the ACC - three changes in 
less than six months. (246) The head of its Agricultural 
Sub-Division, Major J. Chayton, was not sent to Sicily 
until 25 July. It took a further six weeks before two 
assistants arrived to help him enforce the laws for the 
collection and distribution of grain. This delay further 
increased the already heavy workload of CAOs, one of whose 
main functions was to deal with local supply matters.
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In his report the Major refers to Article 4 of 
Proclamation No.8, which stated that "All existing laws, 
Decrees and Rey illations i.elating to Agriculture will he 
strictly enforced and observed". (247) In practice this was 
virtually impossible to carry out as the Italian system of 
agricultural control was ’a very intricate and delicate 
piece of mechanism1. Breakdowns had occurred before the 
occupation and after the invasion 'the machine was almost 
completely wrecked and impossible of reconstruction'. The 
only alternative was to reconstruct the system completely - 
a task beyond the realms of physical possibility. (248) 
Under existing Italian law, almost every agricultural 
product was subject to the compulsory system of delivery to 
the ammassi. As the shortage of bread increased, the 
collection of wheat to provide an adequate ration became 
even more vital and SCAOs concentrated their efforts in 
this direction. Chayton reported that not enough efficient 
and trustworthy native personnel were available so SCAOs 
built up their systems around individuals. The result was 
that agricultural organisations in all Provinces varied 
considerably in their structures. (249)
For their part farmers were justifiably dissatisfied with 
official prices. Rennell issued General Order No.3., which 
increased the rate for August deliveries to the ammassi 
from L.360 per quintal to L.500. September and October 
prices were set at L.450 and L.400 respectively, offering a 
premium for early delivery. At the same time the price of 
bread was raised from 2.5 to 3.6 lire a kilo, and the 
maximum ration per capita raised to 300 grams of bread a 
day and 280 grams of pasta per week, although the actual 
ration varied from province to province and town to town 
and could be as low as 100 grams a day. The ration in 
Catania town never reached the maximum.(250)
Major Rowell's fact-finding tour of Sicily in the second 
week of August underlined the problem of ration books. The 
pre-occupational ration books were being used but many 
people claimed that books had been lost or destroyed in air
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raids. Some claimed they had been told by retreating 
Fascists that Allied forces would punish anyone possessing 
a Fascist ration book and they had consequently destroyed 
their books. (251)
Reference was made earlier to the shortage of bread in 
Catania when the SCAO and his party of CAOs first arrived. 
Lord Wellesley's prompt action in obtaining emergency 
supplies was welcomed by the local population but within a 
very short time the influx of returning refugees created 
further serious shortages. In theory the rationing system, 
which provided extra bread for workers in heavy industry, 
was fair but a Cabinet document described it as 
'handicapped by the corruption of the local bakeries and 
the Italian administration' . (252) In Catania the cure was
to close most of the bakeries to ensure proper supervision 
of a limited number on a rota basis. The distribution of 
the bread ration initially took place in the presence of 
CAOs or MPs. (253) During August the average basic daily 
ration was 200 grams a day. Not only bread but other items 
of food were in very short supply. Before AMGOT arrived in 
Catania the Prefect had authorised police searches of shops 
and warehouses to find any hidden items of food:'Per 
fronteggiare la gravissima situazione alimentare della 
citta di Catania autorizzo il Comando dei Vigili Urbani ad 
eseguire perquisizioni nei negozi e magazzini, anche se 
chiusi, alio scopo di reperire generi alimentari. ' (254) 
After AMGOT's arrival the situation showed little signs of 
improving, and the HQ September report cites the 'continued 
source of embarrassment caused by the food shortage in the 
face of statements made by responsible officials of both 
governments as to what has been done and what is to be done 
in supplying the population.' The report pointed out that 
the propaganda agencies must realise that enemy populations 
are prone to remember promises even made over the air and 
that the result of predictions which cannot be carried into 
effect is the reverse of that intended.(255)
By early October the main grain-producing provinces, Enna,
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Caltanisetta and Agrigento had realised that the promised 
supplies to Sicily were not forthcoming and that the 
mainland was also experiencing grave shortages. Quite 
naturally they wished to keep the grain they had produced 
for their local population and therefore reduced supplies 
to other provinces. (256) The non-arrival of the promised 
imports from AFHQ caused the military commander great 
concern as the total lack of food reserves would inevitably 
lead to civil unrest. An extra problem was the increasing 
difficulty of movement by road, even when transport was 
available, owing to the number of blown bridges. During the 
summer months diversions crossed dried-up river beds but 
with the onset of winter the streams would fill them, 
making them impassable. In an attempt to solve the October 
crisis, emergency army food reserves were called on but 
nevertheless food riots erupted in a number of areas, 
including some villages in Catania.(257)
General McSherry, DCCAO, set out the facts of the 
situation in an AMGOT HQ meeting, laying the blame squarely 
on the black market. He stated that considerable quantities 
of wheat had disappeared into hoards and into the hands of 
black market operators before the start of effective 
control. The quantities amassed since then were exceedingly 
disappointing due to continued black market cornering and 
to withholding by producers. He warned that the quantity of 
wheat available from controlled sources would not support 
even an inadequate ration for more than a month or two. The 
price for black market sources would probably increase 
considerably with a consequent decline in the numbers able 
to afford it. (258) At the same meeting the question of the 
discovery and collection of grain supplies outside 
controlled channels was discussed, and as the matter had 
become one of the gravest urgency and was essentially the 
concern of the police, the Public Safety Division would 
have to take immediate action to deal with the problem, or, 
in McSherry's words,'face the prospect of handling grave 
and growing food disorders.'(259)
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Major Alexander took such a serious view of the situation 
that, in a memorandum for the Regional CAO (RCAO) on 13 
November, he referred to a medical aspect of the situation, 
pointing out that malnutrition would entail susceptibility 
to epidemics which in turn would bring a serious risk for
the Allied Armies. As existing stocks were so low,
amounting to less than 800 tons of flour for over 1,000,000 
people in the four main cities, he emphasised that imports 
must begin at once in order to prevent such a deterioration 
in the situation 'as might involve total failure of the 
occupation of Sicily. ’ He pointed out the repercussions 
which might arise, including the possibility of recalling 
troops needed elsewhere in order to control the civilian 
population.(260)
Alexander's pessimistic view of the situation was amply 
justified. Catania had just one day's supply of flour left 
when a ship arrived on 20 November. General Patton had
already informed General Eisenhower on 18 November that the 
situation in Sicily due to shortage of flour was very
serious 'and may become critical with resulting riots and 
bloodshed' (261) Emergency borrowing from American military 
stocks staved off a crisis which might well have led to a 
breakdown of law and order. By December when demands for 
food supplies in Naples and other occupied towns on the 
mainland were added to those on the island, the necessity 
for military action was realised. On 19 December the C-in-C 
issued an administrative instruction, which recognised the 
fact that 'it may be an over-riding military consideration 
that the civil population be fed.' Rennell welcomed this 
statement which 'put the supply of civilian requirements in 
its right perspective'. (262)
AFHQ, whose MGS had failed to supply food from the North 
African stockpiles when requested by AMGOT, informed the 
CCS in Washington on 14 December that 'conditions in 
Southern Italy and Sicily are such that unless reasonable 
quantities of food are supplied very promptly we will 
experience sabotage, unrest and complete cessation of those
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activities necessary to our advance.' (263)
Meanwhile in November Regional Order No.13 had been issued 
in an effort to ameliorate the situation. The maximum bread 
ration was reduced from 300 to 200 grams per person per 
day, bringing down the consumption in grain-producing 
provinces nearer the level in the rest of the island, which 
had actually averaged only 165 grams of bread and 15 grams 
of pasta. The situation in Messina was worse even than in 
Catania, with a daily ration of 100 grams. The Order 
provoked much resentment and led to an attack on a truck 
carrying grain to another province. The grain was stolen, 
the truck burned and an AMG officer disarmed. (264) The 
Order reduced the grain allocation to producers by 20%, 
which had to be sold to their ammassi. Without the sale 
certificate producers could not obtain a milling permit. 
All CAOs in grain producing areas were ordered to spend 
four days a week searching for illegally held grain, 
setting up road blocks at night and seeking help from 
officers in other areas. Major Monk at the Civil Supply 
Division in Catania wrote to CAOs emphasising the extreme 
importance 'of pushing this grain collection campaign to 
the limit as no reliance can be placed on imports of grain 
from outside the province during the next few months.'(265) 
The Supply Officer for the AMG, Eighth Army, thought that 
only civil motor transport to move the grain would solve 
the situation. Mule transport was of some help, but was 
'inadequate statistically and unsatisfactory in practice as 
the mules were now wanted for ploughing, etc., and the Army 
object to them on the roads anyway.' (266)
Although bread had been in short supply for months, fruit 
and vegetables were more easily obtained, although a 
drought had affected the citrus crop. Olive oil, an 
essential ingredient of the Sicilian diet, would be 
sufficient to provide a ration of half a litre per person 
per month. The price was fixed at 22 to 24 lire per litre 
according to quality, an increase of 50% on 1942. The yield 
of oil was less because the crushing process needed coconut
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fibre mats, imports of which ceased when Italy entered the 
war. (267)
Milk and meat formed only a small part of the diet so the 
reduced stocks of meat and milk animals were of minor 
concern. Eggs were in short supply, since they were in 
great demand by the invading armies and the price increase 
soon put them beyond the average family’s purse. Even 
before the invasion, government posters urging the Italian 
people to "Eat to live, don't live to eat" became more 
unpopular as people stood in queues with ration cards, 
under police supervision, only to find frequently that 
supplies had run out. The black market continued to 
flourish, particularly in large towns like Catania, as the 
shortage of transport prevented the normal flow of goods 
from the surrounding rural areas. In his comprehensive 
report on the island in August, Major Rowell referred to 
the problem of getting the food out of the hands of the 
producer into the hands of the consumer at the official 
prices and suggested that the only two ways to destroy a 
black market were to change the ratio between supply and 
demand, and to persuade or compel observance of artificial 
prices. The first could be achieved by importing sufficient 
food to meet consumers' demand at prices which were not too 
high for the poorer classes. The second would be achieved 
by compulsion, which would consist of punishment meted out 
by military tribunals.(268) As AMGOT was quite unable to 
bring in sufficient supplies and as in many towns CAOs were 
too busy with more urgent matters, Rowell's suggestions 
were not easily implemented. When resources were available, 
particularly in the form of clerical assistants, CAOs could 
bring black market offenders or other transgressors to 
court quickly, with the certain effect of deterring others.
To augment food supplies, fishing, an important industry 
in Sicily, was resumed on the south-west coast within a few 
days of the landings and soon extended to the remainder of 
the American coastline. On the eastern side, where military 
progress was slower and naval traffic heavier, a resumption
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of fishing on a large scale was not permitted until the end 
of September. For security reasons permits were needed and 
limits imposed. Boats were not allowed out during the hours 
of darkness and were obliged to stay within three miles of 
the coast. In spite of these limitations, the catch was a 
valuable addition to food supplies in coastal towns. (269)
A document from the Prime Minister's Office, undated but 
probably produced at the end of August, entitled 'REPORT ON 
THE WORKING OF AMGOT (MATERIAL FOR A DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT) 
was written to provide essential information on the 
military administration of Sicily in answer to questions 
raised in the House of Commons, some of which revealed 
ignorance of the role of CAOs. This document described the 
background and development of AMGOT and the environment in 
which CAOs worked. (270)
The section dealing with Civilian Supplies, although 
recognising the difficulties of food distribution, was 
somewhat optimistic, apart from supplies for the three main 
towns. For example, "Food is reasonably plentiful - Owing 
to good management food is being distributed everywhere as 
required - We have reserves available to meet emergencies 
- Stocks of wheat are in hand nearly everywhere for the 
next few weeks, except in Catania, Messina and Palermo - 
AMGOT is not worried over the food situation except in 
Messina - the bread and pasta ration has been increased 
generally, except in large towns, to 340 grams. (271) 
Regarding agriculture, reference was made to the special 
AMGOT division 'whose duty is to restore and improve 
agricultural production’ through consultations with the 
Sicilian Farmers Organisations, the Ispettorato Agrario and 
the Consorzio Agrario. The document was clearly designed to 
give a positive view of the military administration, and 
well-deserved credit to AMGOT staff, who would achieve 
solutions for seemingly impossible situations. It was 
probably not within the scope of the document to consider 
possible future difficulties. Certainly there is no hint of 
a likely food crisis on a large scale.
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Harris points out that the least satisfactory part of the 
planning for HUSKY was the organisation of the Civil Supply 
Division, 'which was conceived on much too small a scale 
for the bundle of diverse responsibilities which were 
finally thrust upon it. (272) It contained no specialists 
in road transport or communications, for which the military 
were responsible, and when the military moved on, the needs 
of the civilian population could not be met. The solution 
was to bring in AMGOT specialists as early as possible, to 
work alongside the military and to ensure that civilian 
needs were not neglected. In this respect it is no surprise 
to read Lord Rennell's remarks that the military technical 
services had shown themselves very jealous of allowing 
AMGOT to have anything to do with public utilities. (273) 
The situation improved after the invasion of the mainland 
when officers of the Transportation Sub-Commission were 
attached to the Military Railways Services, showing that 
some lessons at least had been learned from the Sicilian 
experience.(274)
Because of its location and port facilities Catania was to 
be the central distribution warehouse for the eastern side 
of the island, covering the provinces of Siracusa, Catania 
and Messina. The Supply Division CAO in charge of the port 
was Capt P. Gurney. He did not arrive until 11 October. His 
task was to organise and train teams of Sicilian storemen 
and foremen to supervise them, to check the competence of 
stevedore detachments, and to arrange for a fleet of 
lorries to be on standby when a ship arrived. It was five 
weeks before the first ship, carrying a consignment of 
flour, arrived but he comments that the preliminary work 
paid off, as 2,000 tons of flour were discharged, part 
warehoused and part delivered to Messina and Siracusa in 
record time. (275) But even with a well-trained work force 
problems frequently occurred, although mostly caused by 
AFHQ. Information sent from Algiers regarding the arrival 
times of ships would be incorrect, a ship's diversion to 
another port would not be notified, and boats would arrive
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without warning and without cargo details. Complications 
were frequently caused by the different weights of unmarked 
sacks and the number of broken sacks, so that no accurate 
check of total weight could be made and correct invoicing 
was impossible.(276)
Capt Gurney had one American assistant to help with 
account procedures but no ORs to supervise local employees, 
needed especially for a 24 hour discharge if two boats 
docked at almost the same time. Both CAOs were required to 
supervise the unloading and distribution as the warehouse 
was 1% miles from the port. Gurney's report reveals the 
need for more staff to supervise loading and unloading, 
especially if goods were distributed by rail, as this would 
act as a deterrent to looting and black market activities. 
Armed guards were needed to safeguard the warehouse at 
night. Gurney's report to the War Office pointed out a 
number of deficiencies in the planning of the Civil Supply 
Division, in particular the paucity of staff mentioned 
above: 'The whole organisation suffered from the lack of
personnel... Hasty and unused methods had to be employed to 
meet the situation. .'(277) Like most other CAOs, he was 
concerned about the constant moving of AMGOT officers, 
almost always without notice; 'Personnel was continually 
changing to the detriment of any organisation set up to 
deal with supplies.'(278)
In London, meanwhile, a meeting had been arranged at the 
Foreign Office to discuss the shortage of food in Sicily. 
Algiers had requested in November that 20,000 tons of flour 
should be sent to Sicily immediately, stating that civil 
strikes appeared imminent if supplies were not forthcoming. 
Washington was unable to ship supplies from the USA before 
10 December and requested that supplies should come from 
the Middle East. (279) Complaints were received from 
General Eisenhower that a convoy advised as bringing 8,000 
tons of flour brought only 1,180 tons. There was also a 
shortfall of other foods ordered in a second convoy. The 
general asked for these deficiencies to be immediately made
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up in the form of sacked flour as it was impossible to 
distribute bulk wheat with the existing facilities of the 
island.
The War Office had ascertained that the shortage was not 
due to faulty administration since Lord Rennell, when 
reporting the gravity of the situation, had pointed out 
that hoarding was the main cause of the shortage and no 
administration would be likely to extract the frozen grain. 
He added that if military operations on the mainland were 
to proceed at the current scale the port facilities, 
shipping and inland transport would not be able to cope. 
Consequently the military authorities would have to be 
prepared to face starvation among the civilian 
population.1(280)
In December AFHQ admitted that the original estimates of 
civilian food requirements had not taken into account the 
many factors which had altered the situation but the crux 
of the problem still remained the lack of inland 
transport.(281) CAOs in the field were under pressure from 
Major Monk at provincial HQ to ensure that the grain 
collection campaign was being maintained. Those CAOs in a 
grain-producing area, such as Caltagirone, were ordered to 
spend at least four days a week exclusively on searching 
for and confiscating illegally-held grain. (282) Monk had 
informed them that no reliance could be placed on imports 
of grain from outside the province during the coming 
months.(283) Although the military presence in the province 
had diminished, thus decreasing the need for local food 
supplies for Allied troops, this had no significant effect 
on those civilians who could not afford Black Market prices 
for items such as eggs and meat.
The arrival of the ACC, whose role and impact on AMGOT HQ 
will be examined in the next chapter, coincided with the 
sudden departure of the SCAO, whose reason for leaving was 
his unexpected inheritance of the title of Duke of 
Wellington from his nephew, killed at Salerno. He decided 
to return to England to take his seat in the House of Lords
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and presumably to deal with the affairs of the dukedom. 
Wellesley, who from his reports, letters and diary entries, 
gives the impression of having carried out very 
conscientiously the duties associated with his post, may 
possibly have been influenced in his decision to leave 
Sicily by the recent criticisms from Rennell, which he felt 
were totally unjustified, regarding his choice of town 
CAO, his failure to visit communes and his critical 
attitude to some of the items in the Corriere di Sicilia, 
referring to AMGOT administration.(284) He informed the 
mayor of his impending departure and donated 5,000 lire to 
the homeless of Catania.
He was replaced by Lt Col Charles French, former SCAO of 
the neighbouring province of Siracusa. His new province was 
much larger with an estimated population of 713,160 in 53 
communes, compared to Siracusa's 277,570 in 19 communes. In 
addition Catania province still had large numbers of 
British and Empire troops, stationed or passing through. 
Few details are available about Lt Col French, unlike his 
predecessor, but according to Nicolosi, he was regarded by 
the local people as 'un gran signore: a gentleman.' (285)
Unlike Wellesley he spoke no Italian and was always 
accompanied by his interpreter, Capt Bateman. Soon after 
his arrival, the mayor, the Marquese di San Giuliano, 
resigned, although, according to the latter, in the short 
time he knew Lt Col French, a 'forte amicizia' developed. 
Ardizzoni, editor of the Corriere, was nominated by AMGOT 
as the new mayor, and he occupied the post until September 
1945. (286) French and some of the staff of the provincial
HQ in Catania remained in post as members of the ACC when 
administration was handed back to the Italian Government.
The next chapter is based on the problems of administering 
a rural area of fourteen communes, which, although it did 
not suffer in the same way from the effects of combat, had 
other problems to overcome, including the provision of 
accommodation for refugees, and military indiscipline.
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Chapter 5
Allied Military Government in Caltagirone, Province 
of Catania, July 1943 - February 1944
Section 1. War comes to Caltagirone
The first large town captured in the province of Catania 
was Caltagirone, an agricultural centre built on three 
adjoining hills dominating the south-western edge of the 
Catania plain. Its commanding position is recognised by the 
description of the town as Regina delle montagne.(l) One of 
the most ancient of Sicilian towns, it had suffered badly 
in the 1693 earthquake. Its reconstruction resulted in some 
fine Baroque churches and palazzi, many decorated with 
local hand-painted ceramics, a traditional industry for 
which the town is justly renowned and which in recent years 
has become a well-known tourist attraction. (2) The area's 
prosperity still depends mainly on the production of grain, 
vines, olives and lowland crops from the numerous small 
towns and villages, situated on the slopes leading from 
Caltagirone to the Catania plain.
Sicilian writer, Francis Guercio, visiting the town in 
1938, praised the town's architecture but deplored its low 
standard of cleanliness. To him the town recalled 'only too 
vividly the pre-sanitary period of European history, when 
even large cities were littered with refuse and pervaded by 
unclean smells.' In spite of this, Guercio reminds his 
readers that Caltagirone had long been regarded as 'the 
most civilised provincial town in Sicily.'(3) Like other 
towns in the Mezzogiorno the largely peasant society had a 
strong sense of identity and cherished their traditions and 
customs. They cherished, too, the memory of the town's most 
famous citizen, don Luigi Sturzo, priest, mayor, and 
founder of the Partito Popolare in 1919, who became one of 
the fuorusciti in the nineteen-twenties, when he went into
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exile in the United States. (4) Historian Alfio Caruso, who 
has lived for many years in Caltagirone, refers to the town 
of Don Luigi as 'una vera spina nel fianco per la provincia 
di Catania fascista perche considerata antifascista dai 
Federali.'(5) He also writes about the belief shared by 
many Calatini during the war that Sturzo's contacts with 
members of the American government would spare the town 
from Allied bombing. (6) In 1937 the Congresso Eucaristico 
Regionale held its annual meeting in the town. Public 
displays in the large central park demonstrated the 
strength and militancy of the members of the Caltagirone 
Church. (7) The diocese was led by Bishop Capizzi and
consisted of 150,000 Catholics from 37 parishes, 130 
priests, 5 convents and 5 monasteries.(8) Each church had 
various religious and social organisations attached to it 
and the priests played a leading role in the life of the 
town, following the custom in rural areas. As every other 
town in Italy, Caltagirone was also subject to the
fascistizzazione process and the town park was also the 
location for regular fascist parades and school gymnastic 
displays in which all children participated.(9)
Caruso suggests from his many interviews with older 
residents in the town that, apart from the numerous 
religious festivals, Calatini enjoyed a busy social life
based on marionette theatre performances, concerts by the 
town band, films, plays performed by pupils of the high 
schools and by students from Catania University, as part of 
their dopolavoro activities. From time to time performances 
were given by visiting opera companies from Catania and
Palermo.(10)
Mussolini's declaration of war in June 1940 gradually 
brought about a change in the citizens' way of life. 
Although the war seemed far away from the island, food 
shortages soon led to rationing which halved the pre-war 
consumption of staple foods such as bread, rice and pasta. 
In spite of efforts to grow vegetables in their own 'orti 
di guerra ', many Calatini were obliged to go to surrounding
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villages to obtain food from the rural communities, paying 
black market prices. As Caruso comments:'I contadini 
diventarono i nuovi ricchi.' (11)
Meanwhile the town was gradually becoming a military base.
In June 1943, 4 junior school buildings were requisitioned 
and adapted for use as military hospitals. Barracks and 
open air camps housed troops of the Italian XVI Corpo 
d'Armata. 9,000 men of the Hermann Goering Division had 
been moved into the town in readiness to defend the 
southern beaches. Anti-aircraft batteries had been set up 
on one of the town’s hills and a radar station on another.
A squadron of German fighters were lined up on the nearby 
airfield of Santo Pietro. (12)
War in the shape of Wellington bombers came to Caltagirone 
on 9 July in spite of the belief that the town would be 
spared through Sturzo's influence. Three previous raids on * 
the Santo Pietro airfield had resulted in death or injury 
to thirty servicemen. (13) On this occasion the town centre 
took the brunt of the attack. The Podesta had issued orders 
only two days earlier that, in the event of an air raid, 
people were to take refuge in ’covered places' as there 
were no properly constructed air raid shelters in the town. 
Disobeying the order would incur a prison sentence of up to 
three months and a fine. (14) The first raid took place in 
daylight without any warning siren, and people took refuge 
in sheds, stables and makeshift tents in the countryside or 
risked sheltering in the railway tunnel on the line from 
Caltagirone to Piazza Armerina. Others hid in the 
prehistoric caves in Montagna, north of the town.
The Allied invasion began in the early hours of the 
following day. According to Caruso, the German tanks, 
before leaving to counter-attack the American Seventh Army 
at Gela, broke down the doors to shops and warehouses. The 
troops took what they wanted and left the premises open for 
local inhabitants to help themselves, which they did, since 
many had been without food since they fled the bombing. 
Some went on the rampage and stripped many private houses
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of all their contents, taking them away on any form of 
transport they could find. (15)
The Eighth Army, meanwhile, after a relatively easy 
landing in the south-east sector of the island, had been 
halted in their attempts to cross the Catania Plain. The 
plan for the capture of Catania was changed, Montgomery 
deciding to move west along the Vizzini-Caltagirone 
highway. The 1st Canadian Division was directed to take 
Caltagirone and on 16 July entered the town without
resistance, all Axis troops having left.(16) The previous 
day the Division had captured Grammichele, which was 
heavily defended by the retreating Hermann Goering 
Division. According to Caruso the Canadians were welcomed 
along the Via Roma by crowds who were also celebrating one 
of their many feast-days, that of the Madonna del
Carmine.(17)
It is worth noting that most Sicilians during the early 
stages of the invasion made no distinction between the 
various Allied nationalities. They were all referred to as 
Americani, whether British, Canadian or from the United 
States, and in most interviews recorded by Caruso with 
Calatini about the war, the latter refer to the American 
entry into the town.(18) US combat troops would have passed 
through the town on their way north and, as in all towns in 
the province with a hospital, barracks for billeting troops 
and rest areas, these facilities would have been utilised 
by Allied servicemen of all nationalities. Support and 
logistical troops from both the Seventh and Eighth Armies 
would still operate in the region.
According to Caruso, the Canadian invaders were welcomed 
by the Calatini, relieved that for them the war was over
in a relatively short time. They had probably not then
heard of the Biscari incident in which American troops had 
shot Axis prisoners.(19) Their euphoria would be short­
lived when it was realised that the new government had no 
immediate solutions to their problems. The sweets and 
cigarettes handed out by the Canadians as they marched into
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the town were no substitute for bread and pasta. Caruso 
writes that the CAOs governing the town would face 'una 
societa incontrollabile, ormai al collasso .... una societa 
caratterizzata dal mercato nero, dall1incertezza del futuro 
prossimo e dove si viveva "alia giornata".1(20)
Section 2. The Arrival of AMGOT in Caltagirone
The CAOs responsible for governing Caltagirone arrived in 
the town at 9 a.m. on 18 July. The senior officer of the 
team was Major P.F. Benton Jones, a Regular Royal Artillery 
officer, recruited into AMGOT. He was accompanied by Capt
H.C. Corbin and Legal Officer, Major Gilshennan. With them 
were four clerks to provide office assistance before they 
moved forward to the town of Enna after its capture, when 
office staff would then be sought locally. (21) CAOs Benton 
Jones and Corbin were both British in keeping with the 
agreed ratio of CAOs in a province headed by a British 
SCAO, in this case Lt Col Lord Gerald Wellesley. The latter 
had set up a temporary provincial HQ in Lentini while 
awaiting the capture of Catania, the provincial capital.
The only troops in the town were personnel of the 30 Corps 
Military Police (CMP) and the Royal Engineers (RE) . The CMP 
were there to keep law and order in the town following its 
capture and the RE unit was employed to clear the roads of 
debris from the recent bombing in order to ensure the free 
flow of military traffic proceeding north. (22) In this 
they were assisted by recently formed squads of air raid 
wardens from UNPA and many civilian volunteers, who had 
already begun to move fallen masonry in the search for 
victims of the bombing. (23) As in the many other Sicilian 
towns which had been bombed, some bodies could not be 
locally identified because thousands of refugees had moved 
from coastal towns and densely populated areas, such as 
Palermo, Messina and Catania, into Caltagirone and the 
small towns and villages in the district. (24) In spite of
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its recent development as a military base, Caltagirone was 
considered erroneously to be a safer location.
As the Fascist Party HQ, normally the first choice of HQ 
for an AMGOT team, had been razed to the ground, the CAO 
placed a police guard on the remains of the building until 
a thorough search of it could be made, and set up the AMGOT 
Office in the Palazzo Municipale. Nearly all the records 
had been destroyed, either by bombs, or as frequently 
happened, by deliberate Fascist action. The Podesta, Baron 
Marco Iacono della Motta, a landowner appointed in April 
1943, handed over the keys of the town and was invited to 
remain in post along with the municipal staff. Following 
administrative instructions from AMGOT, the CAO informed 
the staff that continuation in post would be solely on the 
basis of their satisfactory cooperation, performance and 
behaviour. (25) Apparently the Baron was considered by the 
local Calatini to be anti-Fascist because he had lost part 
of his estate in the colonisation of the latifondi. (26) He 
was willing to cooperate with the new authorities and 
remained in post until October when he sought permission to 
resign in order to devote more time to his estate.
One of the first tasks of the CAO was to display three 
proclamations, the first announcing the establishment of 
military government in the town, the second listing the 
offences against Allied forces which were punishable by 
death or imprisonment, and the third establishing the 
currencies used by the Allied forces as legal tender. These 
were displayed in public places, e.g. outside the Town Hall 
but not on church walls. (27) Both the Union Jack and the 
Stars and Stripes were also to be displayed on the local 
AMGOT office. Maj Benton Jones had not been provided with 
these and in his first report to HQ on 20 July asked for 
some to be sent to him. (28)
The need for CAOs to enlist the aid of the clergy was 
noted in the previous chapter. They had been warned of the 
high rate of illiteracy in the island compared with other 
Italian regions and help from a local priest to explain the
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contents of the Proclamations to his parishioners would be 
vital. In a report to HQ, the CAO of Caltagirone emphasised 
this problem in his own area and confirmed that the local 
priest could be relied on to explain the proclamations from 
the pulpit.(29) Unlike the situation in Catania where the 
Archbishop was conspicuous by his absence, the CAO had 
contacted Bishop Capizzi soon after arriving in Caltagirone 
and requested permission for the AMGOT staff to attend Mass 
in the cathedral on the following Sunday. The request was 
welcomed and as Major Benton Jones noted in his August 
report to AMGOT HQ, all the clergy had proved to be very 
cooperative. He also wrote that 'the importance of 
utilising their influence cannot be too highly 
stressed.'(30)
Harris points out that the AMGOT plan to rely on existing 
police forces, particularly the Carabinieri, to maintain 
law and order was amply justified.(31) This was the case in 
Caltagirone, where both they and the Guardie Municipali 
remained in post, and worked well under the leadership of 
their captain with only general Allied supervision. (32) 
The Carabinieri had been disarmed by the Canadian combat 
units when they entered the town and their weapons removed. 
They were soon rearmed by the CAO with the weapons which 
civilians were obliged to hand in under the conditions of 
Proclamation No. 2. (33)
Maj Benton Jones obviously realised that the standard of 
discipline found in the British police forces of the period 
was not applicable to the Sicilian character. In a detailed 
report submitted to AMGOT HQ for the southern half of 
Catania province, he wrote that it was hopeless to expect 
that the Allied civil police organisation could be imposed 
on Sicilian police forces. He pointed out that it was not 
always easy for a professional Allied policeman to realise 
that 'what appeared to be the beginning of a major riot was 
merely two Sicilian friends passing the time of day.'(34)
A transit camp for captured Axis prisoners was set up in 
an outlying part of the town, from which Italian POWs were
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brought in to help the RE and UNPA squads remove the many 
bodies still buried in the ruins of bombed buildings. While 
this took place roads and piazze were closed to traffic. As 
this was a local matter, the public was informed by an 
AMGOT order issued under the name of the Podesta. (35) 
Harris states that the mayors of most communes were removed 
by AMGOT CAOs and their title with its fascist association, 
was changed back to that of sindaco. (36) This did not 
happen in Catania and it is noticeable that in Caltagirone 
not only was the mayor retained in post but throughout his 
tenure of office he continued to use the fascist 
designation of his official appointment.
Fortunately units of the RE had remained in the vicinity 
and were invaluable in locating the many unexploded bombs 
in the town. As soon as they were discovered the CAO 
publicly displayed lists of the twenty-six sites to be 
avoided until the bombs could be safely defused. (37) To 
help identify the recovered bodies local inhabitants were 
asked to report the names of their missing relatives and 
acquaintances to the Ufficio dello Stato Civile. (38) This 
served as a precautionary measure to prevent a dead 
person's ration card being used by someone else.
It was essential to ensure the safety of the area by 
eliminating any possible underground resistance from 
remnants of Axis forces. The German garrison was stationed 
in Caltagirone for only a few months and, unlike Catania 
where relations between German troops and local civilians 
had deteriorated by summer 1943, there was no evidence that 
the same situation had arisen in Caltagirone. There 
remained a possibility that some local people might shelter 
a member of the armed forces, or help a POW to escape, in 
contravention of Proclamation No. 2. To emphasise how grave 
such offences were, a special Manifesto was issued by AMGOT 
in both Italian and German to remind citizens of the 
punishment they would receive if this proclamation was 
ignored. A reward was offered to any citizen who provided 
information leading to the arrest of a German soldier or a
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POW wearing civilian clothes.(39)
A curfew was imposed between sunrise and sunset, except 
for those in possession of an AMGOT pass. (40) As in most 
areas, it was often ignored. Benton Jones suggested to HQ 
that CAOs should be already armed with permission to open 
Summary Military Courts as soon as they entered a captured 
area. The first person caught breaking the curfew could 
then be brought immediately to court, punished and the 
punishment made public the same day.(41) This would act as 
a deterrent to others.
The CAO imposed a blackout on all houses and buildings in 
use after dark and a total ban was placed on lighting fires 
outside. These were measures to counter possible enemy air 
attacks and to help prevent acts of sabotage. It appears 
that infringements of these rules took place in Caltagirone 
since the CAO issued a special decree, authorising both the 
military police and Carabinieri to shoot, without warning, 
in the direction of any source of light. (42)
Benton Jones visited the local prison and pronounced it 
'in good order'. 12 of the 15 prisoners were either serving 
long sentences or awaiting removal to criminal lunatic 
asylums. One Italian soldier charged with theft and two 
civilians, charged with attempted murder and double murder 
respectively, were awaiting trial. The prison had contained 
165 inmates but 150, who were serving short sentences, had 
been released provisionally during the bombardment prior to 
the arrival of the Allies. The prison authorities promised 
to provide the CAO with a list of prisoners' names. (43) No 
further report was available in the records to confirm 
whether these men returned to complete their sentences. The 
CAO had followed the directions of the PHD and checked the 
health of the local population. As noted at the beginning 
of this chapter, Guercio had drawn attention to the low 
standard of cleanliness in Caltagirone immediately before 
the war. The absence of water in parts of the town and the 
lack of soap might well have lowered the standard even more 
and endangered public health. Benton Jones, however, could
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report that ’the health situation seems satisfactory.' (44) 
At a height of 2,000 feet, the town, although on the edge 
of a malarial plain, showed no evidence of the disease 
which troubled so many Allied troops. Although the civilian 
hospital had been destroyed, an Italian military hospital, 
taken over by the Canadians, had space for civilian 
patients. Others could be housed in schools requisitioned 
for use as hospitals when the town became a military base. 
The CAO arranged for five military doctors to be released 
from a local Italian POW camp to work in the hospitals. As 
local hospitals did not normally deal with large numbers of 
civilian wounded, they lacked sufficient stocks of 
dressings and bandages. These were ordered by him but not 
delivered, in spite of his complaints to provincial HQ.(45) 
The usual Monetary procedures were followed i.e. all banks 
and financial institutions were closed, placed under 
military custody, a general moratorium declared and an 
inventory of assets taken.(46) Before the vaults were 
sealed, the CAO checked the assets and recorded them in his 
report. The Banca di Sicilia had L.7,000,000, the Banca del 
Sud L.680,000 and the Banca Casa Rurale L.3,500,000. The 
managers and clerks compiled details of all accounts 
belonging to Government institutions, Fascist political 
organisations and persons in senior government posts.(47) 
The banks had not been damaged but one of the keys was in 
the possession of a cashier killed in an air raid. This was 
unimportant as one key was useless without the others. (48) 
Benton Jones was given permission by Gr Capt Benson to 
open the Treasury of the Banca di Sicilia, as it was 
responsible for the financial affairs of the commune. It 
paid the wages of State employees and the costs of grain 
brought in by farmers. The bank was instructed to advise 
the public that the farmers of Caltagirone, Grammichele, 
San Michele and Mirabella would be paid against 
presentation of their receipts for consigning grain to the 
ammassi. A copy of the budget estimate for these four 
communes was to be immediately submitted to AMGOT. (49)
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The military government also had authority to maintain the 
existing tax laws. Apart from giving payments, the opening 
of the Treasury was necessary to receive taxes which were 
now required to be paid. This was not of course applicable 
to those taxes which had benefited Fascist organisations. 
The public, unsurprisingly, showed no enthusiasm, as a 
report from Grammichele on 30 July revealed. The CAO had 
been informed by the Commune treasurer that most people 
would pay the taxes, so he authorised the issue of the 
usual notices. However, he had since learned that the 
public were refusing to pay.(50) Harris writes that 'in 
spite of the prevalent wishful thinking that the four 
freedoms inscribed on the, A.M.lire notes included also 
freedom from taxation', revenue slowly began to trickle 
in. (51) This was only after HQ had issued a General Order 
on 13 August which ordered the prompt payment of all taxes 
but with the proviso of a tolleranza (extension of time for 
payment) in cases where collection difficulties occurred, 
e.g. in heavily bombed areas. (52)
The CAO's first report of 20 July listed public buildings 
damaged or destroyed. Included was the Post Office, bombed 
and then ransacked by the Germans. It was placed under 
guard, and staff made responsible for clearing up the mess. 
The safe could not be opened as the Germans had destroyed 
the hinges. Other bomb damage included the aqueduct, but 
this had already been partly repaired and could provide 
three-quarters of the town with water. The remaining 
quarter of the town would be without water until certain 
essential spare parts became available.
There was no electricity, since the supply came from 
Catania town, still in enemy hands. The Caltagirone mains 
had been damaged in the air-raid but Benton Jones had 
already arranged to have them repaired to ensure that power 
would be immediately available to the town when the supply 
was eventually restored. Meanwhile the mills, normally 
driven by electricity, could be operated by DERV, ample 
stocks of which had been found in abandoned military stores
201
in the town.(53)
After the initial stages of setting up the administration, 
which in Caltagirone had proved relatively painless in 
spite of the very recent bombings, the CAO was now able to 
give his full attention to the day-to-day administration of 
the town. He was fortunate in receiving help from the RE, 
UNPA and Italian POWS, and obtaining the full cooperation 
of the Podesta, the municipal staff, police and clergy.
Although the health of the population was not a cause for 
immediate concern, it could be affected at any time if food 
supplies were not forthcoming on a regular basis. In the 
early weeks of the occupation, particularly in this corner 
of the province, there were few hints of the severity of 
shortages which would later occur. Although not one of the 
island's three main grain producing provinces, this area, 
nevertheless, was able to provide a significant yield.
The responsibility of the Civilian Supply and Resources 
Division for ensuring that both adequate food and other 
basic necessities reached the civilian population has been 
described in Chapter 4. The work of the Division will be 
continued in this chapter on Caltagirone because the town 
was both consumer and producer of grain and it was here and 
in the surrounding communes that the problems of bringing 
grain to the ammassi can be seen, not only from the reports 
of local CAOs but also from a study of the ammassi system 
by one of the specialist officers of the Civil Supply 
Division.
Section 3.The Food Situation and the Ammassi in Caltagirone
Capt Corbin, second in command to Major Benton Jones, had 
assumed responsibility for the acquisition, collection and 
distribution of food supplies for the town. After locating 
all food warehouses, enemy food dumps and wholesale food 
suppliers, he had placed them under guard and drawn up an 
inventory of their contents. He also checked the amount of
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grain left in the ammassi, after the Germans had removed as 
much as they could take away. He then instructed the 
municipal officials to continue the existing collection and 
distribution system.(54)
There were accessible supplies of food for Caltagirone 
sufficient for forty-eight hours and officials considered 
that the community would be self-supporting if civilian 
transport were available. (55) But there was a distinct 
shortage of transport, as the original Spofford Plan had 
foreseen. The Plan assumed that most roadworthy vehicles 
would have been commandeered by the enemy armies and Allied 
transport would be responsible for supplying urban centres. 
However, as the pre-invasion planning progressed, it became 
clear that no army vehicles could be spared for civilian 
purposes. CAOs would therefore be instructed not to seek 
help from military transport units to move essential food 
supplies unless no other sources of transport could be 
found.(55) In this connection the owners of all lorries in 
the commune had to declare their vehicles and were 
forbidden to drive them without a permit, granted only for 
essential civilian services. Freight was given priority 
over passengers and a priority list of freight movements 
was drawn up. Even with local lorries, the requirements of 
the occupying forces took priority over the transport of 
supplies for civilians.(57) At the beginning of August the 
CCAO himself had referred to the ample food supplies 
available but pointed out the problem of transporting them 
to towns where they were needed.(58) At the end of August a 
memo to the Services of Supply reiterated that the primary 
objectives of civilian supply planning were 'to prevent 
civil unrest and to prevent disease.' (59) But as Harris 
points out, the dominating problem in Sicily was to keep 
the populations in the towns properly fed, by assuring the 
transport and distribution of essential foodstuffs.'
Transport, or rather the lack of it, had become the main 
source of unrest. Capt Corbin, with only forty-eight hours 
supply of food for the town, and no transport obtainable in
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the area had no choice but to bring in the necessary 
supplies by mule convoys. (60) This was a method eminently 
suited to the steep hills surrounding the town and one used 
by most of the local farmers. Not only were CAOs obliged to 
utilise mule transport, combat forces had already found 
mules ideal for carrying arms and ammunition over rough 
terrain unsuitable for motorised transport.(61) The Eighth 
Army's Order of Battle had originally called for seven 
companies of pack mules to accompany the troops but a staff 
officer at AFHQ decided to cancel the order and locally 
procured animals had to be called in.(62) The US Seventh 
Army brought their own pack mules with them as did units of 
the Berber Goumiers, who were used to mountainous 
conditions. (63) In his first AMGOT situation report to 
General Alexander, Lord Rennell referred to the fact that 
AMGOT's organised trains of mule carts were frequently 
seized by combat formations and CAOs were now moving the 
mule trains at night to avoid capture.(64) Mules had 
apparently been in short supply in the island for some time 
before the invasion began. This was due to the Italian 
government's requisitioning of animals to compensate for 
the lack of motorised transport in the island. (65)
Capt Corbin's first task was to gather statistics of the 
local grain production. Of the 41,000 local inhabitants, 
16,000 grew their own supply, and the remainder depended on 
the ammassi. 10,000 hectares of land were cultivated, 
producing 22,000 quintals of grain in 1942, but 1943 
estimates from the Consorzio (consortium) showed a 
shortfall of 25,000 quintals to meet the town's needs.(66) 
However, the Comprensorio (district consortium) covered a 
much wider area and could provide the shortfall. The towns 
of Ramacca and Raddusa already exported their surplus grain 
to Caltagirone. The problem was not one of insufficient 
grain stocks but only of transport. Even the CCAO referred 
to the food situation at the time as 'not unsatisfactory, 
grain is available in outstanding quantities.'
Initial emergency supplies, brought in by the combat force
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for both their own troops and the civil population, were to 
be continued, according to the C-in-C, until the food, 
especially stockpiled in North African ports for the civil 
population, arrived. (67) But as explained in Chapter 4, 
this did not materialise because of the errors committed by 
MGS at AFHQ. When finally a limited amount of grain was 
brought to Catania at the end of August, most was diverted 
to the mainland to relieve the shortage there. This caused 
grain producers in Sicily to fear that their own supplies 
would run short if they were compelled to supply the 
mainland, and consequently they continued to hoard.
The way in which growers were obliged to sell their crops 
of grain had never been popular in Sicily. Benton Jones 
referred to the word ammassi as possessing 'unpleasant 
connections for the farmers. Where practicable better 
results are obtained by using some wording which indicates 
that the system is controlled by AMGOT.' (68) The system 
was retained for the simple reason that no other system 
could be devised. In Caltagirone small producers often 
accused the ammassi of fraud and there was a universal lack 
of faith both in the system and the officials responsible 
for its organisation. The fact that it was a Fascist system 
and the same Fascist officials had been retained by the 
Allies implied that nothing had changed. (69) With the very 
limited number of AMGOT officers and the limited time to 
gather in the harvest, there was little that could be done 
to change the officials.
There were also other factors which contributed to the 
reluctance of producers to bring in the grain, in 
particular the Carabinieri guards posted at the ammassi 
entrances to check that the grain producer was keeping to 
the time stated on his entry pass. The opening times of the 
office which dealt with the paper-work did not always 
coincide with the working hours of the contadini, and 
frequently wives were obliged to come to the office on 
their behalf. (70) The producers were not paid on the spot 
but were given credit notes for the exact amount brought in
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which they then took to a bank. This was not popular as it 
was time-consuming and was later altered by AMGOT to the 
direct paying of cash at the collecting centre on delivery 
of the grain.(71)
It is not surprising that a large portion of the grain 
found its way on to the black market, not only because of 
the higher price which the producer would receive but also 
because he avoided the irksome procedures of the ammassi. 
When the SCAO of Ragusa, the province adjoining the 
southern border of Catania, raised the amount paid to grain 
producers to almost double that paid in Caltagirone, local 
farmers naturally smuggled their grain over the border to 
obtain the better price. But this inducement was short­
lived. As related in Chapter 4, Lord Rennell then 
introduced a sliding scale of payment per quintal 
throughout the island, designed to bring in grain as 
quickly as possible. This helped in the short term but was 
generally not as effective as had been hoped. What had 
more effect on de-hoarding was the raising of the maximum 
bread ration to 300 grams a day in most occupied areas, 
except Palermo and Catania.(72)
A Civil Supply Section Officer, Major Spencer, had joined 
the AMGOT team in Caltagirone to collect statistics on 
local grain production and collection, and to review the 
current situation of food supplies. All the following 
information is taken from his report, dated 1 August 1943, 
which he submitted to the Director of Civilian Supply and 
Resources, at AMGOT HQ. (73)
Maj Spencer's enquiries concerning average yields of grain 
produced figures of four to five quintals per hectare from 
small farmers, but almost eleven per hectare from a large 
experimental farm supervised by a civil servant. Even 
allowing for varying soil quality and cultivation methods, 
this was a very large difference, which was interpreted by 
Spencer as 'confirmatory evidence of the diversion to the 
black market.' He welcomed the new grain prices introduced 
by the CCAO but pointed out that it would take time for all
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communes to be informed and advised that farmers should 
have fourteen clear days to sell their crops at the new 
price of L.500 before it was decreased.
It has been pointed out earlier that the ammassi system 
was of necessity retained under AMGOT administration. From 
his own observations in the Caltagirone area Maj Spencer 
made some suggestions which would not disrupt the system 
but which might possibly reduce the amount of grain to the 
black market. Each grain grower was allowed to keep 250 kg 
a head in his family and, as small children did not consume 
that amount, large families had surplus supplies which they 
sold on the black market. Spencer thought a ration of 300 
kg per male adult over 16 and 125 kg for other family 
members would be more realistic and would prevent the 
accumulation of surplus grain.
Poaching by one commune from another was one of the main 
administrative problems in the collection of grain. Spencer 
described the process:'A fruitful source of statistical 
evasion arises from the practice of people living in one 
commune and working in another. They then claim to "amass" 
in the commune of their residence or else if they "amass" 
in the commune of growth, they claim it is to be "credited" 
to the commune in which they reside.' Spencer wanted this 
to be regulated so that 'a man who owns or sharecrops land 
in a commune must be regarded as a "resident", and the 
fact that he sleeps elsewhere is irrelevant.1 This would 
bring a more reliable degree of control, enabling the CAOs 
to obtain accurate figures of the stocks in their communes. 
They could then arrange transfers between them to meet 
consumption needs.
Threshing of the gathered grain was also a problem. It was 
almost impossible to obtain oil for the mechanical 
threshers which would speed the process. Caltagirone had 
already found a local supply of oil to replace the non­
existent electricity for milling, and a second abandoned 
military oil dump had also been discovered. Cross-country 
convoys were organised to bring this oil to the farmers so
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that threshing could start in August.
Spencer's research in Caltagirone covered a number of 
areas including what he considered to be the excessive
charges of the carters, who were profiting from the lack of 
lorries. He advised CAO Capt Corbin to permit only mule 
carts registered by AMGOT to be on the roads, and to pay 
carters for freight at public rates. Without the pressures 
of a CAO's work-load, Spencer found time to talk to local 
people and obtain their opinions on the measures being 
taken by AMGOT to ameliorate the food situation. The
raising of the bread ration to 300 grams a day had
naturally been welcomed, although the pasta ration of 280 
grams a week was considered rather small.
Although this report to Col Seitz at AMGOT HQ was an 
official account of Major Spencer's assessment of the 
Civilian Supply situation in the Caltagirone area, it
contains a number of personal observations which cast some 
light on the problems faced by CAOs and AMGOT staff in the 
field. The Major, for example, ends his report by thanking 
Col Seitz for the NAAFI rations which he had brought.(74) 
Although perhaps not relative to the subject of his report, 
mention of NAAFI rations shows the isolation of CAOs in the 
field. These rations were intended to be distributed to all 
service personnel but frequently the Quartermaster of a 
combat unit refused to supply a CAO because he was unaware 
of his position in the army. One of the main criticisms 
made about the HUSKY planners in Algiers was their failure 
to explain the role of AMGOT to the army. The CCAO also 
blamed the War Office for 'never inculcating in staff 
courses, etc., the integration of Civil Affairs personnel 
in the Army organisation.' (75)
The fact that CAOs were few in number in the first waves 
of the invasion, lacked transport to carry food and medical 
supplies for themselves even when operating far from Army 
hospital units, must have reinforced their feeling of 
isolation from the main body of troops. Major Spencer had 
not been provided with transport and was totally dependent
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on finding local vehicles to take him to outlying farms and 
villages. His need for a car was urgent since he had been 
instructed by Wellesley to proceed to Catania as soon as 
the town was captured. This order was given him despite his 
recent appointment by Benson to AMGOT HQ.
The problem of supplying food on a regular basis was 
becoming increasingly difficult. Some of the initial 
emergency food supplies for civilians brought over in the 
first landings had found their way to Caltagirone in the 
form of dried and evaporated milk. Those who possessed a 
doctor’s certificate were able to obtain a half litre per 
day. When fresh milk was available it was sold without need 
of a certificate to nursing mothers and babies. (76) Other 
badly needed commodities, such as soap, clothing and shoes, 
had not been included in the shipments. This was a result 
of the military decision that relief supplies should only 
meet the population's minimum essential needs. (77) The 
narrow scope of this decision was attacked by a senior 
civilian official who deplored the absence of clothing and 
footwear. He informed the American Embassy in London that 
’the inclusion of such supplies in the programme does not 
imply pampering - rather it implies sober provision for a 
minimum level of health, efficiency and security.’ (78) It 
would appear that the military' decision-makers were unaware 
of the hard winter conditions in the island, especially in 
the mountainous interior.
Much of Corbin's time continued to be spent on supervising 
grain production and collection in the district. It was not 
easy to obtain accurate statistics as not all the crop had 
been harvested by August, because the location of the grain 
growing areas, in valleys, on hill slopes or on the flat 
plain, normally determined the time of harvest. In the 
summer of 1543 many farmers feared their fields would 
become battlegrounds and harvested the crop while still 
unripe. Unable to take the grain to the mills, which were 
under guard, they tried to grind the ears between lava 
stones. Many would not venture into their fields because of
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rumours that enemy planes fired on peasants harvesting 
crops.(79)
By the end of August Benton Jones was able to provide HQ 
with a fairly detailed report on the grain situation in the 
district, even though local CAOs often had difficulty in 
obtaining full information from the mayors or else disputed 
their findings. In Palagonia the Sindaco estimated a 
harvest of 1,000 quintals but the CAO's enquiries led him 
to believe 10,000 quintals could be obtained.(80) What 
emerged from the enquiries in each commune was the
complicating factor of growers living in one commune, 
whose land was in a nearby commune, bearing out the earlier 
observations of Maj Spencer in his special report to the 
Director of Civilian Supply.
Some CAOs referred to the Sindaco's lack of knowledge. The 
CAO of Mineo said the mayor was not at all well informed on 
agricultural matters and Corbin commented that the mayor of 
San Michele di Ganzaria was unsuited to his post. In this 
commune, as in many others, information on whether the
grain was registered in the grower's home commune or in the 
commune of growth made an accurate assessment impossible. 
The CAO at Grammichele summed up the situation in that 
commune by stating that figures he had obtained suggested 
'a considerable deviation to the Black Market.' (81) 
Conclusions drawn from the assessments showed Ramacca and 
Mineo to be the'principal grain growers with a surplus. San 
Michele, Vizzini and Militello were not self-sufficient, 
and Mirabella, Grammichele and Palagonia varied from year 
to year. The CAO of Scordia was unable to supply figures
but believed the town would not be self-sufficient. 
Although the report sent by Benton Jones was the result of 
much painstaking research by Corbin and the other CAOs, it 
was clearly not a reliable forecast of the amount of grain 
which would be available for the province after the 
harvest. It also cast doubt on the competence of some
Sindaci.
The influx of refugees from large towns, including Catania
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but as far afield as Messina and Palermo, not only 
complicated the assessment of the amount of grain required 
for the coming months but caused both material problems 
and tensions in the local communities. Many of these 
sfollati were unemployed or moving from one temporary job 
to another* Some were living with relatives, many lived 
rough in the countryside. Since all schools in the island 
were closed, the S.Luigi school in Caltagirone, which had 
not been converted into a hospital, was used as the main 
hostel for the homeless. Rooms in some public buildings 
were also made available and permission given to refugees 
to remain until the end of September. The situation was 
similar in many other towns in the district, notably
Scordia with an estimated 6,000 refugees added to its
normal population of 11,000 and Militello with 5,000 added 
to its normal population of 11,000.(82) This figure was 
not static, and when a refugee family's home was 
liberated, the family might decide to return immediately, 
if they had the means to do so. Many left Caltagirone,
only to return, having found their homes destroyed or 
damaged to the extent that they were uninhabitable. Most 
of these were from Catania or Palermo. Others chose to 
stay put until they could be rehoused in their home town.
Caruso refers to the different cultures and outlooks
brought to Caltagirone by the refugees, which profoundly 
changed the atmosphere of the town. It was a tightly-knit 
community, each parish having close links with its priest 
and the various clubs and associations attached to the 
local church. Guercio had referred to Caltagirone as 
'loud, gesticulating and sophisticated in true Catanese 
style.' (83) But the Calatini were country as opposed to 
city-style Catanesi, their town was one-sixth the size of 
the provincial capital and differences in mores were to be 
expected. Most rural areas 'invaded' by townspeople would 
react in the same way. As Nino Savarese pointed out, even 
danger failed to 'sanare i disagi delle forzate 
convivenze.' (84) AMGOT undertook its share of helping the
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homeless by cooperating with the municipal authorities who 
had provided temporary shelter for the refugees and their 
own citizens who were homeless. It was not always an easy 
task and, according to Caruso, some of the refugees 
installed themselves in private houses and refused to move 
out, claiming they were unable to return to their original 
homes. (85) This naturally aroused much local antagonism.
Capt Corbin became involved in the task of finding 
suitable accommodation for the homeless by establishing a 
Commissione Allogi, composed of local businessmen, lawyers 
and other representatives of the legal profession. They 
organised searches for empty houses and offices or any 
premises which could be converted into temporary homes. 
They also helped to resolve problems between landlords and 
tenants of damaged properties by instigating speedy 
repairs, if the necessary building materials, which had 
been in short supply for some time in the island, could be 
obtained. (86)
Living in penury, the refugees needed state subsidies. 
These could only be obtained via a form providing full 
information about themselves and their circumstances, and 
signed by the head of the local police. To obtain the form 
relevant identity documents were essential but, for 
various reasons, many could not produce them. (87) Local 
unemployed Calatini were paid a "sussidio di beneficenza" 
of L.10 a day for a head of family and L.2 for each 
dependant, but not if they were fit for work or if they 
refused to clear debris from the streets after the air 
raids. (88) In Grammichele, before the Allied occupation, 
about 2,000 heads of family were in receipt of a sussidio. 
Each family was estimated to be composed of three persons. 
The rate of cash relief had been set at L.15 for the head 
of the family and L.5 for dependants, amounting to a total 
daily cash payment of L.50,000 in a commune of 15,000. Maj 
Benton Jones estimated the rate paid to the Calatini as 
adequate, with the result that the sussidio in Grammichele 
was subsequently reduced to bring it into line with other
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communes.(89) This obviously did not improve AMGOT1s 
standing in Grammichele.
At the first combined meeting of SCAOs at AMGOT KQ in 
Palermo, SCAO Wellesley stated that he had established a 
rate of L.10 + L.5 for the province of Catania, marginally 
increasing the dependants’ allowance which was established 
by Maj Benton Jones in the early days of AMGOT 
administration.(90) All communes were obliged to conform 
to the rate set by the SCAO and Benton Jones duly 
increased the allowance for dependants. In his report 
covering the whole Caltagirone district, sent to HQ on 27 
August, Benton Jones stated that he had made a rule that 
no able-bodied man (other than a pensioner) would receive 
public assistance unless he was prepared to work for four 
hours a day clearing roads and removing debris from bombed 
buildings etc. (91)
One of AMGOT's problems was the shortage of staff in the 
field, not only in Catania province but throughout the 
island. This frequently led to sudden movements of CAOs 
from one commune to another or from one area to another 
part of the province. Sometimes the decision came from HQ 
in Palermo, who for various reasons needed a replacement 
for a CAO, or from provincial HQ, who judged that a 
certain commune might perhaps benefit from an experienced 
officer. Explanations were rarely given but of the two 
staff reorganisations in Caltagirone it appears that 
Benton Jones may have instigated the first but the second 
was caused by AMGOT HQ withdrawing a number of CAOs from 
Catania province, leaving Wellesley with no choice but to 
re-arrange the areas in the province.
Section 4. The Reorganisation of the Communes around
Caltagirone
On 2 August a re-grouping of the communes into five 
areas, each with two AMGOT officers, took place. The areas
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formed a district, based on Caltagirone. This was possibly 
to even out the ratio of CAOs to communes and to place the 
more senior staff in the more populated areas. The groups 
were as follows:
1. Caltagirone
San Michele di Ganzaria 
San Cono 
Mirabella
2 CAOs, Major Benton Jones and Capt Corbin 
Population = 56,660
2. Ramacca 
Raddusa
Castel di Judica
1 CAO, Lt Vos, 1 CAPO, Lt Sacken 
Population = 19,546
3. Scordia 
Militello 
Palagonia
1 CAO, Lt Shannon, 1 CAPO, Capt Coxhead 
Population = 36,000
4. Grammichele 
Mineo
1 CAO, Capt Munday, 1 CAPO, Capt Chaney 
Population = 25,000
5. Vizzini 
Licodia
1 CAO, Lt Verderame, 1 CAPO, Lt Fleetwood 
Population = 21,600
These statistics do not take into account the large number 
of refugees in the above towns, e.g. an estimated 6,000 in 
Scordia and 5,000 in Militello, plus hundreds scattered 
among the smaller villages and hamlets. (92)
The new District now had only six CAOs to administer a 
population of 160,000 people, without counting the numbers
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of refugees. There was, however, one CAPO in each of the 
four communes with only one CAO, and as previously 
mentioned, CAPOs undertook the duties of a CAO whenever 
necessary. Even so, the CAPOs had their own areas of 
responsibility and at times were hard pressed to deal with 
both. The largest commune, Caltagirone, had two CAOs, both 
of whom appear to have been highly efficient, but no CAPO 
for a population of over 56,000, plus refugees. As 
previously mentioned, the clerks who arrived with the CAOs 
were destined for Enna and there is no evidence that they 
were replaced. Some CAOs were in a far worse situation. One 
was in sole control of four towns, total population 42,000, 
for four months with no CAPO or OR to assist him. (93)
This was an inevitable result of the decision to adopt 
the principle of indirect government, strongly advocated by 
Lord Rennell during the planning stage of HUSKY, and to
which he remained committed, as he emphasised to SCAOs at 
the Palermo meeting. However, economy of Civil Affairs
personnel was taken to its limits in the last week of
August when another phase of administration began. The
whole province was reorganised into five districts,
Caltagirone district being joined by Acireale, Ionia,
Bronte and Paterno. Wellesley informed all CAOs in the
province that 'owing to the sudden loss of twelve officers 
who have been removed from this province for duty 
elsewhere, it has been found necessary to reorganise the 
districts once again.'(94) Although the districts were much 
bigger than before they all had at least three officers. 
The number of CAOs for Caltagirone district was halved from 
six to three, Capt Corbin, Capt Munday and Lt Hunter.
There were now only sixteen CAOs to cover the whole
province although they were reinforced by a number of CAPOs 
and specialist officers. Major Benton Jones was one of the 
CAOs posted elsewhere. Such postings, especially of CAOs 
who had proved their efficiency from the early days of 
AMGOT administration, were becoming more frequent because 
experienced officers with proven skills were needed to help
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establish military government on the Italian mainland. It 
was at this time when CAOs were being withdrawn from the 
island that problems connected with the occupying forces 
rather than with civilian administration began to demand 
the attentions of CAOs in the Caltagirone district.
Reference has been made to the growing tensions in 
Caltagirone district due to the large number of refugees 
and the difficulty of integration between town and country 
communities. Food shortages, inflation rates, inadequacy of 
sussidi, restrictions imposed by curfews, the ten kilometre 
limit on travel and punishments for infringements of the 
Proclamations had all gradually built up an atmosphere of 
oppression. The Allies' entry into the town had been warmly 
greeted but their continued presence was becoming more and 
more oppressive. Benton Jones drew attention to the 
problems for the police which, as he reported to HQ, 'have 
occurred all the time with our own troops, whose discipline 
has not always been of the highest standard.' (95) As a 
Regular RA Major he knew that the number of MP personnel in 
any occupation force was of necessity limited but in his 
report he pointed out the advantages of having at least one 
detachment of MPs in each major town, either in rest areas 
or on the lines of communication.
A number of local incidents had occurred, mostly as a 
result of excessive consumption of alcohol. This was not 
surprising given the low cost and easy availability of wine 
in the island, the intense heat of a Sicilian summer and 
post-battle euphoria. On 8 August Lt Theodore Shannon, CAO 
of Scordia, wrote to the SCAO to report incidents of 
military disorder occurring continually in the town of 
Militello. The CAPO responsible for the area, which 
included Scordia and Palagonia, was Capt Percy Coxhead. The 
CAO was concerned that these frequent incidents prevented 
the CAPO from attending to his normal duties, and if 
allowed to continue, would result in chaos and disruption 
of civil affairs activities. (96)
The previous day the CAPO was summoned to Militello, where
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he found a Canadian firing a revolver in the town square. 
When questioned the soldier aimed at the CAPO, who promptly 
knocked him down. Other Canadians came to help the CAPO who 
soon after had to deal with another soldier who had broken 
into the house of the former mayor, fallen through a glass 
cabinet and caused damage to the room and himself. Coxhead 
brought charges against the men and the CO of their unit 
undertook disciplinary action and arranged reimbursemsnt of 
the damage. (97)
The CAO listed the measures taken to eliminate the problem 
of disorder:
1. The MP unit in Scordia was contacted but had 
insufficient men to control the towns.
2. Towns were placed out of bounds to military personnel.
3. Arrangements were made to sell wine to soldiers if 
officers would purchase it and then take it out of town 
for distribution to troops.
The measures were not successful. In spite of the number 
of troops involved in the invasion, 450,000 having passed 
through Sicily by the end of the campaign, there were not 
enough MPs to control troops' behaviour. Of the total 
number of these troops only one third consisted of active 
combat forces, the rest were made up of support and 
logistical units. (98) The Canadians involved in the 
Militello incidents served in the 1st Tank Delivery 
Squadron of the 1st Canadian Division, part of 30 Corps of 
the Eighth Army. US and Canadian troops were also causing 
serious problems in Caltagirone, Vizzini, Scordia, and 
Palagonia, where they walked up and down the streets 
insulting and assaulting women. Many of these troops came 
in by truck from the USAAC bases 85 and 87 near Palagonia, 
and when drunk would indulge in free fights in the street. 
On one occasion MPs were overwhelmed by sixty US and 
Canadian servicemen fighting among themselves. (99) Road 
blocks were the only way to stop them entering towns but 
this would prevent the free passage of essential military 
traffic.
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A further incident took place in Scordia when three 
Canadians broke into a peasant’s house, attacked him and 
attempted to rape his wife. Incidents of indiscipline in 
the provincial capital were reported by Wellesley where 
British troops were behaving badly. Apart from drunken 
behaviour, resentment was caused by the amount of looting 
by Allied troops. The suggestion by Benton Jones that some 
MP units should be kept in areas where support troops were 
based was echoed by Lord Rennell in a letter to Col French 
at the War Office. He realised the value of guard platoons 
and thought they would be able to restrain troops from 
looting. (100)
A detailed memorandum had been issued to military 
personnel, warning them that theft and robbery were 'as 
punishable in war as in peace; nothing is more demoralising 
to troops or more subversive of discipline than plundering, 
and a soldier in an enemy country must observe the same 
respect for property as in his garrison at home.'(101) 
AMGOT staff, in constant contact with the people in their 
communes, deplored the soldiers’ drunken behaviour, which 
reflected badly on the military government.
It is difficult to obtain reliable evidence of the local 
civilian reaction to the presence of Allied troops in 
Caltagirone, since most local residents interviewed by 
Caruso were very young at the time. Maria Vecchio, whose 
family had moved from Catania to escape the air raids, 
recalled that 'gli ufficiali americani e inglesi si 
comportavano bene, perdevano i freni la sera, quando si 
ubriacavano. I piu cattivi erano i Canadesi, ci incutevano 
paura. ' (102)
A fundamental part in re-establishing a degree of 
normality in the lives of the Calatini was the readiness 
of the Carabinieri to support the Allies in keeping law and 
order. Reference has been made earlier to the willingness 
shown by the local force to collaborate with the AMGOT 
administrators immediately after their arrival and both 
they and the Guardie Municipal! were praised by the CAO for
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their work in apprehending offenders against AMGOT Orders 
and Proclamations and for arresting large numbers of 
looters in the area.(103) The civilian offenders were 
swiftly brought to one of the Summary Military Courts, set 
up on 2 August in Caltagirone, Vizzini, Grammichele and 
Mineo. (104) Most offenders were in court on charges of 
looting and flouting the curfew laws. Sentences ranged from 
one to six months in the local (Caltagirone) prison but 
those guilty of serious looting from bombed houses were 
initially sent to Priolo transit camp and then transferred 
to other camps some distance away. (105)
The CAPOs, rather thinly spread across the rural areas, 
were responsible for obtaining information on aspects of 
law and order in their area, which could vary from one 
small village to another.(106) In country districts they 
kept in close touch with local police to maintain order as 
they had been instructed not to rely on the possibility of 
obtaining detachments of Allied MPs to assist them.(107) As 
in large towns, they were responsible for traffic control 
and maintaining the free flow of military convoys, 
important in Caltagirone, where a large number of support 
and logistic units were based, particularly in the build-up 
to the invasion of the mainland.
An important function was to draw up registers of private 
and trade vehicles in their area and to issue driving 
permits to civilians who provided essential services in 
hospitals and public utilities and who might be called out 
during curfew hours.(108) All CAPOs were instructed to 
observe the directions contained in their AMGOT 'Bible', 
the name given to the handbook containing the General 
Administrative Instructions, so that applications for 
passes would be first endorsed by the local CAPO and then 
sent to Provincial Police HQ to ensure uniformity of 
practice across the province and to prevent passes from 
falling into the wrong hands. Registers at local Police 
Stations were to be securely filed. Daily crime reports 
went to the SCAO to keep him informed of the state of crime
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in his province. The reports listed all details in full - 
name, age, address, occupation, complainant, witnesses, 
details of property involved etc. In addition, a monthly 
crime report, covering all crimes from murder to traffic 
offences and giving full details of the investigation, was 
to be returned. (109)
As the number of AMGOT staff gradually decreased it became 
more difficult to maintain strict control over record 
keeping, particularly after the second reorganisation, when 
some of the CAPOs, including Capt Coxhead, involved in the 
Militello incidents, had been posted. He was sent to Ionia 
in the north of Catania province then in 1944 to Rome, 
where, as Nicolosi relates, he was received by the Pope and 
awarded the title of Cavaliere dell'Ordine di San Matteo 
della Croce in recognition of his work in Sicily. (110) The 
reduction of AMGOT staff in the district, which apart from 
a decrease in numbers, often involved a change of CAO as 
well, naturally resulted in a lack of continuity in the 
administration. More significantly, as Caruso points out, 
’Tutto cio provocava un ritorno, con forza, di rigurgiti 
fascisti.'(111)
Section 5. Political Activity and Defascistisation in
Caltagirone District
When AMGOT entered Caltagirone, the senior CAO, Major 
Benton Jones, interviewed the Podesta and other municipal 
staff and retained them in post. There is no evidence that 
he was other than satisfied with their work and there is no 
mention in his early reports of any overt Fascism. In fact, 
as mentioned in Section 2, he was probably soon made aware 
that the podesta was regarded locally as anti-fascist. But 
as Caruso observes, there were many of the’old regime', who 
for obvious reasons had kept a low profile, but now, with 
fewer AMGOT staff, felt it was possible to emerge into the 
open. The Allies had made it clear from the start of their
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administration that they would not tolerate political 
activity even from anti-Fascist groups, and when some of 
the latter in Grammichele on 31 July showed their delight 
at being liberated by wearing a red disk in their jacket 
buttonhole, AMGOT officials immediately prohibited the 
display of this emblem. Caruso does not believe that their 
intention was to set up a movement with political aims but 
merely to "apporre il rosso in contrapposizione al 
nero."(112) The Sindaco, De Grazia, expressed his concern 
that these demonstrators, closely associated with a similar 
group in Caltagirone,would gain the political upper hand 
once the Allies left Sicily. Following this occurrence the 
AMGOT reorganisation allocated Capt Munday to serve as CAO 
in the town.
Meanwhile a letter, signed by several citizens from 
Grammichele, had been sent to the editor of the Corriare, 
asking him to complain to the SCAO that the local AMGOT 
office had issued an order which contradicted Proclamation 
No.2 and 'curtailed elementary liberties' in the town. The 
letter vaguely referred to mistakes and misunderstandings 
created by inefficient interpreters. The SCAO sent the 
letter to the CAO in Caltagirone, whose reply made clear 
that the order was connected with Proclamation No.11, which 
dealt with the need for written permits for public meetings 
and that the original letter was signed by members of a 
political group, who, since the bread ration was reduced, 
were spreading rumours that the Fascist Party gave more to 
the people than the Allies. The CAO asserted that there 
could be no misunderstandings since he spoke fluent Italian 
and no interpreter was involved. He wished to arrest them 
as political prisoners but the Field Security Section in 
Catania decreed that this was not possible but that the 
Group should certainly be prohibited.(113)
The citizens of Grammichele were not the only ones showing 
signs of unrest. In his report at the end of August, Benton 
Jones stated that 'in almost every commune there exists the 
element of a so-called Partito Democratico, who regard our
221
entry into a town as the arrival of a terrestrial paradise, 
in which they are the only possible leaders.' He referred 
to wild accusations, most of which he judged pure nonsense, 
made against officials in the local administration either 
retained or appointed by AMGOT. These protesters insisted 
on their right to take over, having always been anti­
fascist, but in his opinion they would be incapable since 
they had not held office for very many years. Benton Jones 
advocated treating them very firmly.(114)
One of the first political parties to emerge in
Caltagirone was the Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI). Caruso 
states that secret meetings began in 1941 in the house of 
Silvio Milazzo, a supporter of Sturzo, who had been 
designated Cavaliere dell'Ordine Equestre di S. Silvestro 
for organising the Congresso Eucaristico in 1937. Many 
Catholics, including Luigi La Rosa, later appointed to 
office by AMGOT, attended these meetings, which continued
in secret after the installation of Allied administration.
Although many local PPI members wished to retain the 
Party's name, it was changed to the Democrazia Cristiana 
(PDC), and Milazzo became its provincial Secretary in 1946.
Two meetings of the Christian Democrats took place during 
AMGOT administration. The first was held on 30 November in 
Casa Carcaci, when a provisional provincial committee was 
elected with a local lawyer, Carmel Caristia, as President. 
The second, the Congress of Caltanisetta, took place on 16 
December. Although not every province was represented, many 
important issues were discussed, including the position of 
the PDC in the Committee of National Liberation (CLN), 
relations between workers and employers, and the strength 
of Separatism, which had been the first political group in 
the island to advertise itself after the Allied 
invasion.(115) Sturzo's influence was still strong in other 
parts of the province and many Catanesi became part of the 
Calatini group, sharing the same political programme. 
Caruso points out that this group took a leading role in 
the constitution and coordination of various sectors of the
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Party.(116) Other political groups such as the Socialist 
PSI took more time to regroup and reorganise and it was not 
until October 1944 that representatives of all these groups 
met to form the local CLN under the presidency of Professor 
Bevilacqua. Lord Rennell continued to insist that no AMG 
officer was to become involved in any political matters 
whatsoever and there is no evidence that Capt Corbin 
actively engaged in local politics, although he must have 
known, as did other CAOs, that meetings of local political 
groups were openly taking place.
Paolo de Grazia had provided Capt Corbin with the names of 
all the prominent Fascists in Grammichele but the latter 
took no action. He assumed that the shortage of CAOs in his 
town allowed the leading Fascists to remain in senior 
posts. He wrote again to Corbin in September commenting 
that, in order to feed their families, the 'impiegati 
statali erano costretti ad indossare la camicia nera o 
portare il distintivo fascista al petto', and they would be 
the ones suspended from their posts, not the 'gerarchi', 
who, until the invasion, 'predicavano in conferenza al 
Fascio o al teatro la santita della guerra.' (117) Some
impiegati were indeed suspended but reinstated on appeal 
but there is no indication that any high-level Fascists 
were removed.
Although complaints were heard about the retention of 
Fascists in the Caltagirone district, there is no evidence 
that protests, apart from those of De Grazia, were made. In 
Enna, Lt Col Rodd, concerned about the demonstrations in 
some communes caused by AMGOT's failure to remove high- 
profile Fascists, advised the CAOs involved to replace 
those in office who were obviously mistrusted by the local 
people. (118)
Once the Scheda Personale was in operation, it was used 
in Caltagirone as elsewhere, particularly in the sphere of 
education. As in Catania town most schools had closed 
before the arrival of the Allies, either to be adapted for 
use as military hospitals for the Axis garrison in the town
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or for refugee accommodation. Caltagirone had ten 
elementary and four secondary schools, the Ginnasio Liceo, 
Scuola Agrari, Scuola Avviamento Professionale and the 
Scuola Ceramica, providing both academic and practical 
education for a rural market town with an industrial 
sector. Each elementary school served a Sezione of the 
town. (119) By early December children could return to 
those schools which had been reopened and approved by the 
Proweditore and AMGOT HQ. There were no staffing problems 
as very few teachers had been dismissed after examination 
of their Scheda Personale. In fact the number of Fascists 
removed from their posts appears to be low in this area. 
Whether this was in any way due to the early withdrawal of 
AMGOT staff in advance of the handover to the Italian 
Government is not clear. As pointed out in Chapter 4, it 
was only some months after the departure of AMGOT that a 
High Commission for Defascistisation was established in the 
island. Commissari Prefettizi were given the power to draw 
up lists of Fascists for the Commission, but Caruso 
comments that they often excluded names for their own 
political reasons. Their investigations were frequently 
delayed or indefinitely postponed and many named Fascists 
were reinstated. (120) He also points out that the local 
Church in Caltagirone actively supported those who had been 
Fascists "di facciata", in order to keep their jobs, and 
adopted a policy of letting 'byegones be byegones'. (121)
Section 6. A heavy Workload for CAOs in Caltagirone
District
The epuration process was only one of the many spheres of 
AMGOT administration rendered more difficult by the 
inadequate staffing levels in the province. When the second 
reorganisation occurred at the end of August and Major 
Benton Jones was sent elsewhere, only three CAOs remained 
to administer the district of fourteen communes. Acireale,
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on the coast north of Catania town had eleven communes, all 
easily accessible to both district and provincial HQ, and 
four CAOs. Major Rolph, in charge of the district, was 
requested to release one of them, Lt Vos, to help Capt 
Corbin. Vos was chosen as he had initially served for a few 
weeks as CAO in Ramacca and Raddusa, and knew the district.
Apart from his regular duties Capt Corbin was hard pressed 
by the constant letters and appeals he received, not only 
from those believing that they were wrongfully suspended 
from their posts and asking to be reinstated, but also from 
citizens in need of some form of assistance. Pleas for 
basic necessities such as shoes, clothing, blankets and 
food, bicycles or mules to travel to work, and even 
shotguns for hunting, were received daily at the AMGOT 
office from all communes in the district. Many also sought 
information on the whereabouts of relatives taken prisoner 
or missing. Of the hundreds of letters received, many were 
in English and many written on behalf of those unable to 
write. (122) One letter begged for the return of a car 
confiscated by an English officer on the first day of the 
occupation, since when the owner had been unable to get to 
his place of employment. His wife wrote that since her 
husband had been unable to work, the family, which included 
four young children, were on the brink of starvation.(123) 
Most of these letters are dated September - October 1943, 
after Major Benton Jones had issued his Manifesto to the 
local population requesting them not to waste time seeking 
personal interviews at the AMGOT office.
Efforts were made with the active cooperation of the 
Church to alleviate the misery of those who could not 
afford black market prices for food. A kitchen was set up 
for the poor at S.Orsolo school to serve free hot meals on 
a daily basis but so many people queued for them that 
frequently the supply ran out. (124) Fortunately a close 
relationship with the Church had been maintained by CAOS, 
as they were well aware of both its influence and the 
contribution it made towards the welfare of the population.
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This relationship was much easier to forge in a small rural 
community than in a large industrial town like Catania.
As the AMGOT office in Caltagirone was the district HQ 
all CAOs were required to report there before contacting HQ 
Catania. For example, the CAO of Scordia, where typhoid had 
broken out, wrote to Corbin on 29 August to inform him of 
the acute shortage of food in the hospital. Only a few days 
supply of milk remained. Corbin, about to visit HQ, was 
requested to arrange a consignment of both tinned milk and 
urgently needed medical supplies and, if possible, more 
medical assistance.(125) The chances of obtaining them were 
slight, as Benton Jones had advised HQ the previous day 
that his area was almost completely devoid of medical 
supplies, in spite of the list of requirements he had sent 
on 1 August. Four weeks later none had been received.
By mid-October the atmosphere of unrest created by the 
price of black market food and escalating inflation led to 
a series of strikes culminating in demonstrations in front 
of the Municipio and Prefettura in Palermo on 19 October. 
Italian troops fired on the crowd, killing fourteen. A 
member of AMGOT HQ staff, Sgt Charles Dobson, kept a diary 
in which he described the tense atmosphere in the capital 
and the frequent attacks on Allied troops. He ascribed the 
trouble partly to Fascists and partly to food shortages, 
particularly bread, which had caused bread riots.(126) The
unrest in the island’s capital was beginning to spread and
it was at this time that the Commissario Prefettizio of 
Caltagirone, Iacono Marco Della Motta, retained in post by 
AMGOT, decided to resign. He wished to leave public life 
and spend more time on his estate.(127)
Benton Jones and Corbin must have decided when he was 
first interviewed that his ability to do his job outweighed 
his Fascist background, and that was probably why he was 
retained. There does not appear to have been any local 
antipathy towards his retention by AMGOT. Whether he had
completed his Scheda Personale before he resigned is not
recorded. Caruso points out that his letter of resignation
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was dated 12 October but Corbin must have known in advance 
because his nomination of Luigi La Rosa was dated 4 
October.(128)
Corbin expressed his appreciation of Della Motta’s work 
during the months before the Allies' arrival and during 
AMGOT's administration, referring to '1'opera oculata e 
fattiva da lei svolta a vantaggio dell' amministrazione 
comunale.' (129) Corbin nominated Baron Luigi La Rosa as
Della Motta's successor. La Rosa had been a deputy from 
1921 to 1924, a member of the Partito Popolare and close to 
Sturzo. (130) In his letter to AMGOT HQ, who were checking 
the credentials of Allied nominees for municipal office 
prior to the Region's transfer to Italian administration, 
Corbin made clear that he had taken full account of the 
views of the Church when assessing the suitability of the 
candidates. In his opinion La Rosa was 'un uomo di 
carattere e di assoluta sincerita, scevro di ambizioni 
personali, economicamente indipendente. '(131) Corbin also 
nominated two deputies, rather than the usual one, on the 
grounds that Caltagirone district with its fourteen 
communes was an exceptionally large area to administer, 
especially with a reduced number of CAOs. The deputies 
nominated were clearly anti-Fascist, Socialist teacher, 
Santi Bevilacqua, and Nicolo Di Bernardo, a future member 
of the Partito del Lavoro.
The increased importance of the role now given to local 
administrators was emphasised by Order No.34. from Lt Col 
Poletti which authorised the payment of an honorarium to 
the Sindaco. Poletti was now Regional Civil Affairs Officer 
and it was he who supported a suggestion from the SCAO for 
Caltanisetta at the first joint meeting of SCAOs that 
sindaci should be paid salaries. He considered it 'a wise 
move to encourage self-government.'(132)
A new mayor was later nominated for Scordia. Local anti- 
Fascist groups had written to Corbin recommending Giuseppe 
Di Mauro, and praising him for his work in removing some of 
the 'irregularities' at the local consorzio agricolo. (133)
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Section 7. Allied Efforts to improve Food Supplies
With a reduced number of CAOs and the appointment of new 
municipal administrators in Caltagirone, the role of AMGOT 
in local affairs gradually began to decrease. All Orders 
and Proclamations naturally remained in force and all 
contraventions were duly punished by Military Courts. The 
problems of inflation and the lack of basic necessities 
were as great, if not greater, because of the need to 
supply the recently occupied areas of southern Italy. 
However, some of the immediate post-war difficulties were 
being solved. The streets had been cleared, electricity 
supplies were more reliable, and although water remained in 
short supply, there was sufficient for daily needs. But 
problems still remained, some common to all provinces,
others specific to agricultural areas such as Caltagirone 
district, but all connected with the shortage of food.
The many irksome restrictions imposed on the public were 
even more numerous for those working in agriculture. 
Reference has previously been made to the rules and
regulations applied to those taking grain to the ammassi. 
Farmers rearing animals were also subject to precise
regulations governing the slaughter of cattle, goats, pigs 
and horses. This was only permitted on Fridays but there 
was no restriction on the slaughter of lambs and kids under 
fifty days of age. It was Capt Corbin's task to regulate 
the number of animals permitted for slaughter each week on 
the basis of animals available in proportion to the
population. There were no restrictions on actual meat 
sales. (134) All olive growers had to obtain a permit to 
press their crop, and the pressing was restricted to only a 
few hours a day. The residue, formerly used by the growers 
as fuel or for mixing in animal food, now had to be handed 
over to the Commissariato agli Affari Economici di Catania, 
who were responsible for its distribution. (135)
Reference has been made to AMGOT' s attempts to find a 
solution to the problems of the Black Market, especially in
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grain. Not only was confiscation the new order of the day 
but millers were now obliged to obtain a bolletta di 
macinazione from the Consorzio Agrario in Caltagirone 
before any grain could be milled. (136) In this way AMGOT 
retained full control of wheat, olive oil and residues from 
production to consumption but other agricultural products 
were no longer subject to compulsory delivery to ammassi as 
they had been under Italian law.
Grain collection still remained problematic in spite of 
the continued campaign of CAOs, urged on by Major Monk at 
the provincial Civil Supply Division. It was hoped that the 
refusal of AMGOT to permit milling of family grain until 
the grain was delivered to the Consorzio Agrario would be a 
strong inducement to bring it in. The maximum bread ration 
was fixed at 200 grams a day and was not to be raised 
without the prior approval of the SCAO. The supplemental 
ration of 100 grams for workers on Army projects would be 
continued and, if the grain was available in his commune, 
each CAO could use his discretion to award this supplement. 
There were inevitably occasions when the maximum ration was 
not available especially in the larger communes in spite of 
all efforts to bring in the grain. (137)
As 1943 drew to a close tensions were mounting in the 
district. These were caused by a variety of factors, one of 
which was the ongoing presence of refugees, unable or 
unwilling to return to their homes. Local people resented 
their presence and the supplies they consumed. In addition 
growing inflation, rising unemployment and above all the 
unfulfilled expectations aroused by Allied promises before 
and during the invasion were bringing these tensions to 
boiling point. In January fifty women in Vizzini staged a 
protest inside the Town Hall against a reduction of the 
bread ration from 200 to 150 grams. This followed another 
incident in the small town of Nicolosi, not in Caltagirone 
district but in Catania province, where German hand 
grenades were tied to the door of the Casa Comunale with a 
note attached: 'Ordine tutto noi popolo riunitosi prega di
229
aumentare il pane, se no questa e la reazione. ' (138)
On 24 January AMGOT notices were displayed in Caltagirone 
to inform the public that from the following day the daily 
bread ration would be fixed at 150 grams per person for all 
communes throughout the province. Reports on ensuing events 
on 25 January vary according to the source but all agree 
that a crowd gathered early in the morning, forced their 
way into the Municipio and set fire to papers and 
furniture. Capt Corbin had left Caltagirone on the 
previous day, having been recalled to Palermo. The official 
report therefore came from the SCAO of Catania, Lt Col 
French, and was sent to the RCAO. In it the demonstration 
is ascribed to the low bread ration of 150 grams and the 
local objection to paying taxes. The SCAO was informed that 
the demonstration began at 07.30 hours and gathered 
strength until some fifty bolder spirits forced their way 
into the Municipio, where they burned some papers and 
generally made a nuisance of themselves. They eventually 
calmed down when a unit of Carabinieri fired over their 
heads. The SCAPO and CAO Capt Reynolds arrived from Catania 
at 12.30 and with the aid of the Carabinieri dispersed the 
crowd. The SCAO arrived at 13.15 and sent for the Sindaco, 
Luigi La Rosa, who should have been at the scene of the 
demonstration. The SCAO was told that he was in Catania,
but he appeared at 14.00, and said he was ill and had just
got out of bed. Lt Col French was of the opinion that had
the Carabinieri shown more determination and had La Rosa
been present to speak to the crowd, they would not have 
become so disorderly.(139)
All British and Canadian military units had been withdrawn 
to Catania town on the previous day and reinforcements of a 
hundred men from the Sabauda Division at Enna were called 
on. From Catania came the Questore and another hundred 
Carabinieri who, with the hundred and fifty soldiers and 
police already on the scene, made an exhibition of force 
which alarmed the townspeople. Although French thought such 
numbers unnecessary, he commented that it would not do any
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harm.(140) Guards were placed at the Municipio, Consorzio 
Agrario and the mills. The SCAPO and Capt Reynolds were 
instructed to remain. overnight to await the arrival of a 
new CAO, Capt Parker, to replace Capt Corbin. No mention 
was made of the other two CAOs in the district, who may 
also have been removed elsewhere, although it is unlikely 
that a district of fourteen communes with a population of 
nearly 160,000, plus a large number of refugees, would be 
left without any AMG representative. French decided to 
order the Prefect to send a Commissario Prefettizio to 
replace La Rosa, whom he relieved of his post.(141)
Apart from the SCAO's account, the transcription of a 
telephone message received from the CC.RR. of the Catania 
group was also submitted by the HQ of the 6th Brigata 
Carabinieri Reali. It referred to a crowd of 8,000 gathered 
around the Municipal Piazza and nearby streets. A group 
entered the building, destroyed some documents of little 
importance and damaged some furniture. The police fired 
some musket shots and threw hand grenades which halted the 
demonstration. 28 people were arrested. Public order was 
re-established and reinforcements brought in. No recurrence 
of disorder was anticipated. The SCAO arrived and expressed 
appreciation for the intervention and the measures used. 
The absence of the Mayor and the Vice-Mayor was deplored. 
The only authority present was the Vice-Mayor attached to 
the Ration Service.(142)
Caruso cites another account in a manuscript kept in 
Caltagirone library, which relates how 'la folia inferocita 
assolto il palazzo dell'Aquila, incendiandolo, il regio 
esercito sparo colpi, ma la popolazione distrusse gli 
incartamenti annonari della ragioneria, dell'anagrafe, e 
dell'igiene e brucio tutta la mobilia in piazza tra urla e 
schiamazzi. ' (143)
A further development involved the MGS at AFHQ Algiers. 
The Section had apparently heard that the demonstration 
involved US troops, who were alleged to have fired machine 
guns and thrown hand grenades to quell the disturbance. A
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full report was requested. The ACC Deputy Executive 
Commisssioner forwarded the reports of the SCAO and the 
CCRR and noted that demonstrations of a similar nature had 
occurred in other areas but were always quickly dealt with 
by the Carabinieri.(144)
Although the reduction of the bread ration had sparked the 
disturbance, Caruso cites other probable factors which 
might have given an impetus to the outbreak of violence. 
The month of January 1944 was a month of transition with 
the impending handover of the island to Italian 
sovereignty, and, in Caruso’s words, the local population 
had been expressing 'la paura di essere richiamati alle 
armi e di vedere stravolto uno status quo cui si era ormai 
abituati.(145) These sentiments were not confined to the 
Calatini but common to most areas of the island. In 
Palermo, Sgt Dobson in the AMG HQ Accounts Office, noted in 
his diary that most of the Sicilians he had spoken to did 
not like Badoglio and wanted to be free from Italy. (146) 
What was, however, an extra element inciting many local 
people to stage a demonstration was the return of the 
goatherds to the town. Caruso explains that when don Luigi 
Sturzo was mayor, he refused them entry to the town and 
banned them from returning with their goats and selling 
milk on public highways. They returned after an absence of 
more than twenty years to support the rioters in their 
protest. When the new Commissario Prefettizio arrived, he 
issued an order banning them from the town.(147)
Reflecting on these disturbances, particularly the burning 
of papers from the land registers and the registry office, 
Caruso suggests they could have been efforts to conceal 
evidence which might reveal that people were drawing 
sussidi in the names of dead relatives.(148)
On 11 February the island, Region 1, was officially handed 
over to the Italian Government but disturbances continued. 
The Sindaco of Militello, after organising the distribution 
of tinned food to the poor, obtained from emergency rations 
for civilians, provided by the Allies during the invasion,
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was attacked by an angry mob, 200 strong. Carabinieri were 
called to intervene and restore order. On 8 March an 
Italian Army unit in a Caltagirone suburb, Mazzarrone, was 
confiscating grain which had not been delivered to the 
ammassi in accordance with General Order No.5, when it was 
set on by an angry crowd. Seven people were arrested and 
imprisoned in Caltagirone.(149) Similar incidents followed 
in other parts of the province with women frequently 
heading many of the protests, especially those connected 
with bread rations. It was mainly women who stood in bread 
queues, along with their children when schools were still 
closed, and it often happened that bread ran out before 
those at the end of the queue had been served. As bread 
coupons were date stamped, they could not be used the next 
day and a day’s ration was lost.
It was now the responsibility of the Italian Government to 
deal with all public disturbances since AMG had ceased, to 
administer the region. In Catania town, as described in 
Chapter 4, the SCAO and a number of CAOs and specialist 
staff were given a farewell ceremony on the morning of 11 
February 1944 in the presence of the Prefect, the Catania 
local authorities, provincial Sindaci, English officers who 
formed part of the ACC staff and many others. Both Lt Col 
French and Major Elwes were awarded honorary citizenships 
of the town and expressed their pleasure at remaining in 
the provincial capital as A.CC representatives.(150) They 
were posted to the mainland at the end of April 1944 and 
replaced by Major Giles. In Caltagirone a similar farewell, 
but on a much smaller scale, had been given to Capt Corbin 
when the municipality awarded him honorary citizenship of 
the town. A photograph shows him being presented with a 
scroll by the Sindaco, Luigi la Rosa, in the presence of 
the deputies, Bevilacqua and Di Bernardo, and another 
British officer, possibly Capt Munday.(151) No date is 
given but it was probably mid January, the time when CAOs 
learned where they would be posted when ACC took over.
At AMGOT HQ two separate groups of CAOs were being formed.
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The first consisted of French and German speakers, who 
would return to the UK to be prepared for duty in north­
west Europe. A different form of administration would be 
established there. Instead of serving in an integrated 
US/UK force under a CCAO, as in Sicily and mainland Italy, 
they would serve in separate British and American 
organisations as staff officers of the various military 
commanders in whose zone they operated. (152) The second 
group was destined for further service in AMG on the 
mainland when required, or would possibly be transferred 
into ACC. This was not originally envisaged during the 
planning process when AMGOT personnel from Sicily were to 
be used only for AMG on the mainland and not transferred 
into ACC. This was to prevent experience gained as CAOs 
from being wasted, when it could be used in newly conquered 
areas. On the other hand many thought the knowledge 
acquired of the people and area in which a CAO had already 
served would have been useful to him as an ACC 
representative after the return of the area to the Italian 
Government. Education Adviser, George Gayre, as mentioned 
in Chapter 4, was one senior officer who pointed out that 
AMG staff were much closer to the local people and knew 
their problems better than ACC newcomers.(153)
The early arrival of ACC had caused many upsets among the 
AMG staff in Palermo HQ, including the Education Adviser, 
who had been placed in an awkward position when the 
appointed ACC Education representative arrived unexpectedly 
to take over his post. As for Lord Rennell, he had not even 
been consulted during the planning stage of the Commission 
and in December wrote to the Regional SCAOs informing them 
of his resignation.(154) Harold Macmillan, in his diary 
entry for 5 November, had referred to the 'waning star of 
AMGOT' and also to Rennell's determination to resign from 
AMGOT altogether if he could not become the head of the 
Commission. (155) Others, rather less kindly, began to 
refer to the '•Amgotterdammerung' , or the 'Twilight of the 
Rodds' - a pointed reference to the family members employed
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by AMG.(156)
As ACC staff did not take up their posts until the 
departure of AMGOT from Sicily on 11 February, their work 
in Sicily is outside the scope of this chapter, and only a 
brief account of the role it would later play is given
here. No ACC field officers would operate in the communes
or in a position comparable to that of the CAO or CAPO, 
except in the transition stage until the Italian Government 
was functioning satisfactorily. General administration 
would be subject to ACC control at the provincial level and 
any necessary local inspection carried out from ACC 
regional or provincial HQ.
The above details imply that an ACC official would have 
been allocated to Caltagirone on 11 February but no details 
of his arrival could be found in the local archives. It is 
possible that the new CAO, Capt Parker, due to replace Capt 
Corbin, may have remained in the commune as an ACC officer 
until the new Commissario Prefettizio had settled into his
post. As some of the provincial HQ staff in Catania town
remained as ACC representatives in the province for a few 
months before being transferred to the mainland, they would 
have been available to give assistance to a district, 
where, as the Prefect, Fazio, stated in his report on the 
demonstration, ' lo spirito pubblica continua a mantenersi 
depresso.' (157 )
The tenure of Capt Corbin came to a rather abrupt end, as 
did that of the Podesta, Luigi La Rosa. It was not the best 
of outcomes for AMGOT's six months of administration. By 
mid-February AMGOT HQ in Palermo had closed and the staff 
transferred to Naples. The Prefect's report on the bread 
riot, dated April 1944, revealed that 28 demonstrators had 
been arrested and brought before a military tribunal. Some 
were sentenced but others released through lack of 
sufficient evidence. Fazio referred to the situation in the 
town at the time as 'confusa e incerta'.(158) This was due 
to the high level of unemployment in both industry and 
agriculture, and for those still in employment, the average
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wage was only L.100 a day.
The war in Italy would prove long and drawn out and
conditions on the mainland would be as difficult as those
in Sicily, if not more so. As the war progressed in Europe, 
other countries would be in need of material help from the 
Allies. Sicily would therefore have ongoing problems of 
supplies. Whether these problems coul-d have been at least
partially solved by a more efficient Civil Affairs
administration will be examined in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion. AMGOT in Sicily - Success or failure?
Most post-war literature referring to the role played by 
AMGOT officers in the Allied campaign in Italy has been, to 
say the least, negative. David Ellwood refers to 'civil 
affairs as being 'relegated to the status of a 'Cinderella' 
service suitable for Ancient Military Gentlemen on Tour, 
and for a variety of other elements from the middle levels 
of army life.' (1) Col Vladimir Peniakoff, who operated 
with his band of British soldiers behind enemy lines, wrote 
of his problems recruiting suitable officers. Although 
there were plenty available in depots in Italy, most wanted 
a staff job or if they lacked enough pull, 'they would be 
content with a job at AMGOT where they could look forward 
to comfortable billets, an obliging girl friend and 
reasonable profits on the black market.' (2)
According to Carlo D'Este, the history of military 
government in World War II 'is riddled with instances of 
graft, corruption and illegal black market activities. 
Many ordinary soldiers could not resist the lure of 
fortunes to be made by cooperation with the Mafia and 
criminal organisations in other countries.' (3) The 
description of conditions in Naples, under Allied 
administration from October 1943, presented in Norman 
Lewis's Naples 44 and The Gallery by John Horne Burns also 
contributed to the image of large-scale Allied corruption 
on the Italian mainland. (4) Thomas Fisher, who served in 
Italy with both AMG and ACC, refers to Naples in the winter 
of 1943-44 as the worst-governed city in the Western world, 
adding that 'it was not much better a year later.' (5)
Little, however, seems to have been written specifically 
about AMGOT staff in Sicily apart from a few references to 
officers in the west of the island where a significant 
percentage of Americans of Sicilian origin were stationed. 
Education Adviser Lt Col George Gayre refers to the favours
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for relatives sought by these officers. In his opinion no 
officer with relatives or business interests in Sicily 
should have been appointed to AMGOT administration.(6)
It was also in the west of the island that Mafia elements 
re-introduced themselves. The most notorious godfather in 
Sicily, Don Calo Vizzini, was appointed mayor of Villalba 
by the Allies and the town soon became a centre for the 
distribution of black market goods to the mainland, with 
documents and transport (unknowingly) provided by AMGOT.(7) 
There is no evidence that this activity occurred elsewhere 
in the island and certainly not in Catania province, where 
at this time there was no Mafia presence. CAOs in the field 
across the island were actively engaged in the prevention 
of black market dealings, although admittedly with limited 
success.
Perhaps 'limited success' would be a reasonable summing-up 
of what was achieved by AMGOT in Catania province if one 
judges success or failure by the CCAO's definition of the 
purpose of military government. According to Lord Rennell, 
its two main objectives were 'to enable the armies which 
have conquered the territory to prosecute their military 
operations more efficiently and to provide for the 
wellbeing and local needs of the population within the 
limits of policy and available resources of the governments 
which are waging war against the enemy. (8) These were 
criteria to be observed strictly and in that order.
AMGOT in Sicily was the first military government in 
Europe and also the first joint Anglo-American organisation 
in which the functions of British and American officers 
were complementary and not duplicated. Britain, although 
experienced in establishing military governments in Africa 
preceding the Sicilian administration, had now to take the 
views of her coalition partner into full consideration 
since a completely cohesive administration in every area of 
the island would be imperative. Rennell was determined that 
there would be no place in his organisation for disharmony. 
By bringing together all prospective CAOs at Chrea, he had
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succeeded in binding the two nationalities together. His 
warning to them to avoid criticism of each other was heeded 
and he was later able to describe the experiment of joint 
Anglo-American administration as wholly successful. (9) 
This was certainly the case in Catania province. This 
success can probably be partly explained by the relatively 
small number of CAOs involved, working together with common 
interests, sharing similar qualifications if they served in 
a specialist division and having followed similar curricula 
in their respective training schools.
In Catania province the AMGOT staff, especially those 
based in the town, were more engaged in the first purpose 
of military government than were CAOs in any other 
province, since Catania had the largest number of 
servicemen, both passing through and encamped. Although the 
invasion campaign was over in less than six weeks, military 
needs remained paramount since Catania would be used as a 
launching ground for the invasion of the mainland in 
September. Widespread structural damage in the town from 
air and naval bombardments involved CAOs in the immediate 
organisation of large-scale street clearance operations in 
order to allow the passage of military transport through to 
the north. This they did successfully, although lacking the 
transport to carry rubble away and the materials to start 
rebuilding. The Eighth Army commander came in person to see 
the SCAO to ensure that he was giving priority to clearing 
the streets. (10) The port and surrounding areas needed to 
be rapidly repaired to accommodate ships and landing craft 
and close liaison between AMGOT and the army was essential 
to recruit a reliable civilian work force to carry out 
these repairs.
AMGOT officers also took responsibility for locating and 
requisitioning suitable buildings to house troops, who 
either formed part of the combat forces or were support 
elements. During the invasion phase it frequently happened 
that combat troops were in advance of AMGOT units and 
unlawfully took over protected buildings as billets. AMGOT
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officers would then remove them to other accommodation, not 
always easy to find in Catania town. (One empty barracks in 
the town was considered far too insanitary for British 
troops). Although CAOs did their utmost for the troops, 
relations between them and the military were not always 
cordial, frequently because AMGOT’s role was not understood 
by many unit commanders. Reference has been made earlier to 
General Montgomery's complaints to Lord Rennell about 
AMGOT's performance, which revealed even a General's 
ignorance of the conditions under which CAOs operated.
L-t Col Wellesley also had to be firm at times in his 
dealings with the military, some of whom expected AMGOT to 
supply all their needs. On one occasion he refused to 
requisition a piano and two refrigerators, requested by the 
commanding officer of the Perth Highlanders for the 
Officers Mess, since he did not consider these as military 
necessities.(11) Where the latter were concerned Wellesley 
was always helpful, but he informed Rennell at the end of 
August that so much of his time was taken up with the 
Military Authorities that he had asked 13 Corps to lend him 
a Liaison Officer on their Town Major panel to assist with 
purely military affairs. (12) He ensured that his CAPOs in 
the provincial capital worked very closely with units of 
the Military Police and, together with the support of the 
local Police Forces, they achieved a high degree of law and 
order in what was considered to be one of the most 
difficult towns to govern in the island.
Even after the departure of the combat forces from the 
island, AMGOT staff still maintained close liaison with the 
remaining military in order to assist them in negotiations 
with civilians in the acquisition of supplies. These could 
range from the purchase of large quantities of eggs to any 
available fresh meat to supplement Army tinned rations. The 
town CAO, Capt Thornitt-Smith, not only spoke fluent 
Italian but was well acquainted with the town traders and 
how best to deal with them. The CAOs also proved their 
usefulness to the military in requisitioning mules, needed
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for porterage in the Etna area, and supervising Sicilian 
POWs, released from internment and allowed to return home. 
Even when hostilities ceased, military orders continued to 
be issued regularly to the population and CAOs were 
responsible for enforcing these, in addition to enforcing 
the Proclamations.
They kept in regular communication with the higher 
military echelons and were on the receiving end of 
innumerable reports, directives, instructions, letters and 
orders which came to them from AFHQ Algiers, 15th Army 
Group HQ, AMGOT Administrative HQ, AMGOT HQ of other 
provinces and their own provincial HQ. All this mail was 
delivered by motorcycle courier to CAOs in the field each 
week from the provincial HQ. Replies from CAOs to these 
communications were returned through the same channels. As 
much of this mail was of classified content, the CAO in the 
field could not use the services of a local English- 
speaking secretary, even if he was lucky enough to have 
one, and in the absence of EM and ORs, the amount of paper 
work was overwhelming, as many CAOs complained. (13) This 
was not such a problem for the Catania CAOs working at 
provincial HQ with secretarial help, although the various 
specialist divisions were scattered around the town, 
causing time-consuming journeys between offices.
In Caltagirone district there was not the same high level 
of pressure on CAOs to attend to the needs of the military 
as in the provincial capital, although they were also at 
the receiving end of the same avalanche of military mail. 
Civilian workers were not in demand on the same scale as in 
the provincial capital where preparations to launch the 
mainland invasion involved a large workforce: However,
there were many Allied troops stationed in the district, 
mostly from logistic units, and responsible for supplying 
forward units with rations, arms and transport. There were 
also respite camps and field hospitals to care for the 
injured and sick. These establishments would be well 
staffed and these troops during their off-duty breaks could
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be troublesome. Reference has been made to problems caused 
by drunken behaviour, brawls with other soldiers and 
attacks on civilians. In the absence of MPs, local CAPOs 
were called in to restore law and order. This was certainly 
not the primary purpose of military government. It is 
ironic that Allied forces were not needed to garrison any 
part of Sicily or to maintain the authority of AMGOT but 
AMGOT staff were needed to maintain discipline among Allied 
forces. They would not have been used if adequate numbers 
of MPs had accompanied each deployment of troops.
Caltagirone appears to have had two very good CAOs who 
complemented each other. It is almost impossible to trace 
the backgrounds of those serving in AMGOT, unless they were 
from the higher ranks of the aristocracy or recently 
created barons, or as in the case of a certain Capt 
Pearson, chose to furnish details about themselves in their 
reports to the War Office. (14) Major Benton Jones, senior 
CAO, was a Royal Artillery officer who gives the impression 
in his first report to HQ of being highly organised, the 
type of army officer who 'got things done', and was not 
afraid to speak his mind either to local people, including 
refugees, or to his superiors in his reports. He adopted a 
very firm attitude towards those unwilling to work or who 
wasted his time. (15) Since the number of Allied troops in 
the area were fewer than in the provincial capital and food 
supplies initially easier to obtain in the countryside, 
pressure on CAOs to help the military obtain provisions was 
not as great as in Catania town. As mentioned above, Allied 
troops in Caltagirone district were mostly composed of 
support forces and did not require a large civilian force 
to work for them as did the Catania-based units.
The implementation of the second objective of military 
government, as defined by the CCAO, 'to provide for the 
wellbeing and local needs of the population within the 
limits of policy and available resources' is perhaps' more 
clearly seen in the smaller town of Caltagirone, where the 
second CAO, Capt Corbin, was, in addition to his many other
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duties, responsible for monitoring the grain production and 
arranging its transportation in the absence of motorised 
vehicles. He was ably supported by Maj Benton Jones until 
the latter was posted, when he himself took over as senior 
CAO. As one of the few CAOs who remained in post for six 
months he became well known to the local officials, 
civilians and clergy, and was an active member of the town 
rehousing committee. He appears to have made a good
impression on the local officials and was popular in the
town, being made an honorary citizen of Caltagirone before 
he was finally recalled to Palermo HQ. Taking into account 
the large number of refugees in the district, the 
unacceptable behaviour of Allied troops, political 
undercurrents and the continued shortage of basic 
necessities, CAOs and CAPOs would appear, on the evidence 
available, to have maintained law and order to a successful 
degree, even when the second reorganisation reduced their 
numbers. Benefiting from the support of the clergy, they 
appear to have done all they could to encourage the 
Calatini to make the best of a difficult situation. It is 
significant that trouble only broke out locally the day 
after Capt Corbin was known to have left the town.
The success or failure of an organisation such as AMGOT 
depended not only on the quality of each individual CAO but 
on the support given to the organisation by other service 
branches and also the foresight and acumen of the planning 
team. Previous chapters have pointed out the disorganised 
planning processes for the military invasion and the army's
refusal to allow CAOs to board in the first waves, or to
provide them with their own transport when they arrived in 
the island. Intervention at the highest level in this 
context was fruitless. But the MGS at AFHQ also failed to 
support their own force of CAOs by not ensuring the 
delivery of promised vital supplies for civilian needs. 
Pre-invasion Allied propaganda had persuaded the islanders 
to treat them as liberators and led to great expectations 
among the population which the Military Government was not
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able to deliver because of the shortcomings of the planning 
staff. As Sicilians gradually realised that the promised 
benefits of the Allies' presence had not materialised in 
the form of food and other badly needed supplies, they 
naturally became disillusioned and less cooperative.
This was entirely the fault of the planners, who, although 
they apparently had little advance intelligence of the 
conditions already existing under Fascism, also under­
estimated the disruption which would inevitably result from 
their own regular bombing attacks on the island’s transport 
system. They also seem to have overlooked the enemy's 
tendency when in retreat to employ a 'scorched earth' 
policy of deliberate destruction of vehicles, rolling 
stock, bridges and public utilities. In addition, they 
looted grain stores and livestock as they retreated, so 
that food stocks were depleted on a large scale.
In fairness to the planners in Algiers many of their 
problems arose from the disputes between London and 
Washington about the constitution of AMGOT. According to 
Macmillan, these took two months to resolve.(16) The delay 
inevitably affected the planning process and subsequent 
decisions which needed to be taken during AMGOT's tenure of 
administration. Requests for these decisions went to AFHQ, 
Washington and London for discussion before AMGOT could 
take action, such being the nature of coalition warfare.
The planners' greatest error was their failure to provide 
AMGOT with sufficient and suitable transport, exclusively 
for their own use, plus access to Army mobile repair units. 
Apart from a reasonably paved coastal highway, the island's 
roads were frequently little more than rough tracks which 
soon damaged tyres and axles. The planners would have been 
aware of this from the large-scale photo reconnaissance 
which had been carried out before the invasion. In addition 
the enemy had blown up many bridges, and motorised vehicles 
were regularly forced to drive over the dried-up river 
beds. Vehicles such as jeeps should have been provided 
specifically for AMGOT staff to inspect their communes, and
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also trucks to deliver food. Military units were told 
instead to hand over trucks to CAOs for civilian food 
deliveries. Naturally the units kept their trucks for their 
own purposes. The delivery situation was only improved when 
SCAOs organised their own motor pools with the few vehicles 
which the military finally agreed to pass on to AMGOT.(17) 
This negative attitude on the part of the military towards 
AMGOT was yet another example of the lack of understanding 
of its role. It also contributed to the civilian perception 
that the liberators were not equipped to fulfil the role 
promised by propagandists of supplying them with their 
daily needs.
Apart from reports sent to the War Office by CAOs which 
contain accounts of individual experiences, few objective 
post-war assessments of the achievements of AMGOT and AMG 
in Sicily seem to have been published by British writers. 
Those comments which do appear en passant range from at 
best merely negative to, in most cases, highly critical. 
One favourable comment came from Harold Macmillan, 
following a visit to AMGOT HQ in Palermo. He noted in his 
diary that he was favourably impressed by the work AMGOT 
was doing:'It has really been a great piece of organisation 
in view of the difficulties, and the critics at home have 
no idea at all of how great they are.' (18) He also thought 
AMGOT had done a very fine job in Naples where in the space 
of three weeks they had got essential services working.(19) 
But as reported above, a short time later Naples became 
synonymous with military government at its worst as 
conditions deteriorated to such an extent that the city was 
at starvation level.(20)
Many readers assumed that these conditions were the norm 
in all areas of Italy, particularly as the re-emergence of 
the Mafia in western Sicily as sindaci or interpreters had 
led to an upsurge of criminal activity. In September 1943 a 
meeting of CAPOs at AMG HQ in Palermo reported that Mafia 
activities had begun again. In October Capt Scotten, a 
Military Intelligence Officer, who had previously served as
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American Vice-Consul in Palermo for three years, presented 
a written report on the Mafia's role in island politics and 
pointed out that it was in the process of re-asserting
itself.(21) At this stage Mafia infiltration of AMGOT was 
confined to the western provinces. However, with the growth 
of the Separatist movement in Palermo and its increasing 
activities in Catania, it was distinctly possible that the 
Mafia with its former involvement in political affairs,
would wish to become associated with this movement. It
might well have begun to infiltrate into the eastern
provinces at the time when Finocchiaro Aprile launched his 
attack on AMGOT staff in Catania, but as stated above, no 
evidence is available and no mention made of the Mafia in 
literature produced by local Catania historians at that 
time.
Scotten believed that many senior Allied officers had 
fallen under the influence of the Mafia and were being 
misled by corrupt interpreters and advisors 'to the extent 
that they are in danger of becoming the unwitting tools of 
the Mafia. 1 He also understood that for many Sicilians 
AMG's inability to curb the increasing criminal activities, 
such as looting of food from Allied-controlled warehouses, 
which frequently resulted in rations being unobtainable, 
made the situation possibly worse under the Allies than it 
had been under Fascism. (22) In this respect AMG in some 
areas could be seen as a failure but there is no evidence 
whatsoever in Catania province of CAOs being 'the tools of 
the Mafia. '
American military historians appear to have been more 
interested than their British counterparts in analysing the 
work and impact of Civil Affairs in Italy and seeking 
reasons why it was judged to have been less than 
successful. Many articles appeared in the years following 
the end of the war, most of them critical of AMGOT ’ s lack 
of achievement. This may partly explain why certain 
branches of the Army in the post-war years decided to 
include the study of civil affairs in their curriculum, and
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this led to small units being utilised in a number of post 
World War II conflicts, either alone or in combination with 
other countries who had set up similar units.
Most of the American authors of articles on AMGOT or ACC 
tended to emphasise the role of the Americans in the 
Military Administration. In Spring 1946, Maurice Neufeld of 
Cornell University published an article entitled 'The 
Failure of AMG in Italy', in which he stated 'The Allies, 
with the United States as senior partner in popular esteem, 
have chosen to enter occupied areas with a philosophy of 
lofty intentions....but no clear-cut program designed to 
fulfil these ends.'(23) There was no senior partner. Weeks 
of wrangling during the planning phase had resulted in the 
decision that neither ally was to be regarded as the senior 
partner but the large number of US troops of Sicilian 
origin, particularly in the western half of the island, and 
the senior position of Lt Col Poletti, himself of Sicilian 
origin, led Sicilians to believe that Americans were in 
charge of Allied administration. This view was later 
reinforced when supplies which eventually reached the 
island were known to have come from the United States. 
Another reason for this emphasis on the American role could 
be that Britain's economic situation made her unable to 
contribute to Italy's post-war recovery on the same scale 
as the US.
In his assessment of AMG's lack of success, Neufeld blames 
basic administrative weakness which was compounded by 
staffing the administration with inexperienced men of 
limited political and administrative vision. They may have 
been 'industrious individuals with good intentions', but 
their circumscribed professional training, education or 
point of view would render them incompetent in the field of 
military government.(24) Rennell had previously pointed out 
the difficulty in recruiting staff for AMG who had all the 
necessary capabilities since, apart from the professionally 
trained, those with a knowledge of public administration 
were few in number in both countries. Good serving officers
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could not be spared from their active roles and in
Rennell's opinion, regimental training did not normally 
produce good administrative personnel. There were obvious 
exceptions, as Major Benton Jones proved. Apart from 
Britain’s Colonial civil servants, initially drawn on for 
service in North and East Africa, men with academic
qualifications or business or legal experience, were,
according to Rennell, the most readily adaptable for posts 
in administration.(25) Whether or not they were trained and 
taught sufficiently well is a matter of dispute. Education 
Adviser, Lt Col Gayre, was of the opinion that some 
American CAOs had done infinite harm to AMGOT's prestige 
and cites one US serviceman, who as a result of serious 
misdemeanours, was given a choice of being courtmartialled 
or becoming a CAO.(26)
Gayre's comments about the ignorance of instructors at
Tizi Ouzou were scathing: 'The confidence of some of them 
was the greater in proportion to their ignorance', but CAO 
Henry Adams did not believe the fault lay in the 
shortcomings of instructors but in the attitude of the 
majority of CAOs, who failed to take the instruction 
seriously and ignored the written material at their 
disposal. They assumed that innate practicality and common 
sense would produce efficient administration. (27) Many 
CAOs, however, considered that much of the course content 
was irrelevant and lacking in essential elements, such as a 
more intense study of the Italian language. This was a 
common criticism in CAOs' reports, many of which referred 
to problems with local interpreters who had a restricted 
knowledge of English or who deliberately mistranslated. 
This issue was later addressed in the Civil Affairs 
Training Schools set up in American universities, where new 
courses included intense foreign language teaching.
Not surprisingly it was difficult for the organisers to 
find instructors with knowledge of the grass roots levels 
in areas where CAOs would be operating, particularly as 
conditions would have changed very much since the outbreak
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of war. Instructors were also faced with 'mixed ability' 
classes where mature and highly qualified civilians who 
were experts in their field were taught alongside Army 
officers seeking a 'cushy number'.
CAO Adams was one of seven officers who arrived together 
in Palermo. He had been informed that he would be with the 
Public Safety Division in Palermo city but on arrival was 
ordered to join a group of CAOs to be distributed in 
Palermo province. The group was smaller than originally 
planned but the same number of communes had to be 
administered. They had one small-scale map between them, 
which they had managed to acquire from an MP as they left 
Palermo for Cefalu. There a truck would pick them up and 
take them to their posts in the interior but it was not 
known when it would arrive. Each CAO had been told by the 
SCAO to make his way back to Palermo a week later to report
the progress he had made in his allotted communes. It was
up to him to find his own transport.(23) These 'detailed 
planning arrangements' given to CAOs would prove typical of 
the casual attitude of AFHQ.
Adams found himself in sole charge of four communes and 
his report highlights the varied nature of their problems. 
These depended on the particular conditions in each area, 
but there were certain needs common to all communes in the 
island; the restoration of a transport system, production 
and distribution of food, provision of medical and relief 
services and the imposition of economic controls. His 
report also points out variations in the way military
government was organised in each province. Each SCAO could 
choose the administrative technique suitable for his
province. Three of Catania's adjoining provinces, Ragusa, 
Caltanisetta and Messina, were administered from their 
capitals with CAOs going out on a daily circuit instead of 
being permanently stationed in one of the communes. Citing 
his own experiences based in Petralia, Adams describes the 
difficulty in achieving cooperation between local military 
government areas, since a CAO tended to 'hold onto, to keep
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secret and to guard jealously what resources he had.'(29) 
This attitude was also reflected at a higher level in 
inter-provincial exchanges, when for example, none of the 
surplus amount of olive oil in Ragusa Province was made 
available to Palermo, which had none at all. (30) Similarly 
local sindaci in Caltagirone district had been vague when 
questioned about their commune's grain stocks.
The report cited above typifies the lack of precise 
planning on a local scale. On a broader scale there were 
interminable delays in obtaining decisions for problems 
arising at various stages of the administration. These 
delays became even more frustrating when ACC personnel 
moved into AMGOT HQ in October and immediately took over 
the posts occupied by AMG staff. Gayre commented that as 
ACC officers were so completely ignorant of what was to be 
done, and AMG staff were no longer allowed to take 
decisions, almost nothing was done. He described the 
situation at the end of October as 'a country run by a 
military government, most of whose officers have now lost 
interest in the work, with a Control Commission slapped on 
top of it, and which is not yet a functioning 
organisation.' (31)
At that time, Rennell was supervising the administration 
of the forward provinces at General Alexander's HQ on the 
mainland and his deputy, General McSherry, was in charge of 
the rear provinces at Palermo HQ. Rennell's comments on the 
superimposition of the ACC on the AMG long before the 
Italian Government resumed administration of Sicily were 
later expressed in a more measured way than Gayre' s . He 
stated that the obvious course would have been to add staff 
progressively to the AMG organisation and to have formed 
the ACC out of the former when the time came. The new body 
would then have had the experience gained by AMG officers 
in situ since the invasion, instead of 'finding themselves 
usually superior in rank but inferior in experience and 
knowledge to those whose work they proceeded to take 
over.1(32)
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The comments made by Gayre and Rennell concerning the lack 
of experience and administrative ability of most ACC staff 
were borne out by the administrative chaos which followed 
their arrival at Palermo HQ. Macmillan added his own 
comment about the ACC's Acting Deputy-President, American 
Major-General Kenyon Joyce:'His qualifications appear to be 
absolutely nil.' (33) CAO Adams describes the impact of ACC 
representatives at Palermo HQ, where CAOs from the province 
met regularly for discussions. ACC staff were there to 
investigate AMGOT at work. Ostensibly there to learn, they 
often began to instruct CAOs on matters they themselves had 
not experienced. Adams refers to 'the vast horde' 
inundating AMGOT HQ, bringing 'new forms, new verbiage and 
new faces, making it a foreign citadel, and driving the old 
guard back to their jobs among their Sicilian co-workers, 
where everybody understood everybody. AMGOT became ACC but 
the problems and difficulties continued as before.'(34)
There were still three months of military government to be 
implemented before the island was handed back to Italian 
rule. Morale had been high among the vast majority of CAOs 
in the early stages of AMGOT, in spite of criticism from 
some British MPs, and Rennell, although he may have had a 
few private reservations, had robustly defended CAOs’ work 
in his report to the House of Commons. (35) CAOs in the 
field still continued to carry out their normal duties with 
dedication in Catania province, but they were aware that 
the early arrival of ACC staff was the cause of confusion 
among the population, most of whom were reluctant to accept 
the impending rule of the Badoglio Government.
A gradual withdrawal of a number of CAOs from their 
communes began, well in advance of the hand-over date, 
their areas being transferred to the jurisdiction of the 
nearest remaining CAO, thus doubling his work. This 
resulted in many local authorities being forced to contact 
provincial HQ if a problem arose, and the nearest CAO was 
not available. This happened in Caltagirone in January 
1944 when the bread riot took place. Since there was now no
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AMG presence in the town, the SCAO was sent for. As related 
in the previous chapter, he dismissed the Sindaco and 
arranged the transfer of a replacement CAO to the town.
CAOs who remained in post appear to have done their best 
to maintain morale in a situation of diminishing supplies 
of food and warm clothing, essential for the harsh winter 
conditions. The shortage of fuel made life difficult for 
everyone, citizens and CAOs alike. Many of the latter were 
uncertain as to their future, not knowing if they would 
remain as ACC officers, be posted to the mainland as AMG in 
the forward areas, or return to the UK to be trained for 
the occupation of Western Europe. It was only in areas 
where AMG staff were retained as ACC that the close 
association forged between AMG officers and the local 
population was able to continue. This happened in Catania 
town even though it was only for a short while. The SCAO 
and a few of his staff remained as ACC representatives 
until April 1944, when they were posted to a similar 
position on the mainland.
In his message of farewell to his former AMG officers on 
18 December 1943, Lord Rennell referred to AMG as having 
been 'the subject of some praise and the object of some 
attack' but accepted that he was responsible for the 
principles of administration which his officers had put 
into practice. These were preservation of law, order and 
justice, prevention of disease and distress, removal of 
fear, and creation of economic wellbeing. He pointed out 
that this last principle must of necessity take second 
place since it could only occur within the limits of 
transport and of military requirements. If these stated 
principles or their application were wrong, then he 
accepted that the fault was his, and no personnel who had 
followed these principles need be in fear of attack. (36) 
The fact that the conditions for economic wellbeing could 
not be achieved under the circumstances which prevailed at 
the time was not the fault of the administrators in the 
field.
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It was a rather inglorious end to AMGOT's administration 
in Caltagirone, where the CAOs had accomplished much in 
spite of circumstances for which they were in no way 
responsible. In Catania the continuing presence of the SCAO 
and a number of his provincial HQ staff helped a smooth 
transition to ACC administration. D'Este's negative 
judgement on military government, cited earlier, was 
tempered somewhat by his statement that AMGOT in Sicily 
'was a sincere attempt to restore order in countries 
devastated by war'.(37) Rennell summed up the achievement 
of AMGOT officers in his introduction to Gayre's account of 
his own experiences in Sicily:'The lands which they helped 
to administer retain the memory of men who did their best 
in all honesty and disinterestedness for the populations 
committed to their charge.' (38) My impression of the CAOs 
in Catania and Caltagirone is that they were 'honest' and 
'disinterested' and worked very hard in extremely difficult 
circumstances. Whether this would be the memory kept by the 
Catanesi and Calatini is hard to say. They would be more 
likely to remember that the hardships of war continued long 
after war had finished and the promised fruits of 
liberation did not materialise. Nicolosi described the 
farewell gathering of the SCAO and staff on 11 February in
Catania:'Gli addii sono sempre tristi, ma poiche quello era
l'addio al vincitore, nessuno appariva troppo addolorato. 
In cuor suo ognuno anzi gioiva'(39)
A War Office document referring to the state of mind of
the Italians in 1944, comments that 'Italy began to tire of 
her liberators, who had turned out on better acquaintance 
not to be demigods after all.' The document also cites a 
well known comedian, Macario, who, in a 1944 revue "Febbre 
Azzurra", sang about the Allies:
' Son qui gia piu di un anno
Ma ancor non se ne vanno ' (40)
This probably summed up the feelings of most Italians.
In conclusion to this account of AMGOT's role in Sicily, a
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brief reference will be made to the position of civil 
Affairs in today's army. Donnison pointed out the lack of 
preparation for Military Government in World War II, 
revealed when an urgent need arose for staff to administer 
occupied Italian territory in North and East Africa in 
1940. He emphasised the importance of providing instruction 
to the Services in peace-time to prepare them for the tasks 
which might face an occupying army in future conflicts.(41) 
Educating the Army to understand the role of AMGOT had been 
a serious problem, and since an Army might find itself in a 
future conflict having to undertake the conduct of military 
government, or having to resolve problems affecting the 
indigenous population as a result of the war, it should be 
prepared to take on immediate responsibility for securing 
law and order and dealing with the problems which follow a 
state of conf lict. (42) This happened on more than one 
occasion in Sicily but only lasted a short time, and was 
attributable to poor planning.
Donnison indicated that to the best of his knowledge no 
instruction in civil affairs and military government was 
provided at any military establishment in Britain at the 
time of writing. (His book was published in 1966). He put 
forward some reasons for this, such as the lack of time in 
a crowded and technical modern curriculum, and the need for 
financial economy in defence expenditure in time of 
peace.(43) At the end of World War II Britain was in a 
state of financial crisis and far more concerned with 
putting the nation back on a sound economic basis than in 
formulating new plans for the armed services. As far as can 
be ascertained, no provision for civil affairs courses had 
been made in the curricula of any Army establishments in 
Britain, including the Staff College, Camberley, and the 
Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, for over fifty years. 
During this time mechanisation and modernisation of the 
three armed forces became the main objective of the 
Ministry of Defence.
It was only in 1997, when a fledgling Civil Affairs Group
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was formed at Gibraltar Barracks, Camberley, under the name 
of CIMIC. that a start was made in training personnel to 
study the impact on civilians in a country occupied by a 
military force. The impetus for forming this group probably 
came from the growing involvement of British forces in NATO 
peacekeeping operations and the fact that other countries, 
in particular the United States, had well-established civil 
affairs organisations. CIMIC stands for Civil-Military Co­
operation and the group in the UK is essentially military 
in that its members are initially fully trained Regular 
military personnel or Reservists, who have all undertaken 
specialist courses in the means and methods of dealing with 
the impact of military operations on civilians.
CIMIC is totally integrated in the Army chain of command, 
its functions being to allow the commander to have 
effective interaction with the civil environment in which 
he is deploying his forces and to establish and influence 
relations between the military and civilian population so 
that the latter do not hinder operations. In this there is 
a reflection of the role of CAOs in AMGOT, whose primary 
responsibility was to enable combat forces to prosecute 
their military operations more efficiently. The similarity 
stops there in that the CIMIC group is an integral part of 
the planning process of a military operation, unlike AMSOT.
CIMIC is not a humanitarian organisation but where needed 
CIMIC groups actively carry out projects to aid the local 
people both during and after hostilities. These may 
include distribution of food, water and medical supplies, 
help in re-establishing the local administration and civil 
policing, and the re-opening of schools, activities Wiich 
have been taking place in areas such as southern Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and which were part of a CAO's duties in 
Sicily. Where no military action is involved but a large- 
scale disaster has taken place, a CIMIC team may be 
deployed. One took part in the relief operations after the 
tsunami in December 2004, working in close contact witi an 
Australian CIMIC group, and providing a liaison link *ith
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the Indonesian military. Members of the Joint Cimic Group 
(JCG), as they are now called, are often supported by army 
volunteers from locally based regiments. In Afghanistan a 
school has been built with volunteer help from British 
soldiers of the Kabul Patrol Company, who also constructed 
play facilities for the Setara kindergarden in central 
Kabul. (44) Reservists play an essential part in general 
CIMIC operations, bringing their special skills from 
civilian life, as did AMGOT personnel of the Specialist 
Divisions. They are thoroughly trained in military matters 
and although not in the same state of readiness for 
operations as Regulars, once called up they assimilate 
quickly into the group. This contrasts with the situation 
in 1943, when future CAOs were recruited from civilian 
occupations and, in spite of a brief induction course, many 
found great difficulty in understanding, and adapting to, a 
military way of life.
As military operations are now frequently of a multi­
national nature, UK units cross-train with other allied 
units, in a similar way to the final training course at 
Tizi Ouzou, which sought to integrate US and UK CAOs, after 
separate courses in Charlottesville and Wimbledon. NATO 
CIMIC exercises take place on a regular basis in Europe.
The role and purpose of CIMIC now forms part of the 
curriculum at RMA Sandhurst. Officer cadets take part in a 
Peace Support Exercise, BROADSWORD, which introduces them 
to the functions of CIMIC. The equivalent of CIMIC in the 
United States is known as CA, Civil Affairs, and depends 
heavily on its specially trained Reservists. The US Marine 
Corps has its own units and one edition of the US Naval 
Journal was headed 'Civil Affairs is the Invisible Force', 
pointing out that the work of civil affairs officers in the 
Corps 'was unknown to most Marines'.(45) Sixty years after 
AMGOT's tenure in Sicily this statement recalls Harris's 
reference to the complete ignorance of most of the military 
commanders of tactical units of the functions, or even the 
existence, of CAOs.' It appears that little has changed.
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APPENDIX I
In Proclamation No.l General Eisenhower announced to the 
people of Sicily the occupation of the island and the 
establishment of an Allied Military Government.
TO THE PEOPLE OF SICILY:
WHEREAS in prosecuting their war against the Axis Powers, it 
has become necessary for the armed forces of Great Britain 
and the United States under my command to occupy Sicily.
WHEREAS it is the policy of the Allied Forces not to make war 
upon the civilian inhabitants of the occupied territory but to 
protect them in the peaceful exercise of the legitimate 
pursuits in so far as the exigencies of war and their own 
behaviour will permit, and
WHEREAS in order to preserve law and order and provide for 
the safety and welfare of my troops and of yourselves, it is 
necessary to establish Military Government in the occupied 
territory,
NOW, therefore, I, Harold R.L.G. Alexander, GCB, CSI, DSO, MC, 
General, General Officer Commanding the Allied Forces in 
Sicily and Military Governor of the Territories Occupied, by 
virtue of the Authority vested in me by General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, Commander in Chief of the Allied forces in the 
North African Theatre of Operations do hereby proclaim as 
follows:
I. All powers of government and jurisdiction in the occupied 
territory and over its inhabitants and final administrative 
responsibility are vested in me as General Officer Commanding 
and Military Governor, and the Allied Military Government of 
Occupied Territory is established to exercise these powers 
under my direction.
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II. All persons in the occupied territory will promptly obey 
all orders given by me or under my authority and must refrain 
from all acts hostile to the troops under my command or 
helpful to our enemies, from all acts of violence, and from 
any act calculated to disturb public order in any way.
III. Your existing personal and property rights will be fully 
respected and your existing laws will remain in force and 
effect, except in so far as it may be necessary for me in the 
discharge of my duties as General Officer Commanding the
Allied Forces and as Military Governor to change or supersede 
them by proclamation or order issued by me or under my 
direction.
IV. All Italian civil and criminal courts and all 
universities, schools and educational establishments will be 
closed until further order of the Allied Military Government.
V. All administrative and judicial officials of the province 
and communes, and all other government and municipal 
functionaries and employees, and all officers and employees of 
state, municiapal or other public services, except such 
officials and political leaders as are removed by me, are
required to continue in the performance of their duties, 
subject to my direction or the direction of such of my 
officers of the Allied Forces as may be deputed for that 
purpose.
VI. Further proclamations, orders and regulations issued by me 
or under my authority from time to time will specify what is 
further required of you, and what you are forbidden to do, and
these will be displayed in court houses, police stations and
other public places.
VII. So long as you remain peaceable and comply with my 
orders, you will be subject to no greater interference than
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may be inevitable in view of military exigencies and may go 
about your normal vocations without fear.
Dated: 10 July 1943.
Later Proclamations
2. War Crimes - punishable offences against Allied Forces
3. Currency and Exchange
4. Establishment of Allied Courts
5. Closure of Financial Institutions
6. Control of Allied and Enemy Property
7. Dissolution of Fascist Organisations
8. Wages and Agricultural Regulations
9. Publication of the Sicily Gazette
10. Financial Regulations
11. General Police and Security Regulations
12. Allied Military Lire as Legal Currency
13. Legal Rights of the Italian People
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